Information

Dercylidas (fl.411-394 BC)


Dercylidas (fl.411-394 BC)

Deryclidas (fl.411-394 BC) was a Spartan general best known for his campaigns against the Persians during the Persian-Spartan War (400-387 BC).

Dercylidas first appears in the spring of 411, during the Great Peloponnesian War, when he was sent to the Hellespont to try and stir up revolts against Athenian authority. He was able to stir up revolts in Abydos and Lampsacus, on the Asian side of the Dardanelle, although the Athenian commander Strombichides was quickly able to retake Lampsacus.

Dercylidas served as harmost of Abydos while Lysander was in command of the Spartan war effort. During this period he was humiliated by the Persian satrap Pharnabazus, having had to stand guard duty with his shield as a result of a report from the satrap.

He next appears in 399, during the Persian-Spartan War. The first Spartan commander in Asia Minor, Thibron, was considered too lax, and he was replaced by Dercylidas.

His first act was to arrange a truce with the satrap Tissaphernes so that he could concentrate his efforts against the hated Pharnabazus. In his first campaign in Aeolis he is said to have captured nine cities in eight days, and taken the treasure of Queen Mania, a recently murdered satrap of Dardanus. At the end of the campaigning season of 399 he arranged a truce with Pharnabazus and spent the winter of 399-398 campaigning in Bithynia.

In the spring of 398 he moved to Lampsacus, where he met commissioners from Sparta who confirmed him in his post for another year, and commented on the superior discipline of the army under his command compared to that of Thibron.

The commissioners also informed him that the Greek communities of the Thracian Chersonese (Gallipoli) were asking for aid against the Thracians. Dercylidas crossed over to the Chersonese and built a wall across the peninsula to protect its inhabitants against raids. He then crossed back into Asia and besieged Atarneus, then held by a group of Chian exiles.

In 397 the Ionian Greeks sent ambassadors to Sparta asking for help against Tissaphernes and suggesting that a Spartan attack on his lands in Caria might convince the satrap to acknowledge the independence of the Ionian Greeks. Dercylidas was ordered to carry out this invasion and led his troops against Tissaphernes.

This triggered a rare period of cooperation between the satraps. The Spartans found themselves facing the combined forces of Tissaphernes (recently appointed overall commander in the area) and Pharnabazus, but no battle took place. Tissaphernes had been at Cunaxa, and had no interest in attacking a strong force of hoplites in a good defensive position. Instead peace talks began, although neither side appears to have been interested in making any confessions. Dercylidas demanded that the Persians should leave the Greek cities of Asia Minor alone, while the Persians demanded that the Spartans should withdraw their troops and their governors from the area. Both sides then agreed to put these terms to their home governments.

During this brief truce news reached Sparta of a Persian plan to prepare a fleet of 300 triremes in Phoenicia. In response Agesilaus II was sent to Asia Minor at the head of a sizable army. Dercylidas remained in Asia long enough to act as one of three commissions during Agesilaus's brief truce with Tissaphernes. He served under Agesilaus for a brief period after this, and took part in an successful ambush of Mysians who had attempted to attack his column in some narrow valleys. He then returned to Sparta.

In 394 he was sent to bring the news of the fighting around Corinth and the inconclusive Spartan victory at the battle of Nemea to Agesilaus (Corinthian War). He caught up with the king at Amphipolis during his march back into Greece from Asia Minor. Dercylidas then agreed to carry the same news to Sparta's allies in the area. Shortly afterwards the Spartan fleet was destroyed at Cnidus, and many of Sparta's allies in Asia Minor and the Hellespont area changed sides. One of the few exceptions was Abydos, where Dercylidas was able to maintain Spartan control.

Dercylidas was said to have been rough but cunning, unmarried, and very happy to be away from Sparta.


Essayist-Lawyer

You may recall that the Peloponnesians had made an alliance with Persia by agreeing to cede all of Asian Greece to the Persian Empire. It was a shameful betrayal of the Greek cause, and the Athenians would no doubt have been outraged by it if they had not been equally willing to the the same thing. Presumably no one actually expected the deal to hold they simply wanted a tactical alliance to defeat a common enemy before going to war with each other. Be that as it may, the Persians were not immediately in a position to collect on the deal because their emperor died shortly after the end of the war and Persia was consumed with civil war between two of his sons. The Spartans backed Prince Cyrus and sent a mercenary force to fight for him. This force included Xenophon and was the subject of his most famous work, the Anabasis, but it does not concern me here.

With Persia distracted, (circa 402-401 BC), the Spartans set out to settle a grudge with the city of Elis. Elis, though in the Peloponnese and therefore Sparta's own backyard, was a democracy, had formed an alliance with Athens and Argos earlier during the war, and had grossly insulted the Spartans by barring them from the Olympics and by beating one of their Elders* when he entered a chariot driven by a Theban. Besides, Elis had subordinated a number of smaller neighboring cities and was starting to look like a mini-hegemon. Sparta's dominance was strong enough that all the mainland Greeks except Thebes and Corinth, but including Athens, joined. They received potential assistance from an oligarchic faction, led by a very rich man, who led a slaughter of democrats, including a man who resembled the leader of the democratic faction. This started to put the democrats to route, but in fact the democratic leader was drunk and sleeping it off. When his followers realized he was still alive, they rallied and forced the oligarchs to take refuge with the invaders. The end of the war was mixed. Elis was forced to give up all subordinate cities, but kept its democracy.

Meanwhile (circa 400 BC), Persia's civil war had ended with Cyrus, the Greek candidate, being killed. The southern satrap, Tissaphernes, who had been on the opposite side, was in a position to enforce the original treaty with Sparta and demanded that Ionia submit to his rule. We have no information on whether Ionia had shaken off the decarchies or, if so, how far they had begun to recover. Whatever the case, they had little choice but to appeal to Sparta for aid. The Spartans sent a force consisting of 1000 freed helots and 4000 allies, commanded by Tibron. When they asked Athens for troops, the Athenians sent 300 cavalry who had supported the Thirty, hoping they would not return. He fought with considerable success, capturing cities or persuading them to defect, but was then ordered to head south. However, he also plundered allied land and was therefore recalled (and later exiled), and replaced with Dercylidas. Dercylidas promptly made a truce with Tissaphernes (presumably requiring him to leave Ionia alone for the time being) and instead headed north to fight Pharnabazus, the rival satrap, who had been a loyal ally in the previous war, but had insulted Dercylidas personally, so he held a grudge.

Heading north, Dercylidas fought with considerable success, winning nine cities in eight days before stopping for the winter. That spring (398 BC), he met with ambassadors from the Cheronese (the peninsula on the north side of the Hellespont) whose lands were being plundered by the Thracians. He drove the Thracians out and built a wall across the isthmus, thus protecting the peninsula and allowing it to prosper. Xenophon also reports that he took messengers from the southern cities and found them "peaceful and prosperous," which seems unlikely, given the decarchies Lysander had imposed and the ordeal of getting rid of them.** But in 397 BC, the Ionians sent ambassadors warning that they were once again being menaced by Tissaphernes and asking for help, so Dercylidas headed south again. The sides prepared for battle, but Tissaphernes was intimidated and sought a conference. At it, the Greeks demanded independence for the Asian Greek cities, while the Persians demanded the withdrawal of the Greek army and Spartan garrisons. Each side conveyed the proposal to their respective governments.

Xenophon described the Asian campaign in detail because he was almost certainly present indeed, it contains a reference to himself. But he makes no mention whatever of another very important development that was taking place at about the same time. Remember Conon? The Athenian admiral present at the city's final and utter defeat? Fled to Cyprus, rather than return home and face the music? Well, during the truce with Dercylidas, the satrap Pharnabazus persuaded the Persian king that he needed a Greek commander for his navy and then sailed to Cyprus and persuaded Conon to take the job. Conon began gathering forces as Pharnabazus headed for the mainland to join Tissaphernes to meet Dercylidas and the Greeks. The Spartans countered by making an alliance with Egypt and setting out to build their own navy. They attempted to blockade Conon, but Conon escaped, sailed to Rhodes (far south of Asian Greece, see map above), and incited a revolt.

Xenophon does not mention any of this, only that in Sparta (396 BC) there were rumors of a Phoenician fleet of 300 ships setting sail. But presumably these developments had something to do with why the Spartans raised a force of 2000 freed helots, 6000 allies, and 30 citizens, commanded by their new king Agesilaus, with Lysander second in command. It is here that Xenophon first mentions the decarchies that Lysander set up, saying that he hoped to restore them. On the way, he wanted to make sacrifice at Aulis (near Thebes), as Agamemnon had when sailing to Troy, but the Thebans refused. At first he simply gained an extension of the truce and continuation of negotiations. Xenophon also acknowledges that many of the Asian Greek cities were in a state of "confusion," their decarchies overthrown, but the democracies not restored. Lysander being better known in Asia than the king Agesilaus, everyone approaching him instead of the king. Agesilaus and his council resented this and responded by refusing any request Lysander made. Egos clashed, and Agesilaus sent Lysander north, to the Hellespont. Lysander was ultimately recalled to Sparta.

Agesilaus stayed and waged war, more successfully in the mountains, where infantry had the advantage, than on the plains, where advantage lay with the cavalry. While wintering over, he began to raise his own cavalry. He made raids deep into Persian territory, taking many captives and much booty. He advanced inland as far as Sardis (see map), which was definitely Persian territory (Greeks were seafarers and lived along the coastline). Tissaphernes was present at Sardis at the time, leading the Persians to suspect collusion. He was executed (no sorrow on the part of the Greeks!) and replaced with Tithraustes. Tithraustes persuaded Agesilaus to head north again, into Pharnabazus' territory and offered to pay his army's expenses if he did. Xenophon then mentions, rather off-handedly, that the Spartan authorities placed Agesilaus in command of the navy, and that he set the cities to work building ships and placed his brother-in-law, Peisander in command, although he was lacking experience. Not mentioning the navy Conon was raising or the revolt in Rhodes rather downplays the importance of naval matters! Agesilaus then returned with his land campaign. He may have downplayed the importance of naval matters as well.

The Persians, unable to dislodge the Greek army, sought to force it to leave by stirring up trouble in Greece. Xenophon reports that they sent a Rhodian to bribe politicians in Thebes, Corinth and Argos to start a war on Sparta. Athens did not need a bribe the desire to resume their former power was sufficient. The Thebans then stirred up a war between two smaller neighbors, the Phocians and the Locrians and intervened on behalf of the Phocians by invading Locris. The Spartans had a lot of old grudges with Thebes and were eager to intervene on the other side. Plutarch, incidentally, is skeptical of this version, offering it as one alternative, against the other, that the war began on its own without outside intervention, that Lysander was angry at the Thebans for claiming a share of the spoils of war and for giving refuge to Athenians fleeing the Thirty, and that he persuaded the Ephors to go to war with Thebes. Threatened with invasion, the Thebans sought alliance with Athens. This was a bit awkward, since after Athens' defeat, it was the Thebans who had called for Carthaginian (or, the Greeks might have said, Melian) terms, and the Spartans who opposed them, but the Thebans blamed that on the individual delegate and pointed out that the Spartans had, after all, set up the Thirty and the Thebans given refuge to Athenians fleeing them, and pointed to the decarchies*** Lysander had imposed, and other complaints as well. The Athenians agreed, despite their still-weakened condition nine years after the end of the last war.

Lysander gathered a local force under his command, while king Pausanias (the Spartans, you may recall, had two kings), marched north with a Spartan force. Lysander attacked the city of Harliartus (see map above), a local city with a Theban garrison, without waiting for Pausanians' force to arrive. According to Plutarch, Lysander wrote to Pausanias to inform him of his plans, but the message was intercepted and the king therefore did not know Lysander was attacking Haliartus. In any event, Lysander did not wait, but launched a direct attack on the wall. Theban forces came to the city's relief, Lysander was killed, and his army routed to the hills. Pausanias arrived too late to come to the rescue. Anything he might have accomplished was thwarted when the Athenian force showed up. Lysander's body was too close to the wall to recover by force, his army was scattered, the allies were dispirited. Pausanias therefore requested a truce to recover the bodies. This was considered an admission of defeat. The Thebans refused unless the army agreed to withdraw, which it did. This was unheard-of. Requests for a truce to recover bodies were always granted unconditionally. As the Peloponnesian army retreated, the Thebans harassed anyone who set a single foot of the road.

When Pausanias returned home, he was criminally charged with failing to show up on time, with agreeing to the truce, and with allowing the restoration of the Athenian democracy (which was beginning to re-assert itself in foreign policy for the first time since its defeat). He fled for his life and was sentenced to death in abstentia. Apparently Athenians were not the only ones with the deplorable habit of criminally charging defeated generals. The restoration of democracy in Athens would not be the only time Pausanias would prove himself "soft" on democracy. In exile he would be on "friendly terms" with the popular party in Mantinea and interceded with his son not to execute them after they were defeated in a later war.

The year was now 395 B.C. The Corinthian War was on. And my blogging on Ancient Greek history will stop for a while as I learn about the endless, sordid wars in which the Greeks wore each other down until the Macedonians came in and ended their system of sovereign and independent city-states. I mean to return to contemporary topics now, but also to put up a few posts on Classical Greece in general, not related to the failure of democracy, but simply about the fascinating things I have learned along the way.

_______________________________________________
*Presumably meaning a member of the Council of Elders and not just an old man.
**Grote interprets this phrase to mean that the Persians were not bothering them, and not to address their domestic condition.
***These decarchies are referred to in the present tense. Grote takes this as evidence that some of them still continued as late as 395 BC. My version of the Hellenica takes this to mean that Xenophon was trying to show up the Thebans as bald-faced liars.


ALL I NEED IS MY PASSPORT

Did you know that the story of the Trojan Wars was told in a set of 12 narratives titled the Epic Cycle, which possibly dates from the eighth to the sixth centuries BCE. The Illiad and the Odyssey are the only complete works remaining. Regarding Troy, I would like to quote from Eric H. Cline’s book The Trojan War, A Very Short Introduction.

Is Homer’s story convincing? “Certainly the heroes, from Achilles to Hector, are portrayed so credibly that it is easy to believe the story. But is it truly an account based on real events, and were the main characters actually real people? Would the ancient world’s equivalent of the entire nation of Greece really have gone to war over a single woman, however beautiful, and for ten long years at that? Could Agamemnon really have been a king of kings able to muster so many men for such an expedition? And, even if one believes that there once was an actual Trojan War, does that mean that the specific events, actions, and descriptions in Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey, supplemented by additional fragments and commentary in the Epic Cycle, are historically accurate and can be taken at face value? Is it plausible that what Homer describes took place and in the way that he says it did?”

While the people of Troy were called Trojans, the city itself had two names Troy and Ilios. Ilios is used six times in the Epic Cycle, and the words are interchangeable. The Wilusa is the Hittite name for Troy, they occupied Anatolya in 1600 BC

Most Turks have yet to forgive Schliemann for smuggling Trojan treasures out of the country. The Turkish government is still trying to retrieve the hoard from the Pushkin Museum in Moscow.

There are scholars that have been studying this for eons, and while there is interesting proof, without a time machine, we may never understand the true picture.

What we do know is that the town of Troy does exist and that some of the most important figures in history have walked through it.

In 480 BC, the Persian king Xerxes sacrificed 1,000 cattle at the sanctuary of Athena Ilias while marching through the Hellespontine region towards Greece.

Alexander the Great visited the site in 334 BC and there made sacrifices at tombs associated with the Homeric heroes Achilles and Patroclus.

In 399 BC, the Spartan general Dercylidas expelled the Greek garrison at Ilion who were controlling the city on behalf of the Lampsacene dynasts.

The city was destroyed by the Roman general Fimbria, in 85 BC following an eleven-day siege.

In 20 BC, Emperor Augustus visited Ilion and stayed in the house of a leading citizen, Melanippides son of Euthydikos.

Heinrich Schliemann’s excavations were condemned by later archaeologists as having destroyed the main layers of the real Troy. Kenneth W. Harl in the Teaching Company’s Great Ancient Civilizations of Asia Minor lecture series sarcastically claims that Schliemann’s excavations were carried out with such rough methods that he did to Troy what the Greeks couldn’t do in their times, destroying and leveling down the entire city walls to the ground. Other scholars agree that the damage caused to the site is irreparable. After Schliemann, the site was further excavated under the direction of Wilhelm Dörpfeld (1893–94) and later Carl Blegen (1932–38). These excavations have shown that there were at least nine cities built, one on top of each other, at this site.

The odeon (theater) dates to the Roman Troy IX and was renovated by Hadrian in 124 AD.

The ancient walls of Troy

The Northeast Bastion or guard tower is from Troy VI 17th-15th Centuries BC

Original Foundation Stones belonging to Troy II and III – 2500 BC

The Ramp is part of Troy II, possibly to overcome elevation changes.

The Sanctuary where Xerxes sacrificed �” cows, possibly dates to the 7th century BC

A future museum of Troy, being built on “Turkish Time”, I must think that it, like the Acropolis Museum in Athens, is being built in the hopes that the treasures will return one day.

Amphora and water pipes of ancient Troy

The area surrounding Troy is fertile and beautiful

To reach Troy you must take a ferry across the Dardanelles to the fishing town of Çannakale and then drive a few miles through the countryside.

Photo opportunities on the Ferry

Directly across the Narrows of the Dardanelles, Çannakale Boğazi in Turkish, lies the fortress of Kilitbahir, the Lock of the Sea. Kilitbahir was built by Sultan Mehmet II, the Conqueror, in 1452.

One of many monuments to the Gallipoli Campaign, also known as the Dardanelles Campaign. The Battle of Gallipoli was a campaign of World War I that took place on the Gallipoli peninsula in the Ottoman Empire during WWI, between April of 1915 and January 1916. The campaign was one of the greatest Ottoman victories during the war. In Turkey, it is regarded as a defining moment in the nation’s history: a final surge in the defense of the motherland as the Ottoman Empire crumbled.

It is thought that there were at nine Troys, built on top of each other, seven of these have been documented.


ARTAXERXES II

ARTAXERXES II, Achaemenid Great King whose personal name is given as Arsaces (Ctesias F 14 apud Photius 469.28 in Jacoby, Fragmente) or Arsicas (Ctesias F 15a, apud Plutarch, Artoxerxes 1.4, etc.) or as Oarsēs (for ho Ársēs?) by Dino (F 14 [Jacoby], apud Plutarch, loc. cit.). He was the oldest son of Darius II and Parysatis, thus a grandson of Artaxerxes I. His reign (405-04 to 359-58 B.C.) was the longest among the Achaemenids. Greek authors, beginning with Plutarch, give him the epithet Mnēmō &ldquoRemembering, Having a good memory&rdquo the Old Persian form of this seems attested in the Greek gloss abiataka.mnḗmona.Pérsai (Hesychius A-123 L., corrected from abiltaka since J. Oppert, Le peuple et la langue des Mèdes, Paris, 1879, p. 229 n. 1). Artaxerxes II was born before his father&rsquos accession, ca. 453 or 445 (if his life-span is taken as 86 or 94 years cf. Artoxerxes 2.4 Ctesias F 15, par. 51 Ps.-Lucian, Macrobii and Dino F 20a in the same text). He had an older sister, Amestris, and younger brothers&mdashCyrus, Ostanes (Ctesias: Artostes), Oxathres (Ctesias: Oxendras), and others (Ctesias F 15, par. 51 Artoxerxes 1.2, 5.5). He was first married to Stateira, daughter of Idernes (Ctesias F 15, par. 55 Artoxerxes 5.6).

When Darius II died in 405-04 B.C., Artaxerxes was appointed king in accordance with his father&rsquos wish. Parysatis had favored Cyrus, who was born in the purple and so would have been the legitimate successor (Xenophon, Anabasis 1.1.3 Diodorus 13.108.1 Artoxerxes 2.4-5 Justin 5.11.1-2). Cyrus, who was satrap of the western provinces of Asia Minor, took part in a conspiracy against his brother at the coronation ceremony at Pasargadae but the plot went wrong (Ctesias F 16, par. 59 Artoxerxes 3.1-6 Justin 5.11.3-4). At Parysatis&rsquo request Cyrus was pardoned he was reappointed to his satrapy (Anabasis 1.1.3 Artoxerxes 3.6, 6.7). In 401 Cyrus rebelled again and moved on Babylon with a force that included 10,000 Greek mercenaries (in abundant supply since the end of the Peloponnesian war in 404). At the crucial battle of Cunaxa in Mesopotamia, Cyrus fell at the hand of a Carian soldier, although the official record credited this deed to Artaxerxes (Anabasis 1 Ctesias, F 16 Diodorus 14.19.2-24.6 Artoxerxes 6.2-13.7 Georgius Syncellus 1.485.14ff. D. Justin 5.11.5-11). An authentic account of these events is given in Xenophon&rsquos Anabasis, whose main subject, however, is the subsequent retreat of the Greek 10,000. Their escape clearly indicated the empire&rsquos debility (cf. Artoxerxes 20.1-2). Another eyewitness was Ctesias of Cnidus, for some years (perhaps 405-04 to 398-97 B.C.) physician to the Great King&rsquos family (ibid. 1.4 cf. Jacoby, Fragmente, no. 688). Ctesias healed Artaxerxes&rsquo wounds at Cunaxa.

This succession dispute led, further, to hostilities between Artaxerxes (represented by his satraps Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus) and Sparta, whose forces were led by the generals Thibro, Dercylidas, and Agesilaus. Sparta had sided with Cyrus. For some years (400-394) the fortunes of war wavered but in August, 394 B.C., Conon of Athens, admiral of the Persian fleet, gained a decisive victory at Cnidus (Xenophon, Hellenica 4.3.10-12 Diodorus 14.-83.5-7 Cornelius Nepos, Conon). A settlement was then reached in 387-86, called the king&rsquos peace or (after Sparta&rsquos ambassador) the peace of Antalcidas. The terms were favorable to the Persians. Artaxerxes dictated, with threat of war, that the Greek poleis of Asia Minor and the islands of Clazomenae and Cyprus should be Persian the other poleis (except for the ancient Athenian possessions of Lemnus, Imbrus, and Scyrus) should be autonomous (cf. Hellenica 5.1.31 and Diodorus 14.110.3). Thus was secured both Persian power in Asia Minor and Persian influence in Greece itself.

The main task of Artaxerxes&rsquo entire reign was the maintaining of the empire&rsquos frontiers. At Artaxerxes&rsquo accession Egypt had rebelled, and a local dynasty ruled in virtual independence. The Achaemenid campaign of 389-87 B.C. failed, and in 380-79 the king began to plan a new expedition using Greek mercenaries. The attack was carried out in 374-73 but failed, due to disagreement between the leaders Pharnabazus and

Iphicrates of Athens (cf. Cornelius Nepos, Iphicrates). Another failure was the campaign against the Cadusii which the king himself led (Artoxerxes 24.2-25.3). Successful undertakings included the war against King Euagoras of Salamis (Cyprus), ended in 381 B.C., and the repression of rebels in Ionia, Paphlagonia, and elsewhere. An especially great danger was posed by the Satraps&rsquo Revolt (ca. 368-58). Satrapies had by then become in part hereditary. Some of the western satraps, from Egypt to Bithynia and from Caria to Syria, formed a coalition against the central government and minted their own coins. Prominent rebels were Datames of Cappadocia (see Cornelius Nepos&rsquo biography) and Ariobarzanes of Phrygia they were later joined by Autophradates of Lycia, initially one of the king&rsquos most reliable followers, and Pharaoh Tachos. The latter, confronted by a rising at home, deserted the cause and surrendered to the king. The entire revolt was suppressed, but some of the satraps were pardoned and allowed to return to their satrapies. (See especially the account in W. Judeich, Kleinasiatische Studien. Untersuchungen zur griechisch-persischen Geschichte des IV. Jahrhunderts v. Chr., Marburg, 1892.)

Plutarch praises Artaxerxes as just, mild, and affable (cf. Diodorus 15.93.1, Cornelius Nepos, De regibus 1.4). Yet he seems to have been effeminate, enervated, and easily influenced&mdashweak, but also cruel and mistrustful, engulfed as he was in harem intrigues. Vigor was displayed only at the moment of need thus he was late in deciding to fight a decisive battle with Cyrus, but then he took part personally (Anabasis 1.7.9, 17 1.8.22ff. Artoxerxes 7-13). The inner vigor of the empire&rsquos administration was weakened by his inefficiency and if many of his troubles came to a favorable end, it was due to such able men around him as Tissaphernes, Pharnabazus, Autophradates, and, not least, his son Ochus, the subsequent Artaxerxes III. Particularly strong influences at court were those of Parysatis, who had little liking for her eldest son (Anabasis 1.1.4, Artoxerxes 2.3) and Stateira. These were enemies from the time of the king&rsquos accession and vied in securing executions (Ctesias F 15-l6, 27, pars. 56, 58ff., 68ff. Artoxerxes 6.6-8, 14.9-17.9). Parysatis at last succeeded in poisoning Stateira (ca. 400 B.C.) and was removed from Susa to Babylon, but she soon recovered her influence on the king (Ctesias F 27, par. 70 Artoxerxes 19, 23.1-2).

Artaxerxes next married one of his daughters, Atossa (Artoxerxes 23.3-5) he is said to have also had 360 concubines (ibid., 27.2). Another daughter was Amestris, whom Heraclides Cumaeus asserts was likewise married to the king (ibid., 23.6, 27.8) others included Apamā and Rhodogune (27.8). Of his three known legitimate sons (Justin 10.1.1 ), Darius was made co-regent (and so recognized as heir-apparent) at the age of 50 but he was later executed for conspiracy (Artoxerxes 26-29). Ochus eventually removed his other brother Ariaspes (Justin, Ariaratus), as well as the illegitimate Arsames (ibid., 30.1-8). The king is said to have had 115 sons by his concubines (Justin, loc. cit.).

The last dating for Artaxerxes II is day 10, month 8, regnal year 46 (Ungnad, Vorderasiatische Schriftdenkmäler, Leipzig, 1908, VI, no. 186 see Weissbach, ZDMG 62, 1908, pp. 646-47). This is year 389 of the Babylonian Nabonassar era (beginning in November, 360 B.C.). Shortly after, in 359-58, the king died. Thus Plutarch&rsquos 62 years for the reign (Artoxerxes 30.9), Diodorus&rsquo 43 years (13.108.1), etc., must be wrong. One may not assume an independent reign before accession to the throne, although Artaxerxes may have received the title of king during his father&rsquos lifetime (ca. 421 B.C.).

Artaxerxes left trilingual inscriptions at Susa, one [A 2 Sa] on the restoration of Darius&rsquo palace (Kent, Old Persian, p. 154 additions and corrections by M. -J. Steve in Studia Iranica 4, 1975, pp. 7-18), one [A 2 Sb] on a column base (Kent, p. 154), and a further building inscription [A 2 Sd] (ibid.). The Old Persian fragment A 2 Sc is from a stone tablet. One Elamite and two Akkadian fragments also come from Susa (&ldquoA 2 Se&rdquo and &ldquoA 2 Sf&rdquo published in F. H. Weissbach, Die Keilinschriften der Achämeniden, Leipzig, 1911, pp. 125, 127 [&ldquoArt. Susa d-e&rdquo] &ldquoA 2 Sg&rdquo ed. V. Scheil, MDAFP 24, 1933, p. 129 no. 31). Further evidence for this king&rsquos building activities, with which the inscriptions are chiefly concerned, is found in the several inscriptions at Hamadān, ancient Ecbatana: A 2 Ha is a trilingual text partially identical with A 2 Sa the building inscription A 2 Hb occurs on a column of the palace while A 2 Hc is a gold foundation tablet. It is notable that Artaxerxes in his inscription invokes Mithra and Anāhitā as well as Ahura Mazdā. This agrees with Berossus&rsquo remark (F 11 [Jacoby]) that under Artaxerxes II, idols (especially those of Anaitis) were introduced for worship throughout the empire.

The Arsacid dynasty of the Parthian empire claimed to derive their lineage from Arsaces/Artaxerxes II, according to Georgius Syncellus (1.539.16f. D.). This claim can be taken seriously, considering the name Artax&scaronahrakan applied to a royal vineyard mentioned in the Nisa documents (P. Gignoux, Glossaire des inscriptions pehlevies et parthes, Corp. Inscr. Iran., Suppl. Ser. I, London, 1972, p. 46b).

See also, for coinage, the works listed under Artaxerxes I: Babelon, pls. II.8-11.

British Museum Catalogue, pls. XXV.12-13.

Fragments of the Greek historians are cited according to F. Jacoby, Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker, Berlin, 1923-58.


Helen of Troy and the Trjoan War

It would be convenient for Hatusa to be the actual city Troy is based on. But the city of Troy is called Ilium, and that is where the Iliad takes its title, and Ilium is Wilusa in Hittite.

Helen of Troy, I would guess is not a real historical figure simply because she is used as a Mcguffin in the Iliad - a plot device to motivate the conflict.

Matthew Amt

Irony, I just wrote about this on another website. Helen of Troy is so ancient she shares legends with Deirdre of Irish myth. She seems to be tied into the classical youth legend as well. that is what gave rise to Cuchulainn, Achilles, Rustam, a guy from India whose name is too long for me to remember, and I've been told there is a Norse version as well.

If there is a candidate for any part of Troy being a real city, my candidate is the capital of the Hittites.

As for the girl, maybe six thousand years ago a young wife ran off with a handsome interloper and the story was built on it over the generations. To me the most interesting thing is how similar the two stories are in their most pagan forms. Helen was conceived in water, Deirdre's real father may have been Manannan mac Lir god ot the sea. The young heroes Cuchulainn and Achilles are a part of the story..magical horses. Maeve and Athena could be sisters in warfare. Cuchulainn kills his son, Apollo kills Achilles' son, and Rustam kills his son.

Deirdre chooses her beautiful lover and kills herself when he is slain by the king, Helen just flashes her breasts and saves herself from Menelaus' sword.

(Lugh Lamfada and Perseus share an origins story as well)

Helen is clearly a mythical lady to explain a war story's origins. By the way. by being married to Helen, Menelaus escaped the gloomy after life all the other Greek heroes suffered upon their deaths. Interesting thought that.

Not to be picking on *you*, bedb, but I'm always a little curious at literary analysis like this. It seems sad that a whole segment of academia is dedicated to dismissing any possibility of reality in ancient stories. A little arrogant, too! But the premise in "linking" all these story tropes seems to be that they all spring from the same source in the much farther distant past. And that each culture just embellished or changed names or changed details, keeping the same old re-used core story.

So the only conclusion has to be that after about 6000 BC, nothing happened! Since all the epics of heroes and burning cities and stolen women come from much farther back in time, none of the great cultures of the Bronze Age actually *experienced* anything like that, right? Or they would have told their *own* stories, rather than recycle what they heard from Grandpa, right? So because the Mycenaneans were the only people to tell of their great kings and heroes and the epic of Helen and the Fall of Troy, we can blithely dismiss it, because it's just last week's reruns.

Because we KNOW there were great cities and citadels, and we know that many were besieged and sacked and burned. We have graves of mighty warriors full of weapons and gold. We have evidence of empires and migrations and armies, and even records and letters. So SOMEthing must have been going on! And just like all of us remember, for instance, the biggest snowstorm in our lives, or the worst traffic accident we've ever seen, every generation of every one of those cultures would have stories of the Biggest War they knew, or how a foreign prince ran off with their queen.

The Trojan War often gets described as a series of trade wars spanning a decade. Yet I remember reading recently that there is a curious lack of evidence for Troy (the Hissarlik site) being some major trade center in the Late Bronze Age. Sure, it seems to be in a good place for that! But who knows? Maybe it was attacked and burned because one of its princes ran off with a Greek queen? Stranger things have happened!

Why should we start the study of a particular point in time by dismissing the major written sources about it as fantasy?

Sure, the Iliad has characters that might resemble those of other times and places--Every culture has heroes! Should we deny a society its Caesars and Queen Elizabeths and Alexanders and Hitlers just because some other culture also had them? Just seems odd, to me.

Well, I'm frothing a bit! But yes, there is a lot of archeology and some written evidence behind the story of the Trojan War. We are a LONG way from proving that it happened or that any of the characters were REAL, much less that Homer portrayed everything accurately. (Which was not his goal, of course!) It doesn't help that the chronology is a mess and many of the dates are wrong.

I'm just not ready to pass it all off as myth.

Calebxy

I understand it is difficult for some people to accept that the IndoEuropeans and IndoIranians/Vedic Indians come from one family and share similar stories, but to me that is what makes history all the more fascinating and tragic in many ways.

My specialty is horses and the history and associated with them. You cannot study Dub Samhain and Liath Macha without Cuchulainn. Bailus and Xanthus without Achilles, Rakush without Rustam. The IndoEuropeans. more specifically the Celts. and the IndoAryans/Vedic Indians domesticated the horse. All horses descend from one stallion. All of them..from the mythical Arabian to the Chincoteague pony.

The family split up between 4,000 and 2,000 BC. The Vedic Indians became exceptional horse breeders and charioteers. They were so great the Hittites adopted their word for horse. Ashva (VI) to Aswa (H) One of the oldest 'books' on horse training was written in cuniform by Kikulli. it stunned researchers because this book was the written in the Sanskrit language using cuniform. The tablet was discovered in the ruins of Hatusa. (The Egyptians loved Mittani horses. check out Nefertiti and Akhenaton's chariot horses)

I love mythology and by all means look for Troy if the current ruins do not meet your requirements, but to me the Hittites were the breeders of horses on a great plain. They arrived on the scene at a time when people didn't have horses. These were the stealth bombers of the ancient world. Acquiring horse became the objective of EVERYONE. Hard to imagine the Mittani actually actually conquering the Assyrians, but they did. Once the Assyrians got horses the Mittani left (for India I presume). only another horse people the Medes after many failed attempts could beat them. The burning of the Assyrian cities would also make good candidates for Troy. not saying they were but burning cities were not unusual back then.

There are myths that intrigue me to no ends, and I do believe there is a grain of truth to these stories. Is the great palace at Knossos the one Minos lived in? Was there an ancient war between Athens and Minos? when I was a kid the Minoans were described as a gentle people who suddenly disappeared (same was said about Mayans). Archeology has smashed those beliefs in the head.

So we have an ancient story that was created back before the Indo Europeans separated. Some chieftain several thousands of years later has a young wife who runs off with her boyfriend (this exact thing happened in Sparta with Chilonis and Acrotatus) and the old jilted man starts a war by inviting Pyrrhus to Sparta. The beautiful prince (if we are to believe the gratfiti at Olympus) holds the powerful Macedonian at bay and saves the day. He doesn't live long and dies in war. (sounds a little like the Iliad to me) Acrotatus did steal his uncle's wife..he did fight the Macedonians and he did die a young man leaving behind a pregnant wife. And Helen was from Sparta so this story would have resonated with them.

I also majored in English and History of the English language was my love. Words are so incredible. When I learned that the old Irish word Tuatha (people) shared a similarity with the Hittite word for people Teute,I even wondered if maybe the Hittites with their Saka slaves/body guards were the first IEs to arrive in Ireland. Danu is Scythian for river, and the Vedic Indians have a myth that Danu was sliced open and all the rivers of the world poured forth from her body. Among the Celts/Irish rivers have female names. I'll stop there, I can go on about rivers if I don't catch myself.

It does not surprise me that these stories are identical (yes small variations), and most assuredly someone ran off with someone's wife, but the Iliad, Deirdre and Neisi (which by the way no one knows what that name means although it does have a meaning in Hittite. not saying but it does give me pleasure to contemplate it)

Right now people are trying to prove King Arthur exists. I don't believe in him outside of some Welsh and even Greek myths. Making a man look like his rival was popular in the Heracles story. But I would never say stop looking for Camelot or Arthur. That would be a sin in my opinion. I'll probably look until the day I die for a Hittite/Irish connection. I also believe the Egyptians visited Great Britain at the time of Stonehenge, and that the occasional Roman visited China during the Tang Dynasty. I also believe the Tocharians were Celtic and introduced the horse to China and Mongolia (OK that is cheating..I asked Dr Mair at the University of Pennsylvania about this and he and JP Mallory wrote books on the subject)

People are connected, ideas shared. And the old story tellers like Homer whoever he was tried their best to pass these tales down unchanged. It was a source of pride to them. They found a man in Turkey among the nomadics back in the sixties who told a story that the researchers knew had not been changed in hundreds of years. It was a craft that has slowly died out.

Tulius

I am one of those that want to think that Agamemnon and the other characters were real. But I won’t give that step unless there are at least some evidence about it. Until there it is a question mark.

Bebd, it is only difficult for the others if you don’t supply sources to support your thesis.

You have some appealing ideas, and some elaborated constructions, but without some evidence I think it would be difficult to you to bring another paradigm to light. We must recall that without sources we don’t have history, we just have question marks.

Aristodemus

We'll never know if Helen was real or not, but as someone else has already suggested, we do know from archeology that Troy was real.

They call Troy the city of 9 lives, as archeologist have peeled away 9 settlements on top of one another. They believe that Troy VII was Homer's Troy as they found it was destroyed by fire around 1184 BC.

It's interesting to note that Troy VI was destroyed by an earthquake around 1250 BC, which jives with mythology. Supposedly the city of Priam's father fell due to an earthquake and VII was built a lot stronger to withstand future quakes.

On the other hand, Homer described Troy as being rather large. Archeologists were disappointed to find Troy VII was a lot smaller and less impressive than in the epic poem.

Troy VIII is mentioned by Herodotus. In 480 BC Xerxes stopped there to sacrifice 1,000 cattle enroute to Greece. Xenophon also mentions it in a story about a Spartan named Dercylidas who in 399 BC expelled a Persian-allied tyrant from Ilion. In 334 BC, Alexander crossed the Hellespont and visited the Temple of Athena at Troy where he supposedly found (and took) Achilles shield.

Troy was occupied during all those centuries due to its strategic position on the Hellespont. Agamemnon might not have attacked Priam's Troy to return Helen to his brother Meneleus. Historians tend to think the real reason was Troy was exacting taxes on Greek merchant ships traveling through the Hellespont to the Black Sea. Still, the Helen version makes for a much better story.

Dan Howard

An extraordinarily patronising post. It boils down to "my field of study is superior to yours so my subjective interpretation of the sources is best".

I understand it is difficult for some people to accept that the IndoEuropeans and IndoIranians/Vedic Indians come from one family and share similar stories, but to me that is what makes history all the more fascinating and tragic in many ways.

My specialty is horses and the history and associated with them. You cannot study Dub Samhain and Liath Macha without Cuchulainn. Bailus and Xanthus without Achilles, Rakush without Rustam. The IndoEuropeans. more specifically the Celts. and the IndoAryans/Vedic Indians domesticated the horse. All horses descend from one stallion. All of them..from the mythical Arabian to the Chincoteague pony.

The family split up between 4,000 and 2,000 BC. The Vedic Indians became exceptional horse breeders and charioteers. They were so great the Hittites adopted their word for horse. Ashva (VI) to Aswa (H) One of the oldest 'books' on horse training was written in cuniform by Kikulli. it stunned researchers because this book was the written in the Sanskrit language using cuniform. The tablet was discovered in the ruins of Hatusa. (The Egyptians loved Mittani horses. check out Nefertiti and Akhenaton's chariot horses)

I love mythology and by all means look for Troy if the current ruins do not meet your requirements, but to me the Hittites were the breeders of horses on a great plain. They arrived on the scene at a time when people didn't have horses. These were the stealth bombers of the ancient world. Acquiring horse became the objective of EVERYONE. Hard to imagine the Mittani actually actually conquering the Assyrians, but they did. Once the Assyrians got horses the Mittani left (for India I presume). only another horse people the Medes after many failed attempts could beat them. The burning of the Assyrian cities would also make good candidates for Troy. not saying they were but burning cities were not unusual back then.

There are myths that intrigue me to no ends, and I do believe there is a grain of truth to these stories. Is the great palace at Knossos the one Minos lived in? Was there an ancient war between Athens and Minos? when I was a kid the Minoans were described as a gentle people who suddenly disappeared (same was said about Mayans). Archeology has smashed those beliefs in the head.

So we have an ancient story that was created back before the Indo Europeans separated. Some chieftain several thousands of years later has a young wife who runs off with her boyfriend (this exact thing happened in Sparta with Chilonis and Acrotatus) and the old jilted man starts a war by inviting Pyrrhus to Sparta. The beautiful prince (if we are to believe the gratfiti at Olympus) holds the powerful Macedonian at bay and saves the day. He doesn't live long and dies in war. (sounds a little like the Iliad to me) Acrotatus did steal his uncle's wife..he did fight the Macedonians and he did die a young man leaving behind a pregnant wife. And Helen was from Sparta so this story would have resonated with them.

I also majored in English and History of the English language was my love. Words are so incredible. When I learned that the old Irish word Tuatha (people) shared a similarity with the Hittite word for people Teute,I even wondered if maybe the Hittites with their Saka slaves/body guards were the first IEs to arrive in Ireland. Danu is Scythian for river, and the Vedic Indians have a myth that Danu was sliced open and all the rivers of the world poured forth from her body. Among the Celts/Irish rivers have female names. I'll stop there, I can go on about rivers if I don't catch myself.

It does not surprise me that these stories are identical (yes small variations), and most assuredly someone ran off with someone's wife, but the Iliad, Deirdre and Neisi (which by the way no one knows what that name means although it does have a meaning in Hittite. not saying but it does give me pleasure to contemplate it)

Right now people are trying to prove King Arthur exists. I don't believe in him outside of some Welsh and even Greek myths. Making a man look like his rival was popular in the Heracles story. But I would never say stop looking for Camelot or Arthur. That would be a sin in my opinion. I'll probably look until the day I die for a Hittite/Irish connection. I also believe the Egyptians visited Great Britain at the time of Stonehenge, and that the occasional Roman visited China during the Tang Dynasty. I also believe the Tocharians were Celtic and introduced the horse to China and Mongolia (OK that is cheating..I asked Dr Mair at the University of Pennsylvania about this and he and JP Mallory wrote books on the subject)

People are connected, ideas shared. And the old story tellers like Homer whoever he was tried their best to pass these tales down unchanged. It was a source of pride to them. They found a man in Turkey among the nomadics back in the sixties who told a story that the researchers knew had not been changed in hundreds of years. It was a craft that has slowly died out.


Troy VIII (700 BC)

Troy VIII period is known as Hellenistic Troy. Hellenistic Troy is culturally similar to the rest of the sovereign. The events experienced in this period were transferred to the present day by Greek and Roman historians after the period. B.C. In 480, when Persian King Xerxes walked from Hellaspontine region to Greece, he sacrificed 1000 cattle in the temple of Athena, which was excavated in the Troy VIII layer. B.C. After the Persian defeat in 480-479, Illion and its region became the continental property of Lesbos and BC. He remained under the control of Lesbos until the Lesbos Revolt, which failed in 428-427. Athens saved the so-called Aktaean cities, including Illion, and included the population in this region in the Delian League. Athens influence in Hellaspont, BC. It was reduced by the 411 oligarchic coup and that year, the Spartan general Mindaros imitated Athena Illias, imitating Xerxes. In 399, Spartan general Dercylidas expelled the Greek garrison, which ruled the region on behalf of the Lampskenes dynasty and took it back from the Persian influence. Illion, BC He remained under the control of Persian Satrap in Dascylium until the Antalcidas Peace between 387-386. During this renewed Persian influence period (BC. 387-367) The statue of Ariobarzanes, the Hellaspontine Phrygian satrap, was erected in front of the temple of Athena Illias. B.C. Between 360 and 359, the city was taken under control by Charidemus from Oreus, from the Euboean island (Euboean), which occasionally worked for Athenians. B.C. Arriabos, who was honored with a power of attorney by the Illions (Troy) in 359, was expelled from the city by his son, Menalaus of Athens. B.C. While going to Asia Minor expedition in 334, Alexander He came to the city and visited the Temple of Athena Illias and donated his armor there. Alexander visited the tombs of the heroes of the Homeric period, offered victims to them, and later put the city on free status and exempted the tax. According to Alexander's latest plans, Athena considered to rebuild the Illias temple in a larger way than any other known temple in the world. [28] Antigonus Monophtalmus took control of Troad in 311 and founded the new city of Antigoneia Troas, the synosicism of Skepsis, Kebren, Neandreia, Hamaxitos, Larissa and Kolonai. B.C. In 311-306, Athena Illias succeeded in obtaining reassurance from Antigonus that he would respect their autonomy and freedom and the status of the Koinon was MS. 1. He continued to work until the century. The koinons were generally composed of Troad cities, but 3. 2 of the 19th century. in half he was involved in Eastern Propontist Myrlea and Chalcedon for a while. The governing body of the Koinons was Synedrion, where each city was represented by two delegates. In particular with regard to financing, the daily work of synergy is left to five agonothetai schools that have no more than one representative in any city. This system of equal (not proportional) representation ensured that no one could rule the quino politically. The main purpose of Koinon was to organize the annual Panathenaia festival, held in the temple of Athena Ilias. In addition to bringing many pilgrims to Ilion during the festival, the festival created an enormous market (panegiris) that attracted traders in the region. In addition, Koinon financed the new building roles in Illion, a new theater built in the city and the development of the Athena Illias temple to make the city a suitable place in such a great festival BC. During the period 302–281, Ilion and Troad were part of Ilion's kingdom of Lysimachus, who helped expand the urban population and territory by matching nearby communities. Lysimachus was defeated by Seleucus I Nikator in the battle of Corupedium in February 281, thereby passing control of the Seleucid kingdom of Asia Minor, then passing Seleucus's Troad on August 281 or September, on his way to Lysimachia in the nearby Thrace Chersonese Ilion. issued a decree in honor of stating new loyalties. In September, Seleucus was killed by Ptolemy Keraunos in Lysimachia, making his successor, Antiochus I Soter, the new king. At 280 or soon after, Ilion issued a long decree generously honoring Antiochus to strengthen his relationship with him. During this period, Ilion lacked suitable city walls, except for the Troy VI fortification, which was still collapsing around the fortress, and the city was easily looted during the Gallic invasion in 278. Ilion had a close relationship with Antiochus for the rest of his reign for example, BC In 274, Antiochus gave land to his friend Assos Aristodicides, who would be tied to the soil of Ilion for tax purposes, and BC.


A History of My Times

Thucydides’ The History of the Peloponnesian War ends suddenly with seven more years to go, one man decided to pick up the history and its aftermath which for centuries many readers were grateful for . Читать весь отзыв

LibraryThing Review

Xenophon's continuation of Thucydides. Читать весь отзыв

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Xenophon was an Athenian gentleman born in the early 420s BC. He was a fine officer and leader for Athens, but his support of Socrates led to his banishment. He lived under the protection of Sparta on an estate near Olympia, where he began to write his histories and memoirs.

Rex Warner was a Professor at the University of Connecticut. He taught in Egypt and England and was Director of the British Institute in Athens. He died in 1986.

George Cawkwell is a Fellow Emeritus of University College, Oxford. He has specialised in the history of Greece from the sixth to the fourth century BC.


Dercylidas (fl.411-394 BC) - History

Antalcidas is first recorded at the outset of the Corinthian War. Following the end of the Peloponnesian War after the destruction of the Athenian fleet at the Battle of Aegospotami in 405, Sparta had launched a series of raids against the Persian satrapies of Asia Minor. Pharnabazus, satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, finally responded by sending the Rhodian Timocrates to bribe the other Greek city states into declaring war on Sparta. Thebes rose up in 395, eventually encouraging others to join in what became known as the Corinthian War. Persia was now on friendly terms with Athens and Pharnabazus permitted their disgraced general Conon to command his fleet of Phoenician and Cypriot ships in attacks that culminated in the destruction of the Spartan fleet at Cnidus. He was then permitted to return to Athens with part of the fleet and given funds to rebuild the city's Long Walls.

Antalcidas continued in favor with Artaxerxes until the revolting Thebans annihilated Spartan supremacy at Leuctra in 371, diminishing his influence. Plutarch notes a laconic comment made by Antalcidas to Agesilaus after one of the Spartan losses to Thebes, saying in effect, "Isn't it amazing how good they've gotten after all of the training we've given them." That year or possibly in 367, Antalcidas undertook a final mission to Persia. Plutarch held that its failure drove him to starve himself to death.

For unknown reasons, Tiribazus was restored to power in Lydia by 388. Antalcidas resumed negotiations and over the next year the pair journeyed to Susa to win the king's support for a Persian alliance against Athens. This was granted and Antalcidas was made admiral of Sparta's fleets. He pursued a vigorous policy, particularly around the Hellespont, and the Athenians agreed to negotiate with Argos, Sparta, and the Persians at Tiribazus's seat at Sardis. By the winter of 387, the Peace of Antalcidas had been arranged, by the terms of which:

Antalcidas (, Antalkídas died c. 367 ), son of Leon, was an ancient Greek soldier, politician, and diplomat from Sparta.

To bring the Athenians to the negotiating table, Antalcidas then moved his fleet of 90 ships to the Hellespont, where he could threaten the trade routes along which the Athenians imported grain from the Black Sea region. The Athenians, mindful of their disastrous defeat in 404 BC, when the Spartans had gained control of the Hellespont, agreed to negotiate, and Thebes, Corinth, and Argos, unwilling to fight on without Athens, were also forced to negotiate. In a peace conference at Sparta, all the belligerents agreed to the terms laid down by Artaxerxes.

Soon afterwards, in 393 or 392, Antalcidas was dispatched to Tiribazus, the satrap of Lydia, to sue for peace. Learning of his mission, Athens sent its own embassy under Conon. The Spartans offered full recognition of Persian supremacy over Asia Minor, and the satrap threw the Athenians in jail. When King Artaxerxes II learned that Antalcidas had further convinced Tiribazus to provide funds for rebuilding Sparta's demolished navy, he replaced the satrap with Struthas, who resumed raiding Sparta and her allies. However, the Spartan fleet thus funded regained control of the Gulf of Corinth by the end of the year.

Most scholars see the Peace of Antalcidas as the first example of a common peace. Hermann Bengtson viewed the common peace as a side-effect of the treaty, which was originally only a decree of the Great King (from which it derives its name). The Spartans were appointed as guardians (prostatai) of the peace, with the power to interpret and enforce its provisions. All the Greek states swore to abide by this decree at Sparta - in light of the Great King's threat to go to war with anyone who refused to do so. This fact and the aforementioned exceptions show that a common peace was not fully achieved. Nor would one be achieved subsequently. While the autonomy and the inclusion of all cities was guaranteed, they were entirely dependent on the interests of those same powers which initiated and guaranteed the common peace.

At the Battle of Coronea, Agesilaus I, the new king of Sparta, had slightly the better of the Boeotians and at Corinth, the Spartans maintained their position, yet they felt it necessary to rid themselves of Persian hostility and if possible use Persian power to strengthen their own position at home: they therefore concluded with Artaxerxes II the humiliating Peace of Antalcidas in 387 BC, by which they surrendered to the Great King of the Greek cities of the Asia Minor coast and of Cyprus, and stipulated for the autonomy of all other Greek cities. Finally, Sparta and Persia were given the right to make war on those who did not respect the terms of the treaty. It was to be a very one sided interpretation of autonomy that Sparta enforced. The Boeotian League was broken up on the one hand while the Spartan dominated Peloponnesian League was excepted. Further, Sparta did not consider that autonomy included the right of a city to choose democracy over Sparta's preferred form of government. In 383 BC an appeal from two cities of the Chalkidice and of the King of Macedon gave Sparta a pretext to break up the Chalkidian League headed by Olynthus. After several years of fighting Olynthus was defeated and the cities of the Chalkidice were enrolled into the Peloponnesian League. The real beneficiary of this conflict was Macedon, though Paul Cartledge considers it to be indulging in hindsight, to blame Sparta for enabling the rise of Philip II.

In 387 BC, an edict was promulgated by the Persian king, preserving the Greek cities of Asia Minor and Cyprus as well as the independence of the Greek Aegean cities, except for Lymnos, Imbros and Skyros, which were given over to Athens. It dissolved existing alliances and federations and forbade the formation of new ones. This is an ultimatum that benefited Athens only to the extent that Athens held onto three islands. While the "Great King," Artaxerxes, was the guarantor of the peace, Sparta was to act as Persia's agent in enforcing the Peace. To the Persians this document is known as the "King's Peace." To the Greeks, this document is known as the Peace of Antalcidas, after the Antalcidas who was sent to Persia as negotiator. Sparta had been worried about the developing closer ties between Athens and Persia. Accordingly, Antalcidas was directed to get whatever agreement he could from the "Great King". Accordingly, the "Peace of Antalcidas" is not a negotiated peace at all. Rather it is a surrender to the interests of Persia, drafted entirely for its benefit.

During the Second Peloponnesian War, a Spartan expedition led by Dercylidas arrived at Abydos in early May 411 BC and successfully convinced the city to defect from the Delian League and fight against Athens, at which time he was made harmost (commander/governor) of Abydos. A Spartan fleet was defeated by Athens at Abydos in the autumn of 411 BC. Abydos was attacked by the Athenians in the winter of 409/408 BC, but was repelled by a Persian force led by Pharnabazus, satrap (governor) of Hellespontine Phrygia. Dercylidas held the office of harmost of Abydos until at least c. 407. According to Aristotle, Abydos had an oligarchic constitution at this time. At the beginning of the Corinthian War in 394 BC, Agesilaus II, King of Sparta, passed through Abydos into Thrace. Abydos remained an ally of Sparta throughout the war and Dercylidas served as harmost of the city from 394 until he was replaced by Anaxibius in c. 390 the latter was killed in an ambush near Abydos by the Athenian general Iphicrates in c. 389/388. At the conclusion of the Corinthian War, under the terms of the Peace of Antalcidas in 387 BC, Abydos was annexed to the Persian Empire. Within the Persian Empire, Abydos was administered as part of the satrapy of Hellespontine Phrygia, and was ruled by the tyrant Philiscus in 368. In c. 360 BC, the city came under the control of the tyrant Iphiades.

During the 6th century BC, all of Anatolia was conquered by the Persian Achaemenid Empire, the Persians having usurped the Medes as the dominant dynasty in Iran. In 499 BC, the Ionian city-states on the west coast of Anatolia rebelled against Persian rule. The Ionian Revolt, as it became known, though quelled, initiated the Greco-Persian Wars, which ended in a Greek victory in 449 BC, and the Ionian cities regained their independence. By the Peace of Antalcidas (387 BC), which ended the Corinthian War, Persia regained control over Ionia.

However, five years later, in 387 BC, Tiribazus was again in power, and worked together with the Spartan general Antalcidas to rebuild the Spartan fleet as a threat to Athenian interests in the region. This action brought the Athenians and their allies to the negotiating table. Tiribazus represented Artaxerxes at the ensuing negotiations, which led to the Peace of Antalcidas.

In Greece, the Spartans under Agesilaus met the numerous rebelling poleis. Among the most important battles that the Spartans fought in this war was that of Coronea, which was fought against a coalition of Greeks but especially the Thebans. The Spartans sought the aid of the Persians, asking them to cut off their support of the Thebans, Corinthians and Athenians. The resulting Peace of Antalcidas, named for the Spartan who negotiated it, was established in 386 BC and resulted in Sparta’s loss of its Asian territories.

An inscribed prospectus for the League was found at Athens dating to 377 BC, detailing the aims of the new league. The terms of the league were as follows: meetings would be held in Athens, but every city would enjoy one vote no matter its size and would retain its independence. Unlike the terms of the Delian League, these terms did not include forced garrisons or tribute, and Athenian citizens were prohibited from owning property in other member states. Athens framed these terms as a departure from those of the Delian League, which had been unpopular among tribute states due to the ruthlessness of Athenian hegemony and the harsh punishments against states that rebelled. Athens also convinced foreign powers, including Sparta and Persia, that the charter was a way to enforce the Peace of Antalcidas instead of a subversion of it.

Shortly after the stand-off in Thebes, Agesilaus disbanded his army in Thespiae and returned to Peloponnesos through Megara. He left the Spartan general Phoebidas as his harmost (ἁρμοστής, a military governor) at Thespiae. Phoebidas was the same general responsible for the unauthorized seizure of the citadel of Cadmea in 382 BC, in violation of the Peace of Antalcidas in place then. Agesilaus previously refused to punish Phoebidas (though he was fined), which have led some modern historians to believe that Phoebidas' earlier actions were under the direct command of the king.

For most of the first years of his reign, Agesilaus had been engaged in a war against Persia in the Aegean Sea and in Asia Minor. In 394 BC, the Spartan authorities ordered Agesilaus to return to mainland Greece. While Agesilaus had a large part of the Spartan Army in Asia Minor, the Spartan forces protecting the homeland had been attacked by a coalition of forces led by Corinth. At the Battle of Haliartus the Spartans had been defeated by the Theban forces. Worse yet, Lysander, Sparta's chief military leader, had been killed during the battle. This was the start of what became known as the "Corinthian War" (395–387 BC). Upon hearing of the Spartan loss at Haliartus and of the death of Lysander, Agesilaus headed out of Asia Minor, back across the Hellespont, across Thrace and back towards Greece. At the Battle of Coronea, Agesilaus and his Spartan Army defeated a Theban force. During the war, Corinth drew support from a coalition of traditional Spartan enemies—Argos, Athens and Thebes. However, when the war descended into guerilla tactics, Sparta decided that it could not fight on two fronts and so chose to ally with Persia. The long Corinthian War finally ended with the Peace of Antalcidas or the King's Peace, in which the "Great King" of Persia, Artaxerxes II, pronounced a "treaty" of peace between the various city-states of Greece which broke up all "leagues" of city-states on Greek mainland and in the islands of the Aegean Sea. Although this was looked upon as "independence" for some city-states, the effect of the unilateral "treaty" was highly favourable to the interests of the Persian Empire.

With Sparta removed from the scene, Persia re-established its dominance over Ionia and parts of the Aegean. The Peace of Antalcidas in 387 BC officially ceded control of these areas to Persia it would continue to hold them until the arrival of Alexander the Great half a century later.

Leontichus (Λεόντιχος) was an Athenian commander during the Corinthian War. In 388 BC, he participated in naval operations around Abydus and along with fellow commanders Demaenetus, Dionysius and Phanias unsuccessfully pursued the Spartan fleet under Antalcidas. However, Antalcidas was able to evade them and link up with an allied Syracusan and Italian squadron at Abydus.

After a few more years of fighting in 387 BC, the Peace of Antalcidas was established, according to which all Greek cities of Ionia would return to Persian control, and Persia's Asian border would be free of the Spartan threat. The effects of the war were to reaffirm Persia's ability to interfere successfully in Greek politics and to affirm Sparta's weakened hegemonic position in the Greek political system.

The above statement of the acquittal of Epicrates on the charge of corruption in his embassy to Artaxerxes, seems at first sight opposed to the statement of Demosthenes that he was condemned to death, and that he was actually banished. But, in fact, Demosthenes seems to be referring to a distinct and third occasion on which Epicrates was charged with corruption. For in his repetition of the charge there is the important head, katapseudomenoi tôn summachôn, of which we find nothing in the oration of Lysias, but which is just the charge we should expect to be made against the Athenian envoy who took part in accepting the Peace of Antalcidas (387 BC). That Epicrates was really that envoy is the more probable from the fact, which is expressly stated, that it was Epicrates who recommended that peace to the Athenians.


Sparta&rsquos Imperialism and Collapse

After the defeat of Athens in the Peloponnesian War, the member states of the Delian League were not liberated but taken over by Sparta: tribute was collected (Diod. Sic. XIV. 10. ii, claiming over 1,000 talents a year, cf. Isoc. XII. Panath. 67&ndash9, Polyb. VI. 49. x), and oligarchic constitutions were imposed. Sparta in general favoured oligarchies, but the rule of small cliques is associated particularly with Lysander: he was behind decarchies, rule by boards of ten, in many cities, and the Thirty in Athens (Nep. VI. Lys. 1. v, Plut.Lys. 13. v-ix, but ephors&rsquo orders Diod. Sic. XIV 13. i for Athens see below). In Byzantium the Spartan commander Clearchus made himself tyrant, but the Spartans drove him out (Diod. Sic. XIV. 12). Coins issued by a number of east Greek cities, with Heracles strangling two snakes, and EYN (for symmachikon, &lsquoalliance&rsquo), on the obverse and the city&rsquos normal design on the reverse, are best attributed to supporters of Lysander c. 40 5&ndash400. Lysander himself, as the man who had won the war for Sparta, received extravagant honours (cf. p. 159).

For a while there was a reaction against Lysander. In 403, when the Thirty in Athens withdrew to Eleusis, he supported them, but king Pausanias won the backing of a majority of the ephors, and arranged a reconciliation between the men in the city and the returning democrats (cf. p. 295). For that Pausanias was brought to trial before the gerousia and the ephors, and was narrowly acquitted, with king Agis voting against him but all the ephors for him (Paus. III. 5. ii). Around the Aegean Lysander&rsquos decarchies were replaced by patriot politeiai, &lsquotraditional constitutions&rsquo, on the orders of the ephors. Diodorus has a story that, after setting up oligarchies elsewhere, for Sparta itself Lysander plotted to replace the hereditary kings with elected kings. He tried to buy the support of oracles, was denounced by the oracle of Ammon (in north Africa) and was tried but acquitted a speech advocating the plan was discovered among his papers after his death - a detail which, even if invented, must have seemed plausible, though we tend to think of the Spartans as particularly uninterested in written texts (Diod. Sic. XIV. 13, cf. Plut. Lys. 19. vii, 20, 24&ndash5, 30. iii-v). However, when Lysander&rsquos friend Cyrus prepared to revolt against Artaxerxes II, in 402, he employed Clearchus, who became the principal commander of his mercenaries, and Sparta sent a substantial contribution and a commander, Chirisophus (Xen. Anab. I. iv. 2&ndash3 less clear than Hell. III. i. 1, Diod. Sic. XIV 19. ii-v).

Sparta still resented its exclusion from the Olympic games by Elis in 420 (cf. p. 133), and Elis was among the states which defied Sparta by harbouring democratic exiles from Athens in 404&ndash403. Probably in 402&ndash400, after demanding the autonomy of theperioikoi living to the south and east of Elis proper, Agis fought a three-year war. In the second year he called on Sparta&rsquos allies, and Boeotia and Corinth refused in the third year Elis capitulated, and was required to leave the perioikoi autonomous (the southern cities united in a Triphylian federation: cf. SEG xxxv 389, xl 392 = R&O 15. A, B), but not to give up the superintendence of Olympia, &lsquosince the Spartans thought the rival claimants were rustics and not competent to superintend&rsquo also to give up its triremes, and to leave its harbours of Phea and Cyllene, to which Sparta wanted access, unfortified (Xen. Hell. II. ii. 21&ndash31 Diod. Sic. XrV 17. iv-xii, 34. i, has two campaigns and Pausanias as commander). Sparta then expelled the Messenians who had been living in Naupactus since the 450&rsquos and in Cephallenia since 421 (Diod. Sic. XIV 34. ii-vi, cf. pp. 50, 132).

About 400, after his victory in Elis, Agis died. He had a son, Leotychidas, but Lysander successfully supported rumours that Leotychidas&rsquo father was Alcibiades (cf. p. 152) and obtained the throne for Agis&rsquo half-brother Agesilaus (Xen. Hell. III. iii. 1&ndash4, Plut. Ale.23. vii-ix, Ages. 3, Lys. 22. vi-xiii). Lysander hoped to rule through a grateful Agesilaus, but Agesilaus proved to be one of Sparta&rsquos strongest kings he also stressed his attachment to traditional Spartan virtues, refusing a statue when other leading Spartans were setting up ostentatious monuments, and refusing divine honours in Thasos (Xen. Ages. xi. 7, Plut. Spartan Sayings 210 C-D). Soon after his accession a revolt was planned by Cinadon, a hypomeion (&lsquoinferior&rsquo, perhaps a man of Spartiate ancestry who had been downgraded for inability to provide his mess contributions) who hoped to unite all the unprivileged classes against the homoioi (&lsquoequals&rsquo, a term perhaps introduced when full Spartiates needed to be distinguished from &lsquoinferiors&rsquo). He was dealt with firmly, and in a typically Spartan way (sent out of the city with a detachment of men who had orders to arrest him) but the episode, though not necessarily the tip of an already large iceberg, reminds us that Sparta was becoming more fragile (Xen. Hell. III. iii. 4&ndash11, Arist. Pol. V. 1306 B 34&ndash6, Polyaenus Strat. II. 14. i).

Fig. 4 Fourth-century Spartan kings and a regent

Sparta&rsquos citizen numbers were suffering an irreversible decline, owing in particular to the earthquake of c.464 (cf. p. 32) and losses during the Peloponnesian War, but also to a social structure which was not conducive to the frequent fathering of children. Ancient texts allege that there was a moral decline, attributable especially to the influx of foreign wealth at the end of the Peloponnesian War, and claim that previously coinage in precious metals had been totally banned but after the war it was conceded that coinage could be held by the state but not by individuals (Xen. Lac. Pol.vii. 6, Plut. Lys. 17, Posidonius FGrH 87 F 48. c

Fornara 167). The truth appears to be that, although Sparta did not issue coins, possession had not previously been banned, but the ban on private possession was a response to the suddenly increased quantity after the war, enforced at first but not for long. Plutarch&rsquos life of the third-century Agis claims that originally Spartans had not been able to dispose of their kleros, their &lsquoallotment&rsquo of land, and this was first allowed by the rhetra (literally &lsquosaying&rsquo: used of Spartan laws) of an ephor called Epitadeus (Plut. Agis 5. iii-iv), a change which scholars have tended to date to this period but more probably Spartans were never forbidden to dispose of their land, and the original ban and the rhetra were invented by third-century reformers, perhaps under the influence of Plato. However, it remains true that in the fourth century a small number of families, and often women where there were no male heirs, got possession of an increasing proportion of the land (cf. Arist. Pol. II. 1270 A 15&ndash29), and Sparta&rsquos shortage of citizens was due to the downgrading of potential citizens as well as to a shortage of citizen births (cf. Arist. Pol. II. 1271 B 26&ndash37). There were some attempts to stimulate the birth rate within the existing social framework (e.g. wife-sharing privileges for fathers of many sons) sons of &lsquoinferiors&rsquo and some others could be brought up with the &lsquoequals&rsquo as mothakes (cf. pp. 144, 156, 157) but this was not enough, and the Spartan army relied increasingly on perioikoi and liberated helots (cf. below, esp. pp. 251&ndash2).

When Tissaphernes returned to Sardis, he claimed the Greek cities of Asia Minor they appealed to Sparta and Sparta agreed to support them. In autumn 400 Sparta sent not a citizen army but an army of liberated helots and allies (including Athenians), commanded by a man called Thibron: the term harmost (harmostes, &lsquoarranger&rsquo) is used, especially by Xenophon, of such commanders of non-citizen forces, whether employed for campaigning or for garrison duties. This force was joined by the survivors of Cyrus&rsquo mercenary force it penetrated further inland than the Athenians had done (for the likelihood that Sparta would do this cf. Alcibiades in Thuc. VIII. 48. iii), but, although Thibron appears less incompetent in Diodorus&rsquo account than in Xenophon&rsquos, he did not make much progress in liberating the Asiatic Greeks (Xen. Hell. III. i. 3&ndash7, Diod. Sic. XIV. 35. vi-37. iv).

In spring 399Thibron was recalled, and fined and exiled for letting his troops ravage the land of the Greeks he had gone to help. His successor was Dercylidas (the first of a series of men linked with Lysander), described as deceitful and unSpartan, and as liking to be away from home (EphorusFGrH 70 F 71, cf. Xen. Hell. III. i. 8 Hell. IV. iii. 2). He made a truce with Tissaphernes in order to concentrate on Pharnabazus, the satrap of Dascylium he had considerable success, and made a truce with Pharnabazus before wintering in Bithynia (Xen. Hell. III. i. 8-ii. 5, Diod. Sic. XrV. 38. vi-vii). In 398 three inspectors, headed by another man connected with Lysander, reappointed Dercylidas: he renewed his truce with Pharnabazus and went to the Chersonese to fortify that against Thracian attacks and he besieged and captured Atarneus, on the Asiatic coast opposite Mytilene (Xen. Hell. III. ii. 6&ndash11, Diod. Sic. XIV. 38. vi-vii). In 397 he was probably inspected and appointed again in response to another appeal from the Asiatic Greeks, Sparta ordered him to move south into Caria to put pressure on Tissaphernes, and Pharax, again connected with Lysander, was sent with ships to support him. Pharnabazus joined Tissaphernes but when a battle was about to be fought near Ephesus, Tissaphernes offered a truce to discuss a deal by which the Spartans would withdraw and the Asiatic Greeks would be autonomous (Xen. Hell. II. iii. 12&ndash20, Diod. Sic. XIV 39. iv-vi for the truce cf. p. 227). However, in 398 Pharnabazus had gone to the King and had obtained permission to raise a fleet to be commanded by the Athenian Conon (who since the end of the Peloponnesian War had been with Evagoras in Cyprus: cf. p. 158) in 397/6 Conon with a first contingent of ships was besieged in Caunus, north-east of Rhodes, by Pharax but was relieved by Pharnabazus, after which Rhodes defected to him from the Spartans (Diod. Sic. XIV. 39. i, 79. iv-vii, Philoch. FGrH 328 F 144

The war continued, and in 396 Sparta sent reinforcements, and Agesilaus as commander. He still did not have Spartiate soldiers, but he had a board of thirty Spartiate assistants including Lysander of Sparta&rsquos allies, Boeotia, Corinth and Athens all refused to serve. Seeing himself as a successor to Agamemnon in the Trojan War, Agesilaus went to Aulis to sacrifice before crossing the Aegean, but the Boeotians interfered, an act for which he never forgave them. On arrival at Ephesus he accepted Tissaphernes&rsquo offer of a truce to discuss terms, but Tissaphernes asked the King for an army (cf. p. 227). Lysander hoped to control Agesilaus, but Agesilaus got him out of the way to the Hellespont, where he won over Spithridates, a subordinate of Pharnabazus. Agesilaus campaigned against Tissaphernes, was hampered at first by a lack of cavalry but proceeded to raise a force (Xen. Hell. III. iv. 1&ndash15, Diod. Sic. XrV. 79. i-iii, Plut. Ages. 6&ndash9). In 395 Agesilaus&rsquo thirty Spartiates were replaced by a new board. He defeated the Persians in a battle near Sardis of which we have very different accounts from Xenophon and the other tradition: either in the absence of Tissaphernes he won a straightforward cavalry battle (Xenophon) or he ambushed a force which Tissaphernes was commanding. He was unable to take the city but Tissaphernes was executed and replaced by Tithraustes, the King&rsquos grand vizier (the decision will have been taken before the battle). Tithraustes announced the King&rsquos terms: that Sparta should withdraw and the Asiatic Greeks should be autonomous but pay &lsquothe ancient tribute&rsquo (cf. p. 227). Agesilaus said he could not agree without authority from Sparta, but let Tithraustes pay him to move against Pharnabazus (Xen.Hell. III. iv. 16&ndash29, Hell. Oxy. 14&ndash17, Diod. Sic. XIV. 80, Plut. Ages. 10). He then engaged in campaigning and diplomacy. Agesilaus hoped with Spithridates&rsquo help to win over the king of Paphlagonia (east of Pharnabazus&rsquo satrapy), but his plans were wrecked when his subordinate Herippidas won a victory but took all the booty for Sparta. After ravaging Pharnabazus&rsquo estates Agesilaus had a meeting at which he urged Pharnabazus to defect from the King, and Pharnabazus replied that if he were made subordinate to another commander he would defect, but if he were made commander himself he would fight for the King. Agesilaus then moved south, intending in spring 394 to advance into the interior (Xen. Hell. IV i, Hell. Oxy. 24&ndash5, Plut. Ages. 11&ndash15. i).

What were the two sides trying to achieve? For Persia, which suggested the compromises, the terms always included the withdrawal of Spartan forces and if the Asiatic Greeks paid tribute a formal concession of autonomy would not make much difference to the ways in which Persian power was actually exercised. Agesilaus&rsquo attempt to sacrifice at Aulis was a strong gesture, and there are passages suggesting that he had extensive ambitions for conquest (Xen. Hell. TV. i. 41, Ages. i. 8, 36, Hell. Oxy. 25. iv, Diod. Sic. XIV 80. v, Plut. Ages. 15. i-iii), yet at first he like Dercylidas before him was prepared to consider the compromise. He had to satisfy the authorities in Sparta, who may well have been divided in their attitudes to adventures in Asia, and indeed he had Spartiate advisers with him probably his own ambitions increased as he campaigned successfully, but it is not clear how far he hoped to go, or what kind of demarcation he wanted to establish or could have established between a reduced Persian empire and the territories detached from it.

Agesilaus&rsquo high point came after his meeting with Tithraustes, when the Spartans gave him authority at sea as well as on land, and he gave the naval command to his inexperienced brother-in-law Pisander (Xen. Hell. III. iv. 27&ndash9). But Conon had been building up the fleet he commanded for Pharnabazus (Hell. Oxy. 12. ii, Diod. Sic. XIV. 79. viii). In 395 he supported a democratic revolution in Rhodes (Hell. Oxy. 18, Androtion FGrH 324 F 46 cf. Athenian honours for a Rhodian in 394/3, IG ii 2 19), obtained funding from Tithraustes and dealt with a mutiny of Cypriots in his fleet(Hell. Oxy. 22&ndash3) then he visited the King and obtained full support from him (Diod. Sic. XrV. 81. iv-vi). In August 394 (dated by an eclipse) Conon and Pharnabazus defeated and killed Pisander in a major battle off Cnidus (Xen. Hell. TV. iii. 10&ndash12, Diod. Sic. XIV. 83. iv-vii, Philoch. FGrH328 F 145

Harding 12. B). This ended Sparta&rsquos control of the Aegean: Conon and Pharnabazus won over mainland and island cities, expelling Spartan garrisons and promising autonomy (Xen. Hell. TV. viii. 1&ndash6, Diod. Sic. XIV 84. iii-iv). Although the victory was technically a Persian one, Athens honoured both Conon and Evagoras, and fragments of the decree for Evagoras show him represented as fighting as a Greek for the freedom and autonomy of the Greeks (R&O 11). By then Agesilaus had had to return to Greece.

In 404 Sparta had dealt with Athens as it wanted, not as its allies had wanted (cf. p. 159) it seemed to have monopolised the profits of victory, and it had not liberated but had taken over the Delian League. Boeotia and several Peloponnesian states harboured Athenian democrats in 404&ndash403, and Boeotia and Corinth refused to join Pausanias&rsquo expedition (cf. p. 295) the war of revenge on Elis harmed Sparta&rsquos reputation, and Boeotia and Corinth abstained from that conflict Athens began to show signs of independence from 397 (cf. pp. 261&ndash2) and in 396 Boeotia, Corinth and Athens abstained from Agesilaus&rsquo expedition and the Boeotians interfered with his sacrifices. Sparta&rsquos ambitions at this time were widespread: the first Spartan mentioned in connection with Dionysius of Syracuse was a freelance, but later Dionysius was given official support (cf. pp. 314, 318). Another area of interest was northern Greece: Sparta expelled the Messenians from Naupactus (cf. p. 50), put down a revolt in its colony at Heraclea and installed a garrison at Pharsalus, inThessaly (Diod. Sic. XIV 38. iv-v, 82. vi cf. below). Timocrates brought money from Pharnabazus to encourage Sparta&rsquos enemies (cf. p. 227).

In 395 the Boeotians engineered a dispute between Locris (probably eastern Locris, towards Thermopylae) and Phocis Phocis appealed to Sparta and Boeotia was joined by Athens in backing Locris and so began what is called the Corinthian War since after the first two years the war was centred on Corinth (Xen. Hell. III. v. 3&ndash16, Hell. Oxy. 20&ndash1, Diod. Sic. XIV. 81. i-ii, cf. Athenian alliances, IG if 2 14, 15 = R&O 6, Tod 102

Harding 14. A, 16). Sparta sent Lysander to Boeotia via Phocis and Pausanias via the Megarid: Lysander won over Orchomenus, in north-western Boeotia, but fought a battle at Haliartus before Pausanias (perhaps reluctant to cooperate) had joined him, and was defeated and killed. Pausanias withdrew under a truce, for which he was condemned in absence: he retired to Tegea (where he wrote a book on Sparta&rsquos legendary reformer, Lycurgus) and was succeeded by his son Agesipolis I (Xen. Hell. III. v. 67, 17&ndash25, Diod. Sic. XIV. 81. ii-iii, Plut. Lys. 28&ndash30. i). Sparta&rsquos enemies were joined by Corinth and Argos, the Euboeans and states in northern Greece in Thessaly they enabled Larisa to take Pharsalus from the Spartans, and Heraclea was returned to the neighbouring Trachinians (Diod. Sic. XrV. 82: Heraclea perhaps after Agesilaus&rsquo march in 394).

Sparta therefore recalled Agesilaus, who left Asia but hoped to return. In July 394 Aristodemus, regent for Agesipolis, defeated the alliance at the River Nemea, west of Corinth: Dercylidas, travelling east to Abydus, where after Cnidus he assembled a number of expelled harmosts, met Agesilaus and gave him the news (Xen. Hell. IV ii. 9&ndash23, iii. 1&ndash3, Diod. Sic. XIV 82. x-83. ii). Agesilaus travelled through Thrace and Thessaly to Boeotia in August, on hearing the news of Cnidus, for the sake of morale he announced that Pisander was dead but victorious he then gained a far from decisive victory at Coronea and after it abandoned Greece north of the Isthmus (Xen. Hell. TV. iii. 3-iv. 1, Ages. ii. 1&ndash13, Diod. Sic. XIV. 83. iv-v, 84. i-ii, Plut. Ages. 17&ndash19. iv).

In 393 Conon and Pharnabazus sailed to Greece. They raided Laconia and occupied Cythera, and took money to Corinth, which spent it on ships to fight against Sparta in the Gulf of Corinth, and to Athens, where it helped to pay for the rebuilding of the walls which was already under way (Xen. Hell. TV. viii. 7&ndash11, Diod. Sic. XIV 84. iv-v, Philoch. FGrH 328 F 146

Harding 12. B). Conon also established a force of light-armed mercenaries, based in Corinth but commanded by Athenians: at first Iphicrates, later Chabrias (Androtion FGrH 324 F 48 = Philoch. FGrH 328 F 150

Harding 22. A). Corinth became the base of the anti-Spartan alliance and Sicyon the Spartans&rsquo base. In spring 392 the enemies of Sparta in Corinth engineered a massacre of their opponents, and shortly after that, to strengthen the position of the anti-Spartan party, some kind of political union was made between Corinth and Argos, perhaps isopoliteia, &lsquoequal citizenship&rsquo, by which citizens of each had the rights of citizens in the other. Some survivors of the massacre left Corinth but returned under an amnesty, and enabled a Spartan force to capture Corinth&rsquos long walls and the harbour town of Lechaeum (Xen. Hell. TV. i. 1&ndash13, Diod. Sic. XrV. 86. i-iii).

Things were not going well for the Spartans, either in Greece or in the Aegean, so in 392 they tried to win by diplomacy what they could not win by fighting, and Antalcidas obtained the first draft of a common peace treaty by which the Asiatic Greeks would be returned to Persia and all other cities and islands would be autonomous. When this was rejected by their opponents, the Spartans offered modified terms at a conference in 392/1, with concessions to Athens and Boeotia but not to Corinth and Argos, but Athens as well as Corinth and Argos still objected, and no peace was made (cf. pp. 227&ndash8).

Fighting continued in the north-eastern Peloponnese, particularly over Corinth&rsquos long walls and Lechaeum. In 390, when Argos on the strength of its union with Corinth was about to hold the Isthmian games, Agesilaus enabled the Corinthian exiles to hold the games, but afterwards the Argives returned and held the games again. Iphicrates and his mercenary force, backed up by Callias with Athenian hoplites, caught a division of the Spartan army outside Lechaeum and annihilated it. It was perhaps after this that Iphicrates tried to get control of Corinth but failed and was dismissed, and then the union between Corinth and Argos may have been intensified (Xen. Hell. IV. iv. 14-v. 17, viii. 34, Diod. Sic. XIV. 86. iv-vi, 91. ii-92. ii). North of the Gulf of Corinth, in 389&ndash388 Agesilaus enabled the Achaeans to retain Calydon, which they had acquired some time before (Xen.Hell. IV vi-viii. 1, Plut. Ages. 22. ix-xi). In 388 or 387 Agesipolis attacked Argos, and when Argos tried to prevent him by changing its calendar to bring on the festival of the Carnea he gained permission from Olympia and Delphi to ignore that, and also refused to be put off by an earthquake (Xen. Hell. IV. vii. 2&ndash7, Arist. Rh. II. 1398 B 33&ndash1399 A 1 cf. Diod. Sic. XIV. 97. v [Agesilaus]). From Aegina the Spartans made trouble for Athens, and in 387 raided the Piraeus (Xen. Hell. V i. 1&ndash24).

The war was not over in the east. In 391 Sparta sent the earlier unsuccessful Thibron to fight against Struthas, the current satrap of Sardis, but he was defeated and killed (Xen. Hell. IV. viii. 17&ndash19, Diod. Sic. XIV 99. i-iii). He was succeeded by the more successful Diphridas (who managed to capture and obtain a ransom for Struthas&rsquo daughter and son-in-law), and Ecdicus was sent to Rhodes (where there was renewed conflict between oligarchs and democrats). In 390 Teleutias succeeded Ecdicus, and on his way out captured an Athenian squadron sailing to support Evagoras of Salamis (Xen. Hell. IV viii. 20&ndash4, Diod. Sic. XrV. 97. i-iv). The Athenian Thrasybulus was sent to help the Rhodian democrats, but went first to the Hellespont and had a highly successful campaign as he made his way from there to Rhodes but in 389, when fund-raising took him to Aspendus, on the south coast of Asia Minor, he was killed (Xen. Hell. IV. viii. 25&ndash31, Diod. Sic. XIV 94, 99. iv-v). Sparta sent Anaxibius to the Hellespont Athens sent Iphicrates with those of the mercenaries who had left Corinth with him and Anaxibius was defeated and killed (Xen. Hell. IV viii. 31&ndash9). While Struthas was satrap of Sardis, c.391-388, Miletus and Myus referred a territorial dispute to him and he referred it to a jury from the other cities of the Ionian koinon (Milet I. ii 9 = R&O 16

Antalcidas was made Spartan navarch for 388/7: he went to Ephesus and sent Nicolochus to the Hellespont with Tiribazus, reinstated as satrap of Sardis, he went to talk to the King. When he returned, in 387, Nicolochus was being blockaded in Abydus by the Athenians by pretending to head for the Bosporus, Antalcidas ended the blockade he then captured a relief squadron and regained control of the Hellespont for Sparta (Xen. Hell. V. i. 6&ndash7, 25&ndash8, cf. IG ii 2 29 = R&O 19). The anti-Spartan Pharnabazus had been removed from Dascylium to marry the King&rsquos daughter (Xen. Hell.V. i. 28) and from its position of comparative strength Sparta was able to obtain and impose on the Greeks the King&rsquos Peace: Persia received the Asiatic Greeks elsewhere, apart from Athens&rsquo three north Aegean islands, there were no exceptions to the principle of autonomy for all, and Agesilaus by threatening to invade insisted on the dismantling of the Boeotian federation and of the union of Corinth and Argos. The anti-Persian Agesilaus could see the advantage for Sparta, and declared that the Persians were laconising (cf. p. 230). Corinth rejoined the Peloponnesian League, and some opponents of Sparta were exiled and went to Athens (Xen. Hell. V. i. 36, iii. 27, Dem. XX. Leptines 54). There may subsequently have been approaches to Sparta by Evagoras of Salamis (Theopompus FGrH 115 F 103. x) and the Persian rebel Glos (Diod. Sic. XV. 9. iii-v, 18. i-ii, 19. i), but it is unlikely that they obtained anything.

From the Peace of Antalcidas to Leuctra: Agesilaus, Agesipolis, Cleombrotus

After the Peloponnesian War Sparta had taken revenge on Elis after the Peace of Antalcidas it took revenge on Mantinea, as an ally which had not been sufficiently loyal. Because of his father&rsquos connections with Mantinea, Agesilaus had the command given to Agesipolis, though Agesipolis&rsquo father had connections with the Mantinean democrats. In 385 Mantinea refused to demolish its walls, and appealed to Athens, which was cowed by the Peace of Antalcidas and would not help Agesipolis invaded, and summoned a contingent from Thebes. When he diverted a river to undermine the wall, Mantinea capitulated: the polls was split into the separate villages which had united perhaps c.470, and these became oligarchic and pro-Spartan the democratic leaders were allowed to leave, and some went to Athens (Xen. Hell. V. ii. 1&ndash7, Diod. Sic. XV. 5. iii-v, 12Thebans Plut. Pel.4. v-viii, Paus. IX. 13. i exiles to Athens IG ii 2 33. 7&ndash8). Probably Sparta announced its intention of dismantling the polls from the beginning, and was abusing the autonomy principle by applying it to the villages.

Appeals came to Sparta to act against the expanding Chalcidian federation of Olynthus: from Acanthus and Apollonia according to Xenophon, from Amyntas of Macedon according to Diodorus. If cities threatened with absorption did appeal, Sparta in responding may have invoked the autonomy principle once more. Olynthus was in touch with Athens and &lsquoBoeotia&rsquo: there is no secure evidence for Athenian support, but there is some for Theban (Xen. Hell. V ii. 15,27,34, FGrH 153 F 1). Sparta&rsquos campaign was approved by the Peloponnesian League, but for the first time League members were allowed to contribute cash instead of soldiers, as the members of the Delian League had been allowed to pay tribute instead of contributing ships (Xen. Hell. V ii. 11&ndash22, Diod. Sic. XV 19. iiiHell. VI. ii. 16 reports that nearly all paid cash for Sparta&rsquos expedition to Corcyra in 373). The contributions would be spent on the mercenaries who were increasingly being used by all states: by the time of the battle of Mantinea, in 362, the presence of mercenaries even in a Spartan army fighting in the Peloponnese did not call for comment (Xen. Hell. VII. v. 10).

Agesilaus did not go to Olynthus, but the commanders sent in 382 were men connected with him. Thebes refused to join the campaign, but Leontiades, leader of the pro-Spartan party, invited Phoebidas to enter the city as he was marching north with part of Sparta&rsquos advance force he did, and occupied the acropolis, the Cadmea. The anti-Spartan leader Ismenias was arrested, and (despite Sparta&rsquos current alignment) condemned as a mediser for accepting Timocrates&rsquo money in the 390&rsquos many of his supporters fled to Athens. The ephors and other Spartans were angry at Phoebidas&rsquo unauthorised action Agesilaus, who may have been privy to the plan, talked them round (he had hated the Thebans since the incident at Aulis in 396), though according to most of the sources Phoebidas was still fined (Xen. Hell. V. ii. 23&ndash36, Diod. Sic. XV. 20, Plut. Ages. 23. vi-24. i, Pel. 5&ndash6). Pro-Spartan regimes were set up in the other Boeotian cities too (Xen. Hell. V. iv. 46).

Phoebidas&rsquo brother Eudamidas continued north with his part of the force, and the main army from the Peloponnesian League followed under Teleutias. In 381 Teleutias was killed and Agesipolis went with reinforcements (not another League army, but it included volunteers from the perioikoi,and there were thirty Spartiate advisers). He captured Torone in 380 but was taken ill and died the throne passed to his brother Cleombrotus his command was taken over by Polybiadas, who in 379 starved Olynthus into submission. It was mildly treated, and made a subordinate ally of Sparta its Chalcidian federation was presumably dismantled or at least reduced, but Olynthus and whatever remained continued to use the title &lsquothe Chalcidians&rsquo (Xen. Hell. V. ii. 24, 37-iii. 9, 18&ndash20, 26, Diod. Sic. XV 22. ii, 23. ii-iii title coins [ill. 19] and IG ii 2 43 = R&O 22

Harding 35. 101&ndash2). Perhaps during this northern war, Sparta became involved inThessaly again and in Histiaea in Euboea (cf. p. 286).

Agesilaus meanwhile had been dealing with Phlius, in the north-eastern Peloponnese. Sparta had not insisted on the return of pro-Spartan exiles in 391 (Xen. Hell. IV. iv. 5), but did insist c.384-383 (Hell. V. ii. 8&ndash10) in 381 Phlius supported Agesipolis&rsquo expedition to Olynthus, but was grudging in its treatment of the returned exiles, who included friends of Agesilaus. In spite of doubts among the Spartans, Agesilaus campaigned enthusiastically against Phlius, besieging it for twenty months until it surrendered in 379. It tried to surrender to the authorities in Sparta, but Agesilaus arranged for the decision to be referred to himself: the offenders were executed, a new constitution was introduced and he installed a garrison (Hell. V. iii. 10&ndash17, 21&ndash5).

At this point both Xenophon and Diodorus remark on the extent of Sparta&rsquos power: Olynthus and Phlius had been subdued, Thebes was occupied, Corinth and Argos had been weakened, and the Persian King in the east and Dionysius of Syracuse in the west were friendly (Xen. Hell. V. iii. 27, Diod. Sic. XV 23. iii-iv). From now onwards, however, Sparta was going to encounter problems and the friction between the two royal houses, which can already be detected in the reign of Agesipolis, was to increase in the reign of Cleombrotus. Agesilaus favoured hard-line policies, and tended to have links with oligarchs in other cities he may still have hankered after a war against Persia in Greece his main enemy was Thebes. The Agid kings were more willing to conform to treaty obligations and the wishes of Sparta&rsquos allies, and tended to have links with democratic leaders and Cleombrotus preferred fighting against the traditional enemy, Athens the ephors when mentioned were on their side.

Sparta&rsquos troubles began in winter 379/8, when Theban exiles returned and assassinated the ruling clique (cf. pp. 264, 283). The Spartan garrison commander withdrew under a truce, for which he was executed. While it was still winter, Sparta sent an army, under Cleombrotus since Agesilaus pleaded that (in his mid sixties) he was too old. Cleombrotus entered Boeotia, but did very little apart from leaving Sphodrias with a garrison inThespiae. Athens had given Thebes some help while Spartan envoys were in Athens to complain, Sphodrias raided the Thriasian plain, in the west of Attica, allegedly intending to go on to the Piraeus. Athens protested, and Sphodrias was put on trial. Cleombrotus backed him from the beginning at first he was opposed by Agesilaus and &lsquothose in the middle&rsquo (probably those uncommitted, rather than a &lsquomiddle party&rsquo) but Agesilaus&rsquo son was the lover of Sphodrias&rsquo son, and Agesilaus was won over. Sphodrias was acquitted, and Athens came out openly against Sparta (Xen. Hell. V. iv. 1&ndash34, Diod. Sic. XV. 25&ndash7, 29. v-vii, Plut. Ages. 24. iv-26. i, Pel. 14&ndash15. i for the foundation of the Second Athenian League see pp. 264&ndash5). According to Diodorus, Sphodrias acted on the orders of Cleombrotus, and that seems likely enough, since in the years that followed Cleombrotus was happier fighting against Athens than against Thebes but, according to Xenophon and Plutarch, Sphodrias was bribed by the Thebans, who wanted to create an incident that would commit Athens to their side.

In summer 378 Agesilaus invaded Boeotia. He was perhaps a better commander than Cleombrotus (Xenophon), but he also had more enthusiasm for fighting against Thebes (Plut. Ages.). But he too made little headway: he left Phoebidas as harmost inThespiae, and Phoebidas was killed in a cavalry battle. In 377 he invaded again: there was skirmishing near Thebes, with Athenians on the Theban side and Olynthians on the Spartan. Because of the invasions, Thebes had to import corn from Thessaly: the ships were intercepted by the Spartan harmost at Histiaea, in the north of Euboea (where Sparta had earlier expelled a supporter of Jason of Pherae: Diod. Sic. XV. 30. iii-iv), but the Thebans managed to detach Oreus from Sparta (Xen. Hell. V. iv. 35&ndash57, Diod. Sic. XV 31. iii-34. ii, Plut. Ages. 26, Pel. 15). On his return journey Agesilaus burst a blood vessel (cf. Plut.Ages. 27. i-iii), as a result of which he was out of action for several years. In 376 Cleombrotus tried to invade, but the Thebans and Athenians held the mountain passes against him. Since the allies were eager for a naval campaign against Athens, Pollis was sent out with sixty ships, and prevented the corn ships from continuing to Athens beyond the south of Euboea but an Athenian fleet under Chabrias convoyed the ships, and then besieged Naxos and defeated Pollis (Xen. Hell. V. iv. 58&ndash61, Diod. Sic. XV. 34. iii-35. ii).

After the Athenian League&rsquos campaign of 377 but in connection with Agesilaus&rsquo campaign of 378, Diodorus reports a change in Sparta&rsquos military organisation: fear of the League was making Sparta more anxious to conciliate its allies, so to spread the burden fairly the army was organised in ten divisions on a regional basis, Sparta providing one and the Peloponnesian League, allies in northern Greece and &lsquoOlynthus and the Thraceward region&rsquo providing the others as in the war against Olynthus, cash equivalents of soldiers were allowed. Different scholars have guessed at different contexts. Agesilaus is not normally associated with consideration for the allies, but that may not have been the motive for a system in which members of the Peloponnesian League were on the same level as Olynthus and, whatever the date, this is best seen as a sequel to the defeat of Olynthus.

There were further setbacks for Sparta in 375. In Boeotia two of the six moral of the Spartan army, guarding Orchomenus, were defeated at Tegyra by the Theban cavalry and &lsquosacred band&rsquo (the professional nucleus of their hoplite force: cf. p. 284) under Pelopidas (Plut. Pel. 16&ndash19, cf. Ages. 27. iv, Diod. Sic. XV. 37. i-ii omitted by Xenophon). Prompted by Thebes, Athens began a war in the west to distract Sparta: Timotheus won the support of Cephallenia, Acarnania and Corcyra, and when Sparta sent a fleet under Nicolochus Timotheus defeated him off Alyzia, opposite Leucas (Xen. Hell. V. iv. 62&ndash6, Diod. Sic. XV 36. v-vi, cf. IGii 2 96 = R&O 24

Harding 41). InThessaly Jason, tyrant of Pherae, was building up his power (cf. pp. 285&ndash6): Polydamas of Pharsalus appealed to Sparta, and Xenophon gives him a speech claiming that, if Sparta sent a large army, the cities would desert Jason, but, if it thought liberated helots and a harmost would be enough, it need not bother - and Sparta could not support on a large scale so advised Pharsalus to submit (Xen. Hell. VI. i. 2&ndash19). Another appeal came from Phocis, under attack by aThebes which now dominated Boeotia: here Sparta did respond on a large scale, sending Cleombrotus with four moral, and theThebans withdrew (Xen. Hell. VI. i. 1, ii. 1).

In 375/4, at Persia&rsquos prompting, the King&rsquos Peace was renewed: probably the first moves were made early in 375 and the year&rsquos events only increased Sparta&rsquos willingness to make peace (cf. pp. 231&ndash2). But the peace was broken almost at once. Late in 375 Timotheus, on his way back to Athens, restored exiles in Zacynthus, and Sparta protested. In 374 Sparta sent expeditions to Zacynthus and to Corcyra in 373 it sent a further sixty ships under Mnasippus to Corcyra, and he ravaged the countryside and blockaded the city, but kept his own mercenaries short of pay and provisions. Timotheus delayed in coming from Athens, because of difficulties in raising men and money. He was dismissed Ctesicles went over land in winter 373/2 and enabled the Corcyraeans to defeat and kill Mnasippus Iphicrates arrived by sea in 372, in time to defeat a Syracusan squadron sent to support Sparta (Xen. Hell. VI. ii. 2&ndash39, Diod. Sic. XV 45&ndash46. iii, 47. i-vii). On land Thebes was becoming increasingly strong, to the discomfiture of Athens (cf. pp. 271, 285) in 372/1 it again moved against Phocis and Sparta again sent Cleombrotus (Xen. Hell. VI. iii. 1, iv. 2).

Athens&rsquo worries about Thebes led to the conference in Sparta in summer 371 (perhaps mid July), where the common peace was renewed and Agesilaus, making his first appearance in the record since his illness, excluded theThebans when they claimed to swear for Boeotia (cf. pp. 231&ndash2). The terms included the withdrawal of forces, so Cleombrotus asked what he should do. One Spartan, Prothous, wanted to recall him and invite contributions to rebuilding the temple of Apollo at Delphi, recently destroyed by fire and/or earthquake (cf. p. 290), but this was dismissed as nonsense (by Agesilaus, according to Plutarch) and he was told to attack Thebes if it would not respect the autonomy of the Boeotian cities. Cleombrotus avoided the route guarded by the Thebans, and reached Leuctra in the territory of Thespiae, but Sparta&rsquos weakness was exposed when he was outgeneralled, defeated and killed, by an army using novel tactics which he could not cope with despite his best attempts, Cleombrotus died implementing Agesilaus&rsquo policy (for the battle, perhaps mid August, cf. p. 287). The surviving officers made a truce to withdraw, and returned to Sparta with the reserve force brought by Agesilaus&rsquo son Archidamus (Xen. Hell. VI. iv. 1&ndash26, Plut. Pel. 20&ndash3, Ages. 28. vii-viii, Paus. IX. 13. iii-xii Diod. Sic. XV. 51&ndash6 is badly muddled). Athens organised a peace treaty, from which Thebes was excluded (cf. pp. 232&ndash3). Cleombrotus&rsquo throne passed first to his elder son Agesipolis II, who died in 370 then to his younger son Cleomenes II, who reigned until 309 but about whom hardly anything is recorded.

After Leuctra: Sparta in Decline

The defeat of a Spartan army in a major battle was a great shock. After this Sparta was on the defensive within the next ten years it was to lose Messenia, lose the Peloponnesian League, and see Agesilaus serving as a mercenary commander in Egypt.

Sparta&rsquos shortage of citizen manpower (cf. p. 241) was now all too evident. Stories about the distribution of kleroi in the archaic period assume 9,000 citizens (e.g. Plut. Lye. 8. v-vi) for the early fifth century Herodotus estimates 8,000 adult males, of whom 5,000 fought at Plataea (Hdt. VII. 234. ii IX. 10. i, 28. ii). But the earthquake of c.464 caused heavy losses (cf. pp. 31&ndash2), and the Peloponnesian War will have hampered recovery. Perioikoi seem to have formed half of&rsquothe Lacedaemonians&rsquo at Plataea, 60 per cent in the Peloponnesian War (cf. the prisoners from Sphacteria, Thuc. rV. 38. v with 40).Thucydides&rsquo details of the Spartan army at Mantinea in 418, a five-sixths levy (Thuc. V 68 with 64. iii), allow us to estimate 2,100-2,500 adult Spartiates if the text is right, 3,600-4,300 if there were not six lochoi but six moral each of two lochoi in the main army. Heavy casualties continued after the Peloponnesian War: for instance, about 250 out of perhaps c.600 Lacedaemonians were killed at Lechaeum in 390 (Xen. Hell. IV. v. 17). At Leuctra Cleombrotus had a two-thirds levy of men up to 55, which included 700 Spartiates, of whom 400 were killed (Xen.Hell. VI. iv. 15 with 17): in the main army Spartiates may now have been only 10 per cent, and in all there were perhaps c. 1,300 adult Spartiates before the battle and c.900 after. Aristotle remarked that the land would support 1,500 cavalry and 30,000 hoplites, but in fact there were not even 1,000 (Arist. Pol. II. 1270 A 29&ndash31). The decline continued: Plutarch claims that in the 240&rsquos there were not more than 700, of whom perhaps 100 &lsquopossessed land and an allotment&rsquo, but probably his 100 were the very rich, there were 700 &lsquoequals&rsquo and the &lsquoinferiors&rsquo were his &lsquodestitute and disfranchised mass&rsquo (Plut. Agis 5. vi).

The Spartiates were better trained than other Greek hoplites, but as army numbers were maintained by increasing the proportion of non-Spartiates the Spartiates&rsquo skill will not have counted for much. Leuctra showed suddenly that Sparta had been &lsquopunching above its weight&rsquo and was no longer to be feared its conduct since the Peloponnesian War had won it enemies rather than friends a determined revolt by the lower orders could not have been suppressed, but, fortunately for the Spartiates, the lower orders did not immediately lose the habit of obedience. Other Greeks adjusted to the new reality more easily: Sparta&rsquos allies in northern Greece transferred their allegiance to Thebes we should transpose to this context what Diodorus says of the aftermath of the peace of 375, that the cities fell into confusion, especially in the Peloponnese, and there were moves towards democracy and the exile of pro-Spartan oligarchs (Diod. Sic. XV. 40). He reports separately under 370/69 a particularly violent episode in Argos, the skytalismos, &lsquoclubbing&rsquo: the people were first incited against the rich but then turned against the demagogues who had incited them (Diod. Sic. XV. 57. iii-58, cf. Plut. Praec. Ger. Reip. 814 B). Neither Corinth nor Argos was capable of filling the gap created by Sparta&rsquos weakness.

But the most serious threat to Sparta came from Arcadia. In 370 the Mantineans voted to recreate and fortify their single city, dismantled in 385. Agesilaus unsuccessfully tried to dissuade them, but was not prepared to break the peace by attacking they were supported by other Arcadians and Elis. They then supported a party inTegea which wanted an Arcadian federation. Oligarchic anti-federalists fled to Sparta in the skirmishing which followed Sparta under Agesilaus did support the anti-federalists, while Elis and Argos supported the federalists, who emerged successful when Agesilaus withdrew (Xen. Hell. VI. v. 3&ndash21, Diod. Sic. XV 59, 62. i-ii, Plut. Ages. 30. vii). The federation was based on an assembly of ten thousand (perhaps all who satisfied a low property qualification), a council and a body oidamiorgoi (in an inscription, fifty appointed in proportion from participating communities). &lsquoLepreum&rsquo, i.e. Triphylia, the southern part of the territory liberated from Elis c.400, at first supported Sparta but was induced to join (Xen. Hell. VII. iv. 33&ndash4, IG v. ii 1 = R&O 32

Harding 51). Xenophon mentions a professional nucleus for the army, the eparitoi(cf. the Theban sacred band: p. 284) Diodorus&rsquo five thousand epilektoi, &lsquochosen&rsquo, may be the same body but given too high a figure (Xen. Hell. VII. iv. 33, cf. 22, v. 3 Diod. Sic. XV 62. ii, 67. ii). The man who emerged as leader of the federation was Lycomedes of Mantinea (e.g. Diod. Sic. XV 62. ii: in &lsquoLycomedes of Tegea&rsquo in 59. i either the man&rsquos name or the city is wrong).

Arcadia and its allies appealed first to Athens, which was not now interested in opposing Sparta, and then to Thebes (Diod. Sic. XV. 62. iii, cf. Xen. Hell. VI. v. 19). In winter 370/69 the Arcadians attacked Heraea and forced it to join the federation (Xen. Hell. VI. v. 22, cf. IG v. ii 1). When theThebans and their central Greek allies arrived, under Epaminondas and Pelopidas, they invaded Laconia: some of the perioikoi supported them, but when Sparta offered freedom to loyal helots over 6,000 responded Sparta itself escaped but the port of Gytheum was attacked. Then - omitted by Xenophon - the invaders moved west into Messenia, which Sparta had possessed since the eighth/seventh centuries, and liberated that: a polls of Messene was founded on Mount Ithome, and some other independent poleis came into existence. Wintry conditions and shortage of supplies led to the break-up of the expedition Sparta and its allies had persuaded Athens to send a force under Iphicrates, but he was singularly ineffective in trying to prevent the Thebans from returning home (Xen. Hell. VI. v. 22&ndash52, Diod. Sic. XV 62&ndash67. i, Plut. Ages. 31&ndash33. iv, Pel. 24, Paus. IX. 14. iv-vii on Iphicrates cf. p. 271). Sparta was never willing to accept the loss of Messenia and the loss was a blow to Sparta&rsquos economic base as well as to its pride. The Arcadians dedicated a statue group at Delphi, at the beginning of the Sacred Way, directly opposite Sparta&rsquos navarchs dedication.

Another important development omitted by Xenophon is the creation from a number of small communities of the new &lsquogreat city&rsquo of Megalopolis, in the south-west of Arcadia near Laconia and Messenia (cf. ill. 17). This was part of Arcadia&rsquos assertion of itself against Sparta: eventually, if not immediately, Megalopolis incorporated some communities which had previously been under Spartan control. Different texts point to different dates for the foundation, but the decision, building and formal inauguration will have taken some time the ascription of credit to Thebes suggests that the process was not completed until after 370/69, but there are Megalopolitan damiorgoi in IG v. ii 1 = R&O 32

Harding 51, probably of369-367 (Parian Marble FGrH 239 A 73, 370/69 or 369/8 Diod. Sic. XV. 72. iv, 368/7 Paus. VIII. 27. i-viii, cf. JX. 14. vi, 15. vi, 371/0 butTheban involvement).

Ill. 17 Megalopolis: theatre. © Ruggero Vanni/CORBIS

In 369 envoys from Sparta and the Peloponnesian League went to Athens to make a firm alliance (Xen. Hell. VII. i. 1&ndash14, Diod. Sic. XV 67. i: cf. p. 271).This year (probably) saw the first of a series of campaigns in the northeast Peloponnese: Epaminondas came south with the Thebans once more Dionysius of Syracuse sent light cavalry to support Sparta (Xen. Hell. VII. i. 15&ndash25, Diod. Sic. XV 68&ndash70. i). Phlius, where friends of Sparta had been in control since Agesilaus&rsquo intervention in 381&ndash379, resisted attacks this year and again later (Xen. Hell. VII. ii). In 369/8 Philiscus came to Greece from Ariobarzanes a conference at Delphi failed to agree on a new treaty, since Sparta would not abandon its claim to Messenia, so his money was spent on mercenaries for Sparta (cf. p. 234). In 368 another force from Syracuse arrived and, though Athens would have liked to use it against Thebes in Thessaly, this was again used by Sparta. In southern Arcadia Agesilaus&rsquo son Archidamus won the &lsquotearless victory&rsquo in a battle in which no Spartans were killed (but hardly more than ten thousand of the enemy, as claimed by Diodorus) against a combination of Arcadia, Messene and Argos (Xen. Hell. VII. i. 28&ndash32, Diod. Sic. XV 72. iii, Plut. Ages. 33. v-vi).

In 367 the states were preoccupied with the talks in Susa from which Thebes brought a draft treaty through which it hoped to add the weakening of Athens to the weakening of Sparta, thus ending the link between Sparta and Persia (cf. p. 234), and there was no major campaign in the Peloponnese. In 366 Epaminondas with Argive support attacked hitherto neutral Achaea, originally bringing it into a subordinate alliance but not interfering internally. When the Arcadians objected that the oligarchic regimes were likely to go over to Sparta, Thebes sent harmosts, exiled the oligarchs and set up democracies. But this policy backfired: the oligarchs returned and regained control, and did then align Achaea with Sparta (Xen. Hell. VII. i. 41&ndash3, Diod. Sic. XV 75, ii). In Sicyon, between Achaea and Corinth, a leader called Euphron had originally supported Sparta, but in 368 (Diodorus: better than Xenophon&rsquos later context) with support from Arcadia and Argos he had set up an anti-Spartan democracy and then &lsquomade himself tyrant&rsquo and liberated a body of serfs. In 366 the Arcadians under Aeneas of Stymphalus (probably the Aeneas Tacticus whose manual On Withstanding a Siege survives) occupied the city of Sicyon and restored the oligarchic exiles Euphron fled to the harbour and handed that over to Sparta. Later a Theban harmost was installed on the acropolis Euphron returned with mercenaries from Athens and with the support of the democrats got possession of the city but not the acropolis. He went to Thebes to try to buy a settlement, but was followed there and assassinated by his opponents despite the label &lsquotyrant&rsquo his supporters secured a public funeral for him (Xen. Hell. VII. i. 44&ndash6, iii, Diod. Sic. XV. 70. iii).

A breach between Arcadia and Thebes began with the inclusion in the draft treaty of a clause returning to Elis the territory which it claimed, and Lycomedes and the other Arcadians walked out of the conference in Thebes (cf. p. 234). In 366, without breaking off the Theban alliance, Lycomedes persuaded the Arcadians to make a new alliance with Athens, which was thus allied both to Arcadia and to Sparta. He was killed on his way home, but the alliance held, and Athens sent cavalry with instructions to defend Arcadia but not to attack Sparta (Xen. Hell. VII. iv. 2&ndash3, 6).

Corinth was in an unstable state. The Athenians when making their alliance with Arcadia decided to ensure that Corinth &lsquoshould be kept safe for the Athenian people&rsquo, but the Corinthians expelled Athenian forces from their territory and refused admission to an Athenian fleet under Chares, and then hired mercenaries to fight against their neighbours (Xen. Hell. VII. iv. 4&ndash6). It was perhaps at this point that Timophanes tried to make himself tyrant, and was assassinated by opponents including his own brother, Timoleon (Plut. Tim. 4&ndash5, cf. 7. i contr. Diod. Sic. XVI. 65, 340&rsquos for the later career of Timoleon see pp. 327&ndash30). In 365, feeling isolated, Corinth made an approach to Thebes for a peace treaty, and at the same time consulted Sparta: Sparta was willing to let its allies make peace, though it lamented that they would not fight for it now when it had fought for them in the past, and that Thebes was allowing Persia&rsquos claim to Asia Minor but not Sparta&rsquos much older claim to Messenia and Sparta would not itself participate in a treaty which guaranteed the independence of Messenia. Corinth refused the Thebans&rsquo request for an alliance as well as a peace treaty. The upshot was probably a treaty which was represented as another renewal of the King&rsquos Peace but which covered only Thebes and its allies, and the cities of the north-east Peloponnese and it marked the end of the Peloponnesian League (cf. pp. 234&ndash5). Isocrates&rsquo pamphlet (VI) expressing Sparta&rsquos reaction was written in the name of Archidamus: Agesilaus, who might have tried harder not to let the League go, was out of Sparta assisting in the Satraps&rsquo Revolt (cf. p. 258), and the other king, Cleomenes, was a nonentity.

War between Elis and Arcadia followed Thebes&rsquo proposal to restore territory to Elis, when in 365 Elis captured Lasion (one of the more northerly of the communities which it lost c.400, which must have joined the Arcadian federation). The Arcadians fought back vigorously, getting possession of Olympia and at one point entering the city of Elis and fighting in the agora there Elis was supported by Achaea. In 364 the Arcadians invaded Elis again. Sparta, like Achaea, was now allied to Elis, and a force under Archidamus occupied Cromnus, south of Megalopolis, but the Arcadians, supported by Messene, Argos and Thebes, captured almost all of the Spartan garrison. The Arcadians had encouraged those living around Olympia to form a Pisatan state (cf. SIG 3 171, and the adventurously restored SEG xxix 405 gold coins Kraay, Archaic and Classical Greek Coins, no. 333 = CAH 2 plates v-vi no. 260), and with support from Arcadia, Argos and Athens the Pisatans celebrated that year&rsquos Olympic festival Elis and Achaea tried to dislodge them, fighting in the sanctuary but without success (Xen. Hell. VII. iv. 12&ndash32, Diod. Sic. XV. 77. i-iv, 78. ii-iii, 82. i). One result of this episode was that the Arcadians started using sacred funds from Olympia to pay their eparitoi but upper-class leaders in Mantinea headed a faction which disapproved of this, and despite the opposition of the federal officials (probably the damiorgoi) obtained a majority vote in the Arcadian assembly the officials appealed to Thebes for support but the assembly countermanded the appeal. In winter 363/2 the Mantinean faction remained dominant, and negotiated peace between Arcadia and Elis. During the peace celebrations in Tegea a Theban harmost was persuaded to arrest members of that faction Mantinea persuaded him to release them, and protested to Thebes, but in 362 Epaminondas came south with an army from Thebes and its allies. The Mantinean faction, with Elis and Achaea, appealed to Sparta and Athens (Xen. Hell. VII. iv. 33-v 3 Diod. Sic. XV 82. i-iv makes the Mantineans those who favoured using the sacred funds).

Epaminondas went to Tegea, and was joined by Argos and Messene, and Tegea&rsquos Arcadian supporters. While Agesilaus (back from the Satraps&rsquo Revolt, now aged 80 or over) was marching north, Epaminondas headed south to attack Sparta. Agesilaus was warned and returned in time Epaminondas reached the outskirts of the city but was driven back. He then returned to Arcadia Agesilaus followed him and in a battle outside Mantinea the Theban army was getting the upper hand when Epaminondas was killed. The result was a stalemate, with both sides claiming victory and (as Xenophon lamented) the power struggle unresolved (Xen. Hell. VII. v. 4&ndash27, Diod. Sic. XV 82. v-88, Plut. Ages. 34. iii-35, Polyb. IX. 8). Afterwards another common peace treaty was made, with Sparta again excluded on account of Messenia (cf. p. 235).

In 361 some of the men who had been drafted into Megalopolis tried to return to their old homes, with the support of the Mantinean faction and its allies but the Megalopolitans appealed to Thebes, Thebes sent an army under Pammenes, and he forced the dissidents to return (Diod. Sic. XV 94. i-iii). After that the division in Arcadia persisted, with each side claiming to be &lsquothe Arcadians&rsquo it was the Mantinean faction which joined with Achaea, Elis and Phlius in making an alliance with Athens in 362/1 (IG ii 2 112 = R&O 41

APPENDIX: PERSIA AND ITS REBELS

Artaxerxes II (Mnemon) succeeded Darius II in 405/4, and reigned until 359/8 but he was challenged by his younger brother Cyrus (born in 423, just after Darius&rsquo accession, whereas Artaxerxes may have been born as early as 453). Cyrus collected forces in 402, including a body often thousand Greek mercenaries in 401 he marched east, but in a battle at Cunaxa, by the Euphrates upstream from Babylon, he was defeated and killed, though his Greeks were undefeated (Xen. An. I, Diod. Sic. XIV. 19&ndash24). Tissaphernes, whom Cyrus had supplanted in Sardis in 407 (cf. p. 156), fought on Artaxerxes&rsquo side, and after the battle he treacherously killed the Greek commanders (Xen. An. II. iii, v, Diod. Sic. XIV. 26). He returned to Sardis in 400 (Xen. Hell. III. i. 2, Diod. Sic. XIV 35. ii), while the Greeks made their way through Armenia to the Black Sea (Xen. An. II-VII, Diod. Sic. XIV 25&ndash31).

In Egypt a revolt against Persia began under Amyrtaeus c. 404/3 despite several attempts the Persians were not to recover Egypt until 343/2, and then only for a short time. Tamos, an Egyptian who had served in Ionia under both Tissaphernes and Cyrus, on Tissaphernes&rsquo return fled to Egypt but was put to death (Diod. Sic. XIV 35. iii-v). In 396 the Spartans tried to make an alliance with Egypt, and were granted supplies but not an alliance (Diod. Sic. XIV 79. iv).

Cyprus was another problem area. The city of Salamis had long been ruled by kings of a Greek dynasty, as vassals of Persia a Tyrian had seized power by the 430&rsquos, and c.415 he was killed and succeeded by another Phoenician Evagoras, of the old ruling family, expelled him in 411 and set about increasing the power of Salamis within Cyprus (Diod. Sic. XIV 98. i, Isoc. IX. Evagoras 18&ndash20, 26&ndash32, Theopompus FGrH 115 F 103. ii). There was also contact between him and Athens, as a result of which he was made an Athenian citizen some time between 411 and 407 (IG i 3 113, cf. Isoc. IX. Evagoras 54, [Dem.] XII. Letter of Philip 10). Conon took refuge with him after Aegospotami (Xen. Hell. II. i. 29, Diod. Sic. XIII. 106. vi), and it was with his support that Conon was appointed to command a fleet for Pharnabazus in 398 (Isoc. IX. Evagoras 55&ndash6, cf. Diod. Sic. XIV 39. i-ii). After the battle of Cnidus, in 394, Athens honoured Evagoras as well as Conon, describing him as a Greek fighting on behalf of the Greeks (R&O 11).

Diodorus mentions a ten-year war (cf. Isoc. IX. Evagoras 64) between Evagoras and the King, beginning it under 391/0 when the Cypriot cities not yet in Evagoras&rsquo power appealed to the King (Diod. Sic. XIV 98. i-iv) but ending it under 386/5 and 385/4 (Diod. Sic. XV 2&mdash4, 8&ndash11): an astronomical diary allows us to conclude that the war began in 391, the fighting recorded in Diodorus XV was in 386 and 385, but Evagoras did not capitulate until 381. In 391 the Kng gave the command against Evagoras to Autophradates and to &lsquoHecatomnos the dynast of Caria&rsquo (Diod. Sic. XIV 98. iii-iv, where Autophradates&rsquo name has probably been lost at the beginning of §iv,Theopompus FGrH 115 F 103. iv): Hecatomnos&rsquo family is attested at the beginning of the fifth century (Hdt. V 118. ii), and it is most likely that c.392/1 Caria had been detached from the satrapy of Sardis and, in a departure from the fifth-century policy of appointing Persian satraps (though vassal rulers had been tolerated in some areas, e.g. Cyprus), had been given to the head of this leading family. About 390 there was an embarrassing episode when Athens, currently on the Persians&rsquo side, sent ships to Evagoras, and these were captured by Sparta, currently opposed to Persia (Xen. Hell. IV. viii. 24) c.388 a second Athenian force, under Chabrias, did reach Evagoras (Xen. Hell. V. i. 10&ndash12).

The Peace of Antalcidas, in 387/6, allowed Persia to concentrate on its rebels. The treaty stated that Cyprus was to belong to the King (Xen. Hell. V. i. 31) but it did not mention Egypt, so Chabrias moved there (Dem. XX. Leptines 76). Evagoras made an alliance with Acoris in Egypt, and Hecatomnos supported him and he captured Tyre and other places in Phoenicia. Against him Artaxerxes sent Tiribazus, now satrap of Sardis, and Orontes, previously satrap of Armenia, with Glos, son of Tamos and son-in-law of Tiribazus, commanding the ships. Evagoras was defeated in a naval battle off Citium, and the Persians began to besiege Salamis (Diod. Sic. XV. 2&ndash4, Isoc. IX. Evagoras 62,Theopompus FGrH 115 F 103. vi). When it seemed unlikely that he could hold out, Evagoras approached Tiribazus, whose terms were that his power should be limited to Salamis, he should pay tribute, and he should be obedient &lsquoas a slave to his master&rsquo. Evagoras refused to accept the last clause, and made contact with Orontes, who denounced Tiribazus for disloyalty and had him sent to Artaxerxes as a prisoner, and made a treaty by which Evagoras was to obey &lsquoas a king to a king&rsquo (Diod. Sic. XV. 8&ndash9. ii, Theopompus FGrH 115 F 103. ix). Eventually Tiribazus vindicated himself and Orontes was in trouble (Diod. Sic. XV 10&ndash11). Evagoras survived until he was assassinated in 374/3 (Diod. Sic. XV 47. viii), and the dynasty lasted until 310.

In Egypt Acoris and Chabrias fought successfully against Persia for three years, probably 385&ndash383 (Isoc. IV Paneg. 140). When Tiribazus was arrested Glos defected to Egypt and made an alliance with Acoris he may have approached Sparta but it is unlikely that he obtained an alliance before long he was murdered (Diod. Sic. XV 9. iii-v, 18. i). Once Evagoras had been dealt with, Persia concentrated on Egypt. The command was given to Pharnabazus (one of three commanders in 385&ndash383 transferred from Dascylium, where he was succeeded by his son Ariobarzanes). In 380/79 he protested to Athens against Chabrias&rsquo fighting for the Egyptians, and the Athenians recalled him and sent Iphicrates to fight for the Persians (Diod. Sic. XV 29. i-iv). Substantial preparations were made over several years the need for Greek mercenaries underlay Persia&rsquos interest in renewing the King&rsquos Peace in 375 (Diod. Sic. XV 38. i: cf. pp. 231&ndash2) and the invasion finally took place in 374. Large forces were mustered at Ace, in Palestine, and sailed to Egypt. With one contingent they gained a foothold in the Nile delta, but when Iphicrates wanted to advance inland and attack Memphis, Pharnabazus insisted on waiting for the rest of his force. The Egyptians fought back, and when the Nile flooded the Persians had to withdraw. Iphicrates returned to Athens in time to take over Timotheus&rsquo command in 373/2 (Diod. Sic. XV 41&ndash3: cf. pp. 270, 307), while Timotheus took over Iphicrates&rsquo position ([Dem.] XLIX. Timotheus 25&ndash8, 59&ndash60). Pharnabazus was replaced by Datames, satrap in the east of Asia Minor (perhaps originally Cilicia, to which he had added Cappadocia), but he seems not to have acted against Egypt (Nep. XIV Dat. 3. v).

Instead Datames became involved in what is seen as the beginning of the Satraps&rsquo Revolt. Our only continuous account is by Diodorus, all under the year 362/1 (XV 90&ndash3), but our other, scattered, evidence shows that his account is badly confused. About 370/69 Datames returned to Cappadocia, dealt with a rebel but then rebelled himself, and got in touch with Ariobarzanes at Dascylium but Autophradates was sent from Sardis, besieged him and induced him to return to apparent loyalty (Nep. XIV Dat. 4&ndash8). Ariobarzanes became vulnerable, as a supporter of Persia&rsquos pro-Spartan policy left behind when in 367 Artaxerxes was won over by Thebes (cf. p. 234), and because the satrapy was claimed by his half-brother Artabazus. In 366 Ariobarzanes was in revolt, and Athens sent Timotheus to support him yet not to break the King&rsquos Peace. Persia at some point had broken the peace by occupying Samos, and from autumn 366 to autumn 365 Timotheus besieged it, capturing it for Athens (Isoc. XV Antid. Ill, Dem. XV Lib. Rhod. 9). Ariobarzanes was besieged by Autophradates in Assus or Adramyttium, and Timotheus and the Spartan Agesilaus went to relieve him, whereupon Autophradates and Mausolus (who had succeeded his father Hecatomnos: cf. p. 362) withdrew, and even gave Agesilaus money (Xen. Ages. ii. 26, Polyaenus Strat. VII. 26, Nep. XIII. Timoth. 1. iii, Isoc. XV Antid. 112). Autophradates and Mausolus came out on the side of the rebels, and so did Orontes (restored to favour and given a command in Mysia, in north-western Asia Minor), who became the leader of the revolt and the rebels made an alliance with Tachos, the current ruler in Egypt. In 362/1 the rebels approached the Greeks: the participants in the latest common peace refused to back them (IG iv 556 = R&O 42

Harding 57: cf. pp. 235&ndash6), though the Athenian Chabrias went back as a freelance to command the fleet (Nep. XII Chab. 2. i, iii) but Sparta was not a participant and sent Agesilaus officially, with thirty Spartiate advisers, to command the Greek mercenaries - so that at last he found himself fighting against Persia once more (Xen. Ages. ii. 28&ndash30, Plut. Ages. 36&ndash37. i).

But the revolt then collapsed, with treachery all round. In 361, while Tachos advanced into Syria against Agesilaus&rsquo advice, in Egypt his nephew Nectanebo was proclaimed king: Chabrias wanted to support Tachos, Agesilaus after consulting Sparta backed Nectanebo, and Tachos, deserted, surrendered to the Persians. Agesilaus supported Nectanebo against another claimant, and in winter 360/59 died in Cyrene on his way home, to be succeeded by his son Archidamus III (Plut. Ages. 37. ii&mdash40, cf. Xen. Ages. ii. 29&ndash31, Nep. XVII. Ages. 8). He had been a strong king, and an exponent of active policies for Sparta, but he had not been successful, partly because of Sparta&rsquos inherent weakness and partly because he was not interested in making Sparta popular.

Meanwhile Rheomithres, used by the satraps to communicate with Tachos, had gone over to the King. In 360 Orontes took an army to Syria, heading for Mesopotamia, and Datames, once more on the rebels&rsquo side, crossed the Euphrates (Polyaenus Strat. VII. 21. iii), but Orontes then changed sides - after which he disappears from history. Autophradates, who had captured Artabazus, the claimant to Dascylium, released him and made peace, and Artabazus took possession of Dascylium (Dem. XXIII. Aristocrates 154&ndash8). Ariobarzanes was betrayed by his son Mithridates (Xen. Cyr.VIII. viii. 4, Arist. Pol. V. 1312 A 16). Datames returned to Cappadocia: in 359 he beat off an attack by Artabazus, but in winter 359/8 he was murdered by Mithridates (Nep. XIV Dat. 9&ndash11). Artaxerxes himself died, at an advanced age, in 359/8, and, since his other sons had already been eliminated by plots, was succeeded by Artaxerxes III (Ochus) (Plut. Artax. 26&ndash30). He began his reign by ordering the disbanding of the satraps&rsquo mercenary armies, but the main danger had passed.

NOTE ON FURTHER READING

For general studies of Sparta see the note at the end of chapter 3. Books devoted to Sparta in this period include Cartledge, Agesilaos and the Crisis of Sparta David, Sparta Between Empire and Revolution Hamilton, Sparta&rsquos Bitter Victories (on the Corinthian War), and his Agesilaus and the Failure of Spartan Hegemony.

On the EYN coinage the view which now seems likely to be correct (earlier interpretations had attributed the coins to one side or the other in the 390&rsquos) is that of S. Karwiese, &lsquoLysander as Herakliskos Drakonopnigon,&rsquo NC cxl = 7 xx 1980, 1&ndash27. On Sparta and Elis see J. Roy, &lsquoThe Spartan-Elean War of c.400&rsquo, Ath. 2 xcvii 2009, 69&ndash86 (accepting Pausanias&rsquo campaign from Diodorus in addition to Agis&rsquo campaigns from Xenophon). On Spartan imperialism after the Peloponnesian War see H. W Parke, &lsquoThe Development of the Second Spartan Empire&rsquo, JHS 1 1930, 37&ndash79. On Sparta&rsquos dealings with Persia see Lewis, Sparta and Persia, ch. 6. On Agesilaus and his opponents see R E. Smith, &lsquoThe Opposition to Agesilaus&rsquo Foreign Policy, 394&ndash371 BC&lsquo, Hist, ii

1953-4, 274&ndash88 G. L. Cawkwell, &lsquoAgesilaus and Sparta&rsquo, CQ 2 xxvi 1976, 62&ndash84. On the Locrians whose quarrel with the Phocians led to the outbreak of the Corinthian War see J. Buckler, &lsquoThe Incident at Mount Parnassus, 395 bc&rsquo, in Tuplin (ed.), Xenophon and His World&hellip 1999, 397&ndash411 ch. 8. 2 = Buckler and Beck, Central Greece and the Politics of Power in the Fourth Century BC, ch. 2.

On Sparta&rsquos social problems see Hodkinson, Property and Wealth in Classical Sparta, and his earlier article, &lsquoWarfare, Wealth and the Crisis of Spartiate Society&rsquo, in Rich and Shipley (eds.), War and Society in the Greek World, 146&ndash76. For the suggestion that the&lsquorhetra of Epitadeus&rsquo is a fiction influenced by Plato see E. Schutrumpf, &lsquoThe Pvhetra of Epitadeus A Platonist&rsquos Fiction&rsquo, GRBS xxviii 1987, 441&ndash57. On the size of the citizen population see Gomme et al., Historical Commentary on Thucydides, iv. 110&ndash17 (by Andrewes, believing in an error in Thuc. V. 68. iii, but starting from the material of Gomme, who did not believe in an error) de Ste. Croix, The Origins of the Peloponnesian War, app. 16.

On the chronology of the 360&rsquos I follow J. Roy, &lsquoArcadia and Boeotia in Peloponnesian Affairs, 370&ndash362 BC&lsquo, Hist, xx 1971, 569&ndash99, in preference to the lower chronology of J. Wiseman, &lsquoEpaminondas and the Theban Invasions&rsquo, Klio li 1969, 177&ndash99. On Megalopolis and Arcadia see S. Hornblower, &lsquoWhen was Megalopolis Founded?&rsquo, BSA lxxxv 1990, 71&ndash7 (foundation begun 371/0, as in Pausanias, but took some time) Nielsen, Arkadia and Its Poleis, 229&ndash69 (Triphylia), 414&ndash55 (Megalopolis).

The chronology of Persia&rsquos war against Evagoras was settled by R J. van der Spek, &lsquoThe Chronology of the Wars of Artaxerxes II in the Babylonian Astronomical Diaries&rsquo, Achaemenid History xi 1998, 239&ndash54 at 240&ndash51.

On Glos see T T B. Ryder, &lsquoSpartan Relations with Persia After the King&rsquos Peace: A Strange Story in Diodorus 15. 9&rsquo, CQ 2 xiii 1963, 105&ndash9 (believing a deal with Sparta was made) G. L. Cawkwell, &lsquoAgesilaus and Sparta&rsquo (above), 70&ndash1 (not believing) S. Ruzicka, &lsquoGlos, Son of Tamos, and the End of the Cyprian War&rsquo, Hist, xlviii 1999, 23&ndash43.

On the Satraps&rsquo Revolt see M. J. Osborne, &lsquoOrontes&rsquo, Hist, xxii 1973, 515&ndash51, and his Naturalization in Athens, ii. 61&ndash80 Hornblower, Mausolus, 170&ndash82 Weiskopf, The So-Called &lsquoGreat Satraps&rsquo Revolt&rsquo J. D. Bing, &lsquoThe Iconography of Revolt and Restoration in Cilicia&rsquo, Hist, xlvii 1998, 41&ndash76.


Battles in the ancient world (part 2)

This entry was posted on November 28, 2013 by Josho Brouwers .

This is the second instalment in a series of eight blog posts on types of battles fought in the ancient world. In the first part, I wrote about pitched battles, also known as “set-piece” battles. A pitched battle was fought whenever two opposing armies decided to engage each other, usually in order to pursue a decisive victory. It was therefore quite different from a chance encounter, in which an army ran into its opposing number while on the move and decided to immediately attack.

The meeting engagement

A meeting engagement or encounter battle is not a carefully planned battle for at least one of the two sides involved. Instead, an army comes across the enemy – or has only a vague idea of where the enemy is – and the general in charge decides to attack immediately, rather than disengage and organize his forces. One of the most famous meeting engagements in history is probably the Battle of Gettysburg (1863), fought between Union and Confederate armies during the American Civil War. Battles like these differ from ambushes or surprise attacks in that neither side is actively seeking an advantage before combat or attempts to take the enemy by surprise.

A meeting engagement is usually the result of insufficient reconnaissance. Ancient armies did use scouts and spies, but – like all human endeavours – reconnaissance was also the subject of human error and oversight. In his Hellenica (3.2.14–20), Xenophon tells the story of how the Spartan commander Dercylidas very nearly ran into a Persian army already deployed for battle. Some ancient historians emphasize the lack of proper reconnaissance to point out hubris on the part of one of the combatants. For example, during the Peloponnesian War (431–404 BC), the Athenians were confident that the Spartans and their Peloponnesian allies would never be able to attack the Piraeus without their knowing in advance. They were duly surprised when a Peloponnesian force did appear and only managed to narrowly avert disaster (Thuc. 2.93).

The Battle of Mantinea (418 BC) can be considered an encounter battle. The Spartans, under the command of Agis, wanted to engage the Argives and their allies, but the latter could not be moved to abandon their advantageous position on a steep hill. Instead, Agis led his troops away so they could fill up sinkholes to flood the territory of Mantinea. The Argives took advantage of this situation and rushed to meet the Spartans, who were taken by surprise as they emerged from a nearby forest. The Spartans had to deploy their forces quickly to meet the Argives. After a fierce battles, the Argive’s right was forced to rout and victory belonged to the Spartans.

During their escape from hostile country, the Greek mercenary army known as the Ten Thousandcame to rely heavily on scouts in order to avoid being taken unaware by enemy forces, whether Persian or hostile natives. Xenophon made heavy use of scouts to both avoid being surprised by enemy troops and to gain knowledge of the terrain, which would be vital if the Greek forces had to be arrayed for battle at short notice. During the whole trek through Persian territory back to the Aegean, the Ten Thousand were constantly on the defensive (for more on the Ten Thousand, see Ancient Warfare VII.5).

Perhaps the most famous encounter battle of the ancient world is the Battle of Cynoscephalae(197 BC). Roman forces numbering perhaps around 30,000 men and under the command of Titus Quinctius Flaminius marched from Thebes toward Pherae in search of Philip V of Macedon. The two armies met near Pherae where Philip’s troops were defeated in a cavalry skirmish. Both sides then marched away in search of food. The hilly nature of the landscape caused them to lose track of each other’s position. Unaware of the other army’s location, the two forces made camp on opposite sides of a series of small, rocky hills called the Kynoskephalai (“Dogs’ Heads”). Both sides sent out some cavalry or light troops, which met in a brief skirmish. The Romans were about to be defeated when reinforcements joined. The two opposing armies quickly deployed for battle, pitting Macedonian phalanx against Roman legion, similar to the later Battle of Pydna (168 BC), with the Romans emerging victorious.

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This entry was posted in Uncategorized on November 28, 2013 by Josho Brouwers . &larr Previous Post Next Post &rarr