SMS Derfflinger

SMS Derfflinger

SMS Derfflinger was the nameship of the Derfflinger class of battlecruisers, widely considered to be the best battlecruisers of the First World War. She fought at Dogger Bank and at Jutland, where she was badly damaged but survived.

Perhaps rather disappointingly, the Derfflinger was named after Georg Reichsfreiherr von Derfflinger, a Brandenburg general of the seventeenth century. She entered service in November 1914, sixteen months before her sister ship Lützow. They had been laid down and launched four months apart, but at different shipyards. Derfflinger was built by Blohm & Voss at Hamburg, the same firm that had built every previous German battlecruiser, while the Lützow was built by Schichau at Danzig.

Soon after entering service the Derfflinger took part in the raid on the Yorkshire coast (16 December 1914), taking part in the bombardment of Scarborough and of Whitby.

She took part in the battle of Dogger Bank (24 January 1915). In the first phase of that battle she was not the target of any of the British battlecruisers, allowing her to fire undisturbed on the Lion. She caused much of the damage suffered by Admiral Beatty’s flagship, and in return was directly hit once when a 13.5mm shell burst on the main belt of armour. She was back in action by 14 February.

The same thing happened at the start of the battle of Jutland. For ten minutes the Derfflinger was not the target of any of Beatty’s battlecruisers, and was able to fire undisturbed. This error was soon rectified, and by 4.00pm she was under fire. Her first target was the Princess Royal, but her first victim was the Queen Mary. At 4.26 that ship exploded after being the target of both the Derfflinger and the Seydlitz.

At the start of the second phase of the battle the Derfflinger became involved in a battle with HMS Invincible, the flagship of Admiral Hood. At first the Invincible had the better of the battle, inflicting some serious damage on the Derfflinger, but at 6.30 a shell from either the Derfflinger or the König triggered an explosion that destroyed the British battlecruiser.

The Derfflinger took most damage during the second “battle turn away”, when Admiral Scheer was forced to order his battlecruisers to launch an apparently suicidal attack on the British fleet in order to cover the main battle fleet. The Derfflinger was hit nine times between 7.14 and 7.20, and had D and C turrets put out of action. Her fire control gear was knocked out and she was on fire. She only survived because Scheer was able to signal an end to the battlecruiser attack after the success of the second turn away. She came under fire again at 8.15, and was probably only saved by the action of the squadron of pre-dreadnought battleships, which stood its ground while the wounded battlecruisers escaped to safety.

The crew of the Derfflinger suffered 157 dead and 26 wounded, the highest number of casualties for any ship that survived the battle on either side. She took on 3,000 tons of water, and needed four and a half months worth of repairs. She was finally back at sea by mid-October, and rejoined the fleet in November 1916. She took part in most of the remaining sorties of the High Seas Fleet, including the final major sortie on 23-24 April 1918, an unsuccessful attempt to attack the ships escorting a Scandinavian convoy. After the war she was interned at Scapa Flow, and scuttled by her crew on 21 June 1919.

Displacement (loaded)


Top Speed



5,600 nautical miles at 14kts

Armour – deck


- belt


- bulkheads


- battery


- barbettes


- turrets


- conning tower



690ft 3in


Eight 305mm (12in) SK L/50 guns
Twelve 150mm (5.9in) SK L/45 guns
Four 8.8mm (3.45in) SK L/45 guns
Four 500mm (19.7in) submerged torpedo tubes

Crew complement

1112 normal
1391 at Jutland


1 July 1913


November 1914


21 June 1919



Kapitän zur See von Reuter


Kapitän zur See Heinrich


Kapitän zur See Johannes Hartog


Kapitän zur See von Schlick


Kapitän zur See Walter Hidebrand


Korvettenkapitän Pastuszyk

Books on the First World War |Subject Index: First World War

SMS Derfflinger II

A decision was also finally made about the roll-damping tanks, and despite the negative report by the commander of von der Tann saying they reduced the roll by just 33 per cent, it was decided to proceed with them, perhaps because preparations had already progressed too far to remove them and finance had already been approved. Interestingly, the following sister ship, Ersatz Kaiserin Augusta, did not have roll-damping tanks either planned or installed.

The final design of K – Derfflinger – was a striking ship and with it German shipbuilding reached a pinnacle as far as completed Panzerkreuzers were concerned. This class of three ships is often regarded as the best all-round capital ship of the period, and aesthetically is among the most handsome.

Prior to the outbreak of war it had been planned for Derfflinger to be completed on 13 September and the Kaiser had ordered the new Panzerkreuzer to be dispatched to the opening of the Panama Canal, which meant the cruiser would have to be in service on 1 October 1914. After that Derfflinger was scheduled to visit the 1915 Panama–Pacific International Exposition in San Francisco.

With the declaration of a state of war on 1 August 1914 it was determined to accelerate the completion and readiness of Derfflinger for the front, and in August pre-trials and acceptance of the ship’s hull, engines and auxiliary machinery and weapons were begun. The pre-trials were made jointly by the builders and the designated ship’s crew, a process that significantly reduced the trials period. Kapitän zur See Heinrich commented that: ‘The crew were initially drawn together from men that immediately before the outbreak of war were taken from the ships of the cruiser squadron from East Asia and had returned home and were retained in service. Most of the men had served on Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. They were practical men, well trained, and well developed physically. So, the men of the ship were very good.’ The commissioning commander, Kapitän zur See von Reuter, requested and was granted permission to commission the ship early and load munitions in Hamburg. Likewise, the torpedo nets would be brought from Wilhelmshaven to Hamburg and be installed at the constructor’s yard.

The ship met the contractual obligations, and the hull, engines and boilers were all in good condition when the ship was handed over – however, only one coat of paint had been applied internally. Since the ship had been fully outfitted the draught for the trials was 9.4–9.6m, instead of the intended trials draught of 8.33m.

Derfflinger manoeuvred well at high speed but at low speed not so well. Manoeuvring with the propellers alone was sufficient and met practical needs. Vibration of the hull at all speeds ahead and astern was slight and had no adverse effects on the armament. However, there was considerable vibration with the transition from going ahead to astern, especially in shallow water. This was to have an adverse effect, as will be shown.

The accommodation was generally good and the distribution of crew space gave no reason for complaint, although the commander’s cabin was too far aft and his day rest room on the bridge had no toilet. The stores and provision rooms and distribution rooms were of sufficient size and were sufficiently ventilated. Only the positioning of the meat store immediately above an oil cell was criticised and the store had to be moved. The absence of wooden furniture, on the basis that it posed a fire risk, was criticised and it was recommended that some wooden furniture be allowed. Ventilation was regarded as sufficient.

The view from the forward conning tower over the bow was obscured by turret B and the bow of the ship was not visible to the navigation Offizier or helmsman, so a steering guide had to be placed on the bow. Likewise the commander’s view from the bridge was restricted by the conning tower, mast and chart house, and not all of the horizon could be seen. It was recommended that a folding ‘flying bridge’ of light construction be situated on the roof of the chart house.

The designed performance of Derfflinger was 63,000shp and 25½kts, and this was exceeded with an actual performance of 76,634shp and maximum speed of 26½kts. Nevertheless, the trials were conducted with a draught of 9.4–9.6m instead of 8.33m and were run in shallow water, thereby reducing the performance. It was believed that if the trials had been run at designed draught and in deep water a speed 2kts higher would have been achieved. The contractual astern performance of 28,000shp was considerably exceeded with 37,000shp. Range was 5,400nm at 14kts.

The readiness of the ship and the completion of underway trials were twice interrupted by damage to both low-pressure turbines.

The first damage occurred to the port low-pressure turbine on the trip intended for determining compass deviation on 4 September. The repairs consisted of renewing the blades of the third, fourth and fifth stages of the low-pressure turbine and required the lifting and closing of the turbine housing, with the work taking five weeks.

The second damage was found in the starboard low-pressure turbine after going astern on 15 October. Approximately seventeen blades of the third stage were damaged and all the blades of the third stage were replaced. Although initially it was thought the damage was of a minor nature, the blades were reinforced with strong wire to make them shock-resistant. At the same time, the blades of both low-pressure turbines from the third stage on received lock wire in the joints of the blade segments for added strength, while to keep the blades in place the clearance of the entire blades of the ahead and astern low-pressure turbines was increased, by at least 3mm, by filing the blade ends when the turbines were warm and expanded. The edge of the upper turbine blade ends was rounded and the free axial play between the guide vanes and blades was brought to 11mm. The completion of this work required three weeks.

It was later believed by engineers and naval architects that the cause of the damage was vibration brought about by going from ahead to astern. This vibration probably caused resonance vibration of the turbine blades, some of which were up to 40cm in length and caused them to contact the guide vanes in between – resulting in the so-called ‘turbine salad’.

Although the work of the dockyard workers and the crew was commended, it was pointed out that working in a confined space and with no previous experience caused some delays.

The boiler plant fully met its requirements, as did the auxiliary machinery. Only half the turbo-fans were required to provide enough air for the forced draught for the boilers.

The electrical system was good and the turbo-dynamos worked perfectly. However, the diesel dynamos suffered teething problems.

Operational History

At noon on 1 September 1914 Derfflinger was commissioned into the Imperial Navy at the Blohm & Voss Dockyard in Hamburg. The priority was to complete the ship and carry out trials, and for this the ship would have to go to Kiel and the Baltic. At 04.40 on 2 September 1914 Derfflinger reached Brunsbüttelkoog and then entered the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal for the trip to the east. At 15.25 she reached Holtenau at Kiel and the commander recorded: ‘South lock. The ship steers well and could partly run at a speed of 12kts.’ At 16.00 the ship made fast to buoy A8 in Kiel harbour and began taking aboard oil, 1,200 tonnes of coal and other materiel. At this stage of the war, ships had to pass through the canal at reduced draught.

On 4 September Derfflinger suffered the first damage to the port low-pressure turbine however, trials continued with combat training, transferring torpedoes, boat handling and munition handling for the heavy artillery. On 11 September she transferred to the imperial dockyard for repair work using starboard engine and with the assistance of two tugs. Whilst the repair work on the port low-pressure turbine continued, the starboard turbine was also opened and inspected. On 24 September it was reported that Allied warships would break through the Great Belt into the Baltic, and therefore the following day Derfflinger conducted exercises in Kiel Bay, with the ship ready for action. The attack did not materialise and on 26 September turbine repair work continued.

On 9 October shooting practice was carried out and on 13 October there was a calibre shoot on the target ship Bayern. The same day the port low-pressure turbine was reported ready for further employment. The following day Großadmiral Prinz Heinrich, brother of the Kaiser, visited the ship. Then, on 15 October, damage occurred to the starboard low-pressure turbine, again beginning with the third stage rotor blades. Repair work was undertaken on the starboard low-pressure turbine and at the same time modifications were begun on the port low-pressure turbine. This work concluded on 9 November after which the trials were continued, finishing on 13 November. At 01.00 on 14 November Derfflinger began the canal trip back to the North Sea and after replenishing provisions the ship arrived in Schillig Roads on 16 November.

The BdA, Kontreadmiral Hipper, visited the ship on 18 November and the following day Derfflinger joined the I AG as tactical number 3. On 20 November exercises were undertaken in the North Sea, including firing four torpedos, and on return Derfflinger passed the Jade bar with a draught of 9.2m.1 Training with Blücher followed on 24–25 November and then the arduous North Sea routine of picket duty and being on short notice for raising steam began. On 9 December the I AG made an abortive advance into the Helgoland Bight.

At 04.00 on 15 December 1914 Derfflinger weighed anchor and put to sea in the unit of I AG on an operation to bombard the English coast. During the night passage, Kapitän zur See von Reuter lamented the poor visibility ahead from the conning tower after the stern lantern of the next ship ahead had been extinguished. At 08.56 on the morning of 16 December the high coastline came in sight and very soon Robin Hood’s Bay was correctly identified. At 09.02 Derfflinger opened fire on the Scarborough battery and barracks and at 09.08 transferred to the coast watch station and the Grand Hotel. Fire was ceased at 09.12 as Derfflinger turned onto a northerly course and then reopened fire between 09.16 and 09.23 on the same targets. A total of 176 15cm and 145 8.8cm shells were fired at these targets. Course was then maintained along the coast to Whitby at high speed. From 10.08 to 10.13 the signal station and guard house at Whitby were taken under fire.2 Only fifty-three 15cm and twelve 8.8cm shells were fired on Whitby. At 10.14 von der Tann set the signal ‘Z 0’ – ‘follow the leader’ – and course was taken to the cruiser assembly point out at sea. At 10.20 the I Group came in sight to the NW and at 10.52 Derfflinger was on a course ESE, at a speed of 23kts.

From reconnaissance by the German small cruisers it was known that British heavy forces were nearby and at 12.50 the signal was given ‘Clear ship for battle!’ The I AG was almost trapped by the British 1 Battle Cruiser Squadron and the 2 Battle Squadron, but the only enemy forces sighted from Derfflinger were destroyers of the ‘A’ class sighted at 15.07, to port on an opposite course and at a range of 200hm.

Conditions on 16 December 1914 were quite stormy, with a NW wind force 7–8, and the swell from the NW Strength 6. For the first time Derfflinger was being driven under difficult weather conditions. Bad weather preparations were taken in time and the ship remained dry inside. Kapitän zur See von Reuter continued:

The ship was exceptionally seaworthy. Both the upper roll-damping tanks were filled, and the movements were apparently lower compared with other Panzerkreuzers. Whether the roll-damping tanks are to be retained is to be determined by trials, which on 16 December were not possible because of combat conditions. The sloshing around of water and the noise of air rushing backwards and forwards through the air channel had an unfavourable influence on service in the FT (wireless) room. Consideration should be given for the arrangement of the FT room on new cruisers for this.

Whilst steaming against the swell at high speed (23kts) the ship has taken the usual water onboard, but, with no breakers over the bow. Nevertheless, the holes of the sounding position and vision slits are tight.

During the night the I AG steered in loose formation and continued to Amrum Bank and then east of Helgoland to the Jade, where the unit arrived around 19.00 on 17 December 1914.

The next large-scale operation Derfflinger was involving in was the Dogger Bank Battle. At 18.00 on 23 January 1915 Derfflinger weighed anchor and steered to seawards as tactical number 3. The wind was a north-easterly at force 3 and the night was very clear. At 05.34 on the morning of 24 January ‘Alarm!’ was given after a searchlight was briefly observed to the NW. At 08.00 the enemy recognition signal was recognised as ‘UA–F’ and at the same time shooting was observed from the light forces ahead. The German Panzerkreuzer turned to the west, towards the enemy and advanced in this direction. At 08.30 Derfflinger was cleared for battle and the I AG turned away from the enemy, taking course SE. In the poor light the individual enemy ships could not be clearly distinguished. Therefore the turn away was made until there was a clearer understanding of the situation. At 09.17 the signal was given for 23kts. As the British destroyers came within range at 09.42 Blücher received orders to open fire on them. Derfflinger, keen to be in the action, moved out of the line and requested permission to open fire likewise, but the reply was the signal ‘Z 0’ (‘follow the leader’), so she again sheered back into line. When the ship received fire from starboard aft at 09.55 it came as a surprise to those aboard, as several groups of ships had approached unobserved in the smoke and haze. At 10.11 Derfflinger opened fire with the heavy artillery on the first ship from the left, at first with eight guns, then from 10.23 with four-gun salvos. From 10.23 to 10.35 the forward turrets and medium-calibre guns fired on some light cruisers. When at 10.35 the first target was out of range, target was changed to the second ship from the left, then for a brief minute target was changed to the third ship from the left. At 10.36 target was again taken on the original target, the first ship from the left, range 172–190hm. Several hits were observed on the first two ships and fire was continued until the British ships turned away. From 11.48 until noon the medium artillery and even the light artillery fired on two British destroyers, which turned away. During the battle Derfflinger fired a total of 234 30.5cm armour-piercing shells and seventy-six 30.5cm explosive shells. A total of forty-eight 15cm shots were fired and just five 8.8cm explosive shells.

During the battle Derfflinger was hit only once: a heavy shell struck the armoured belt at 11.40. A second shell landed short and caused heavy vibration at the time. There were several other near misses, which fell to port and starboard aft and caused some flooding. Derfflinger suffered no losses.

At 19.40 Derfflinger anchored in Wilhelmshaven Roads and the following morning ran into the imperial dockyard and made fast to Berth BV for repairs, including a period in the floating dock from 27 January – 16 February.

Kapitän zur See von Reuter made some interesting observations about the battle, saying that, despite clean boilers and the excellent performance of the stokers and personnel, the engines could only make 260 revolutions, driving her at 24kts. The draught was 9.4m, and the speed deficiency was attributable to the shortening of the low-pressure turbine blades, he said. However, this observation is at odds with his former comments after 16 December, when he commented that Derfflinger was the fastest of the German Panzerkreuzers.

Further, he commented that the British sought to hold the range beyond that of the Germans, but inside their own, that is about 195hm, and surmised that this was the upper limit of their range. He said the British superiority in speed allowed them to make greater course alterations to throw off the German aim, up to four points, or 44°. He believed two ships were firing on Derfflinger but their fire was slow, but nevertheless they held their aim. He concluded that lagging behind in heavy artillery calibre had been a mistake.


A Blohm & Voss által épített Derfflinger gerincét 1912-ben fektették le a Hamburgban. A vízrebocsátására eredetileg 1913. június 14-én került volna sor, de a fabakok, melyeken a hajó nyugodott, beragadtak és a hajótest csak 30-40 cm-t mozdult meg. A július 12-ei második próbálkozás már sikerrel járt. Hajógyári munkásokból álló legénységgel a cirkáló a Skagerrakon és a Kattegaton át Kielbe hajózott. Október végén a Derfflingert az I. felderítőcsoporthoz (Aufklärungsgruppe I) osztották be, de a próbajáratai során megsérült gőzturbinái miatt november 16-ig nem tudott csatlakozni az egységéhez. [1]

A hajó vízkiszorítása 26 600 tonna volt, teljes hosszúsága 210,4 m. [2] A hajó személyzete 1068 főnyi legénységből és 44 tisztből állt. [3] A Derfflingert 14 szénnel üzemelt kazánnal és két magas- és alacsony nyomású turbinával szerelték fel, melyek négy hajócsavart hajtottak meg. [4] A hajó csúcssebessége 26,5 csomó volt és 10 400 km-t (5600 tmf) tudott megtenni 14 csomós sebesség mellett. [5] 1915 augusztus elején egy darut szereltek a hajó közepére és Hansa-Brandenburg W vízirepülőgépek indítását tesztelték rajta. [6]

A nyolc 30,5 cm-es (L/50) ágyúval felszerelt Derfflinger-osztály a legnagyobb és legerősebb német csatacirkálók voltak. [7] Fegyverzetüket 12 darab 15 cm-es ágyú egészítette ki, melyeket külön kazamatákban helyeztek el. Ezek közül a Derfflingerről négyet eltávolítottak 1916-ban. A hajóra négy 8,8 cm-es légvédelmi ágyút szereltek a hajó közepére. Négy 50 cm-es víz alatti torpedóvetőcsővel is rendelkezett, melyek közül egy-egy volt a hajó orrában, tatjában illetve a hajó két oldalán. [8]

Scarborough, Hartlepool és Whitby elleni rajtaütés Szerkesztés

A Derfflinger első harci bevetése az Anglia keleti partján lévő Scarborough, Hartlepool és Whitby városok elleni támadás volt. Korábban a felderítőcsoport (Aufklärungsgruppe I) csatacirkálói már végrehajtottak egy támadást Yarmouth ellen 1914 végén és Friedrich von Ingenohl, a Hochseeflotte parancsnoka egy újabb rajtaütés végrehajtása mellett döntött. A hadművelet célja a brit flotta főerejének, a Grand Fleet egy részének nyílt tengerre való kicsalogatása volt, ahol azt megsemmisíthette volna a német főerőkkel. [9] December 15-én 03:20-kor Franz von Hipper ellentengernagy, zászlóshajójának, a Seydlitznak a fedélzetén elhagyta a Jade torkolatát, a flotta Wilhelmshavennél lévő haditengerészeti bázisát. A Seydlitzet a Derfflinger követte, mögötte a Moltke, a Von der Tann csatacirkálók, végül a Blücher páncélos cirkáló (német korabeli megjelölése mindegyiknek Großer Kreuzer) haladt. A köteléket a Kolberg, a Straßburg, a Stralsund és a Graudenz könnyűcirkálók valamint két rombolóflottila kísérte. [10] A hajók északnak tartottak, elhaladva a Helgoland sziget mellett, míg el nem érték a Horns Rev világítótornyát, ahonnan nyugatnak fordultak Scarborough irányába. Hipper kifutása után 12 órával a Hochseeflotte is kifutott, hogy távolról nyújtson számukra fedezetet. Ingenohl flottájában 14 modern csatahajó (dreadnought) és 8 régi csatahajó (pre-dreadnought) volt, melyeket két páncélos cirkáló, hét könnyűcirkáló és 54 romboló kísért. [11]

Pár hónappal korábban, 1914. augusztus 26-án a német Magdeburg könnyűcirkáló zátonyra futott a Finn-öbölben, a hajó maradványai pedig az oroszok kezére kerültek és a közelében megtalálták a tengerbe dobott kódkönyveket. Az oroszok a kódkönyvek másolatait átadták a Brit Királyi Haditengerészetnek, melynek titkosítással foglalkozó osztálya – az ún. Room 40 – ezt követően hozzáláthatott a német rádiójelek megfejtéséhez és december 14-én elfogták a Scarborough elleni tervezett rajtaütés rádióüzeneteit. [12] Azonban a terv pontos részletei ismeretlenek maradtak előttük és a britek úgy vélték, hogy a korábbi hadművelethez (Yarmouthi rajtaütés) hasonlóan a Hochseeflotte zöme nem vesz részt az akcióban. David Beatty altengernagy Rosythban állomásozó négy csatacirkálójának támogatására a 3. cirkálórajt (3rd Cruiser Squadron) és a 2. csatahajóraj (2nd Battle Squadron) hat csatahajóját küldték ki a Grand Fleettől, hogy Hipper csatacirkálóit elkapják. [13]

December 15-e éjjelén a Hipper egységeit távolról biztosító Hochseeflotte brit rombolókkal találkozott össze. Az éjszakai torpedótámadástól tartó Friedrich von Ingenohl tengernagy elrndelte hajóinak a visszavonulást. [14] Hippert nem értesítették a visszavonulásról, ezért folytatta a küldetését. A brit partokat elérve csatacirkálói két csoportra oszlottak. A Derfflinger és a Von der Tann Scarborough támadására indult déli irányba, míg a Seydlitz, a Moltke valamint a Blücher északnak tartott Hartlepool és Whitby felé. [15] 09:45.kor a két csoport ismét egyesült és együtt távoztak keleti irányba. [16]

Ekkor Beatty csatacirkálói Hipper visszavonulási útvonalán helyezkedtek el, míg a többi kötelék úton volt, hogy teljesen bekerítse őket. 12:25-kor a felderítőcsoport (Aufklärungsgruppe I) könnyűcirkálói Hipper nagyobb egységeit keresve a brit kötelékek között haladtak át. [17] A 2. könnyűcirkálóraj egyik egysége észlelte a Stralsundot és ezt jelezte Beatty-nek. 12:30-kor Beatty az adott irányba fordult a csatacirkálóival, mivel feltételezte, hogy a német könnyűcirkálók a csatacirkálók elővédjét képezik, azok azonban 50 km-re voltak ekkor tőlük. [18] A Beatty egységeit biztosító 2. könnyűcirkálórajt a német hajók üldözésére küldték, de egy félreértelmezett fényjelzés miatt mind visszatértek a csatacirkálók biztosítására. Ez a kommunikációs zavar lehetővé tette a német könnyűcirkálóknak a menekülést és figyelmeztették Hippert a brit csatacirkálók helyzetéről, így azok a brit erőket északnyugati irányban kikerülve tértek haza. [19]

Mind a két félnek volt rá lehetősége arra, hogy jelentős győzelmet arathasson a másik felett, így utólag mindkét fél csalódottan értékelte az eseményeket. Ingenohl hírnevének sokat ártott a bátortalansága. A Moltke parancsnoka dühös volt, amiért megfogalmazása szerint Ingenohl “megijedt tizenegy [valójában hét] elintézhető brit rombolótól” és hozzátette, hogy “a jelenlegi vezetéssel nem fogunk elérni semmit”. [20] A hivatalos német történelemírás felrója Ingenohlnak, hogy a rendelkezésére álló könnyű erőket nem küldte az ellenséges erők felderítésére: “Olyan döntést hozott, mely nem csak komolyan veszélyeztette az angol partokhoz küldött erőit, de megfosztotta a Német Flottát egy jelzés értékű biztos győzelemtől.” [21]

Doggerbanki csata Szerkesztés

1915 januárjában a németek tudomást szereztek arról, hogy a britek felderítő hadműveletet hajtanak végre a Dogger-pad (Doggerbank) térségében. Ingenohl eleinte vonakodott ezen erők megtámadására kihajózni, mivel az I. felderítőcsoportnak nélkülöznie kellett az esedékes karbantartások miatt szárazdokkba került Von der Tannt. Richard Eckermann ellentengernagy, a Hochseeflotte vezérkari főnöke azonban ragaszkodott a hadművelet végrehajtásához, így Ingenohl kiküldte Hipper csatacirkálóit a Dogger-padhoz. [22] A január 23-ai kihajózáskor a Seydlitz haladt az élen, mögötte a Moltke, a Derfflinger végül a Blücher haladt. A csatacirkálókat a Graudenz, a Rostock, a Stralsund és a Kolberg könnyűcirkálók valamint a II. és V. rombolóflottilla és XVIII. romboló-félflottilla 19 rombolója kísérte. A Graudenz és a Stralsund a kötelék előtt, míg a Rostock és a Kolberg attól jobbra illetve balra haladt. Minden könnyűcirkáló mellé egy romboló-félflottilla volt rendelve. [23]

A német rádiójeleket azonban a briteknek ismét sikerült elfogniuk és ez ismét jelentős szerepet játszott. Bár a németek pontos terve nem volt számukra ismert, azt meg tudták fejteni, hogy Hipper a Dogger-pad környékén tervez végrehajtani hadműveletet. [24] Ellenük Beatty 1. csatacirkálóraját, Archibald Moore ellentengernagy 2. csatacirkálóraját, William Goodeneough sorhajókapitány 2. könnyűcirkálóraját illetve a hozzájuk 08:00-kor a Dogger-padtól 30 km-re északra csatlakozó Reginald Tyrwhitt sorhajókapitány Harwichből érkező rombolóit (Harwich Force) küldték ki.

A Kolberg 08:14-kor észlelte a Aurorát és a harwichiak több rombolóját. Az Aurora a fényszóróit a Kolbergre irányította, mire az tüzet nyitott a brit hajóra két találatot elérve. Az Aurora viszonozta a tüzet és szintén két találatot ért el. Hipper azonnal az torkolattüzek irányába fordult a kötelékével, ám ekkor a Stralsund észlelt nagy füstöt északnyugati irányban, amit Hipper irányába tartó nagy brit hadihajóknak tulajdonítottak. [25]

Hipper ezért déli irányban igyekezett elmenekülni előlük, de a sebessége 23 csomóra volt korlátozva, mivel a régebbi építésű Blüchernek ekkora volt csak a csúcssebessége. Az üldöző brit csatacirkálók 27 csomós sebességgel közeledtek, így hamar beérték a német hajókat. 09:52-kor a Lion 18.000 méter távolságból lövéseket adott le a Blücherre, röviddel rá a Queen Mary és a Tiger is tüzet nyitott. A Blüchert 10:09-kor érte az első találat, majd két perccel később főleg a Lionra koncentrálva a német hajók viszonozták a tüzet. 10:28-kor a Liont találat érte a vízvonalon, mely a hajó oldalán rést ütve elárasztotta az egyik szénraktárát vízzel. 10:30-kor a britek csatavonalában negyedik New Zealand lőtávolon belülre ért a Blücherhez és tüzet nyitott rá. 10:35-re a távolság 16.000 méterre csökkent, így az összes német csatacirkáló a britek lőtávolságán belülre került. Beatty a csatacirkálóit a sorban megegyező ellenfelükkel való harc felvételére utasította. A Tiger kapitánya a fedélzeten kialakult kommunikációs zavar miatt úgy gondolta, hogy a Seydlitzet kell célba vennie és emiatt a Moltkéra nem jutott ellenfél, így az zavartalanul tüzelhetett. [26] Ez idő alatt a Derfflingert egy találat érte, de csak kis károkat okozott. A hajótest páncélzatának két lemeze benyomódott és a néhány szénraktárt elárasztott a betörő víz. [27]

10:40-kor a Lion egyik 343 mm-es lövedéke eltalálta a Seydlitzet tönkre téve annak két hátsó lövegtornyát. A találat következtében 159 ember veszítette életét és kis híján a hajó pusztulását okozta. [28] A katasztrófát a másodtiszt fellépése előzte meg, aki azonnal elrendelte a két lőszerraktár elárasztását, így a lángra kapott kivetőtöltetek tüze nem hatolhatott már le oda. Ekkorra a német csatacirkálók már belőtték maguknak a Liont és egymás után értek el rajta találatokat. 11:01-kor a Seydlitz egyik 280 mm-es lövedéke találta el a Liont, üzemen kívül helyezve annak két generátorát, majd 11:18-kor a Derfflinger két 30,5 cm-es lövedéke találta el, melyek közül az egyik a vízvonalon érte átszakítva az oldalát. A keletkezett résen keresztül víz hatolt be a baloldali adagolótartályba (feed tank). Ez a találat gyakorlatilag megbénította a Liont, mely kénytelen volt leállítani a hajtóműveit a sós víz okozta szennyeződés miatt és így kivált a formációból. [29]

Ekkorra a Blücher már súlyos sérüléseket szenvedett az ellenséges nehéztüzérségtől. Az üldözést több tengeralattjárók észleléséről szóló jelentés is hátráltatta. Beatty rögtön kitérő manővert rendelt el, ami lehetővé tette a németeknek, hogy növeljék a távolságot az üldözőikkel szemben. [30] Ekkor a Lion hátulsó generátora tönkrement, ami miatt a sebessége 15 csomóra esett vissza. Beatty a többi csatacirkálónak parancsba adta, hogy a támadják az ellenség hátvédjét (Engage the enemy’s rear!), de a zavaros jeltovábbítás miatt azok a lassabb Blüchert vették mind tűz alá, így a Moltke, a Seydlitz és a Derfflinger el tudtak menekülni. [31] Mire Beatty a Princess Royalra átszállva ismét visszavette az irányítást a hajói felett a németek már túl messze jártak ahhoz, hogy beérhessék őket. 13:50-kor a britek beszüntették az üldözést. [32]

Yarmouth és Lowestoft elleni rajtaütés Szerkesztés

1916. április 24-25-én az I. felderítőcsoport újabb hadműveletet hajtott végre az angol partok ellen, ezúttal Yarmouth és Lowestoft városokat véve célba. Hipper betegsége miatt az I. felderítőcsoportot Friedrich Boedicker ellentengernagy vezette és a Seydlitzen húzta fel a tengernagyi zászlaját. A Derfflinger, az újonnan elkészült testvérhajója, a Lützow, a Moltke, a Seydlitz és a Von der Tann április 24-én 10:55-kor hagyta el a Jade torkolatát hat könnyűcirkáló valamint két rombolóflottilla kíséretében. A Hochseeflotte nagy egységei 13:40-kor indultak útnak, hogy távolról biztosítsák Boedicker kötelékét. A brit admiralitás ismét tudomást szerzett a német rajtaütésről a rádiókommunikáció megfigyelése révén és 15:50-kor a Grand Fleet is kihajózott. [33]

Boedicker hajói 14:00-re elérték Norderneyt, ahol a hajóival északnak fordult, hogy a Terschellingen lévő holland megfigyelőket kikerülje. 15:38-kor a Seydlitz aknára futott és a detonáció következtében 15 méteres rés keletkezett a hajótesten közvetlenül a jobb oldali torpedóvetőcsövek mögött. Tizenegy ember veszítette életét és 1400 tonna víz tört be a hajótestbe, 1,4 méterrel megnövelve a hajó orrészének merülését. [34] A Seydlitz a kísérő könnyűcirkálókkal 15 csomós sebességgel haladva visszafordult. A másik négy csatacirkáló az aknára futását követően azonnal délnek fordult Norderney irányába, hogy a további károkat elkerüljék. A Seydlitz 16:00-ra kikerült a közvetlen veszélyből és megállt, hogy Boedicker átszállhasson a Lützow fedélzetére a V28 romboló segítségével. [35]

Április 25-én 04:50-kor a német csatacirkálók Lowestoft felé közeledtek, mikor a formáció déli szárnyát biztosító Rostock és a Elbing könnyűcirkálók észlelték Tyrwhitt sorhajókapitány (commodore) harwichi különítményének könnyűcirkálóit és rombolóit. Boedicker nem zavartatta magát a brit hajók miatt és Lowestoftot vette célba az ágyúival. A német csatacirkálók elpusztítottak két partvédelmi üteget és a városban is okoztak károkat 200 házat megrongálva. [36]

05:20-kor a német portyázók északnak fordultak Yarmouth felé és 05:42-kor értek oda. A látási viszonyok annyira kedvezőtlenek voltak, hogy a német hajók csak egy sortüzet adott le, leszámítva a Derfflingert, mely egység 14 lövést adott le a fő tüzérségével. Ezt követően a német hajók délnek fordultak és 05:47-kor másodszor is találkoztak a harwichiakkal, melyek ekkor már harcban álltak a kísérő erők hat könnyűcirkálójával. Boedicker hajói 12.000 méter távolságból nyitottak tüzet. Tyrwhitt azonnal délnek fordulva menekült, de a Conquest cirkálót így is súlyos sérülések érték. A brit tengeralattjárókról és torpedótámadásokról érkező jelentések miatt Boedicker megszakította az üldözést és keletnek fordult a Hochseeflotte zöme irányába. Ekkor Scheer, akit értesítettek a Grand Fleet Scapa Flow-ból való kihajózásáról, visszavonult Németország felé. [37]

Skagerraki csata Szerkesztés

Nem sokkal a Lowestoft elleni rajtaütés után Reinhard Scheer altengernagy újabb északi-tengeri előretörés tervezéséhez látott. Erre eredetileg május közepén került volna sor, de az akna okozta sérülések javítása a Seydlitzen elhúzódott és ezzel együtt a hadművelet is, mivel Scheer egyik csatacirkálóját sem akarta nélkülözni egy nagyobb hadműveletnél. Május 28-án délre a Seydlitz javításai befejeződtek és visszatérhetett az I. felderítőcsoporthoz. [38]

A Derfflinger és az I. felderítőcsoport (Aufklärungsgruppe I) többi csatacirkálója a Jadén horgonyzott 1916. május 30-án éjjel. A következő nap hajnali 02:00-kor (KEI) a hajók lassan kihajóztak a Skagerrak irányába 16 csomós sebességgel. A Derfflinger az öt hajó közül a második volt a sorban a Lützow mögött és a Seydlitz előtt haladva. A Frankfurt (Friedrich Boedicker zászlóshajója), Wiesbaden, a Pillau és az Elbing könnyűcirkálókból álló II. felderítőcsoport (Aufklärungsgruppe II) és a II., VI. és IX. rombolóflottillák összesen 30 rombolója kísérte a csatacirkálókat. [39]

Másfél órával később a Reinhard Scheer vezette Hochseeflotte is elhagyta a Jadét. A flottája 16 csatahajót (dreadnoughtot) számlált. A dokkban javítás alatt álló König Albert és a még próbajáratait végző Bayern csatahajókat leszámítva az összes modern egység kihajózott a küldetésre. A Hochseeflottét a Stettin, a München, a Hamburg, a Frauenlob és a Stuttgart könnyűcirkálókból álló IV. felderítőcsoport, valamint a Rostock könnyűcirkáló vezette I., III., V. és VII. rombolóflottillák összesen 31 rombolója kísérte. A II. csatahajóraj (Schlachtgeschwader II) hat régi csatahajója (pre-dreadnoughtja) a 02:45-kor az Elba torkolatából indult útnak és 05:00-kor csatlakozott Scheer flottájához. [40]

A kísérő erők rövid összecsapása után, röviddel 16:00 óra előtt Hipper és Beatty főerői is összecsaptak. A csatacirkálók összecsapásakor már a németek adták le az első lövéseket kb. 14 000 méter távolságból. [41] A brit hajók célpontelosztásában fellépő zavar következtében a New Zealand és a Tiger is a Moltkét vette célba. A brit távolságmérők rosszul mérték fel a német hajók távolságát és emiatt az első sortüzek egy mérfölddel a német hajók mögött csapódtak be. A kommunikációs zavar miatt a Derfflingert az első tíz perc során nem támadta egyik brit hajó sem. Georg von Hase korvettkapitány később megjegyezte, hogy: “Valamilyen tévedésből kifolyólag minket nem támadtak. Felnevettem és teljes nyugalommal, mintha csak tüzérségi próbán lennénk lőni kezdtük az ellenséget egyre jobb eredménnyel.” [42] 17:03-kor - 15 perccel azután, hogy a Von der Tann tűz alá vette - a brit Indefatigable csatacirkáló felrobbant. [43] Röviddel ezután Beatty erőinek másik része, az 5. csatahajóraj (5th Battle Squadron) négy Queen-Elisabeth-osztályú csatahajója lőtávolságán belülre kerültek a német formáció végén haladó Von der Tannhoz és Moltkéhoz és tüzet nyitottak rájuk. [44]

Miután a Lützow súlyos károkat okozott a Lionnak és az kikerült a látóköréből, a Derfflinger 17:16-kor a tüzét a Queen Mary-re helyezte át. A Seydlitz szintén a Queen Mary-t támadta, így a brit csatacirkáló a két német egység összpontosított tüzébe került és azok gyors egymás utánban értek el találatokat rajta. A mögötte illetve előtte haladó New Zealand és Tiger csatacirkálók megfigyelői jelentése alapján a négy leadott sortűzben három találat érte egyszerre a Queen Mary-t. Két újabb találat következett, majd a hajó közepén hatalmas detonáció következett be. A lángoló hajóból hatalmas, fekete füstfelhő tört elő magasan fölé tornyosulva, majd a csatacirkáló kettétört. [45]

A német flotta élén haladó egységek 18:00 órára lőtávolon belülre kerültek a britekhez és lőpárbajba kezdtek a brit csatacirkálókkal valamint a Queen Elizabeth-osztályú csatahajókkal. 18:09 és 18:19 között a Barham vagy a Valiant csatahajó által kilőtt egyik 381 mm-es gránát találta el a Derfflingert. [46] 18:55-kor a Derfflingert egy újabb találat érte, mely lyukat ütött a hajó elején és ezen keresztül 300 tonna víz tört be. [47]

Röviddel 19:00 után a Wiesbadent a Invincible egyik gránátja mozgásképtelenné tette. A német csatacirkálók 16 pontos fordulót hajtottak végre északkeleti irányba és a Wiesbadenhez közeledtek nagy sebességgel. 19:15-kor észlelték a Defence páncélos cirkálót, mely a Wiesbadent vette célba. Hipper eleinte hezitált, mert azt gondolta, hogy a Rostock az, de 19:16-kor Harder sorhajókapitány, a Lützow kapitánya parancsot adott a hajó ágyúinak a tüzelésre. A többi német csatacirkáló és csatahajó is tüzet nyitott a Defence-re és több nehézgránát is eltalálta azt. Az egyik sortűz a hajó lőszerraktárát érte és a hatalmas robbanás elpusztította a cirkálót. [48]

19:24-re a brit 3. csatacirkálóraj hajói Beatty egységeihez csatlakoztak a német formáció előtt haladva. A britek észlelték a Lützow-t valamint a Derfflingert és tüzet nyitottak rájuk. Az Invincible nyolc perc leforgása alatt nyolc találatot ért el a Lützow-n. A Lützow és a Derfflinger is az Invincible-t vette tűz alá. A Derfflinger 19:31-kor leadott utolsó sortüze után röviddel az Invencible elülső lőszerraktára felrobbant és a brit csatacirkáló további robbanássorozatok közepette elsüllyedt. [49]

19:30-ig a brit csatacirkálókat üldöző Hochseeflotte nem találkozott össze a Grand Fleettel. Scheer már a visszafordulást fontolgatta még mielőtt a sötétség beálltával az ellenség rombolói torpedótámadásokat kísérelhetnének meg. [50] Addig azonban még nem hozta meg a döntését, mikor az élen haladó csatahajói merőlegesen belefutottak a Grand Fleet csatavonalába. Ez a fejlemény lehetetlenné tette Scheer számára a teljes visszavonulást, mivel ez a II. csatahajóraj (Schlachgeschwader II) régi csatahajóinak feláldozását jelentette volna, míg ha azok visszavonulását a modern csatahajóinak és csatacirkálóinak fedezete mellett oldotta volna meg, akkor a legerősebb egységeit tette volna ki a kedvezőbb pozícióban lévő britek tüzének. [51] Ehelyett Scheer a hajóinak egy 16 pontos (180 fokos) jobboldali fordulót rendelt el, ami által a pre-dreadnoughtok a német csatavonal viszonylag biztonságos oldalára kerültek. [52]

A Derfflinger és a többi csatacirkáló – a Lützow-t leszámítva – követte a manővert, így a König csatahajó mögé soroltak be. [53] Hipper csatacirkálói így egy lélegzetvételnyi szünethez jutottak, ugyanis a Grand Fleet parancsnoka John Jellicoe, mivel nem tudta a német flotta merre tart, annak feltételezett irányát keresztezni akarván keleti irányba fordult – holott valójában a németek ekkor nyugatra tartottak. Scheer hamarosan egy újabb 16 pontos fordulót hajtott végre, mivel úgy vélte a brit formáció végén hajózó egységekkel fog így összetalálkozni, azonban a brit csatavonal közepe felé tartott. [54] A német flotta ismét heves ellenséges tűzbe került és Scheer a Seydlitzet, a Derfflingert, a Von der Tannt és a Moltkét küldte neki teljes gőzzel a brit flottának, hogy így bontsa meg a formációjukat és nyerjen időt a főerők visszavonulásához. [55] 20:17-kor a német csatacirkálók 7.000 méterre megközelítették a Colossus csatahajót és Scheer utasítására a brit csatavonal élén haladó hajót vették mind tűz alá. [56] Három perccel később a német csatacirkálók visszavonultak egy rombolók által megkísérelt torpedótámadás fedezete mellett. [57]

A sötétség beállta lehetővé tette a Seydlitz és a többi német csatacirkáló számára, hogy eltakarítsák a fő tüzérséget akadályozó roncsokat, kioltsák a keletkezett tüzeket és helyrehozzák a tűzvezetési és jelzőrendszereket valamint felkészítsék a fényszórókat az éjszakai harcra. [58] Mire a német könnyűcirkálók röviddel 21:00 után ismét összetalálkoztak a britekkel, a Hochseeflotte már ismét jól szervezett formációban haladt. Beatty a csatacirkálóival nyugatra, a harc irányába fordult. 21:09-kor megpillantotta a német csatacirkálókat és 7.800 méterre megközelítette őket mielőtt 21:20-kor tüzet nyitott rájuk. [59] A kialakuló harcban a Derfflinger több találatot is kapott. 21:34-kor az utolsó még működőképes lövegtornyát is találat érte használhatatlanná téve azt. [60] A német hajók minden bevethető ágyúval viszonozták a tüzet és 21:32-kor a Lionon és a Princess Royalon is értek el találatokat. [61] A német csatacirkálók manőverei a britek 1. csatahajóraját nyugati irányba való fordulásra kényszerítették, hogy elkerüljék az ütközést. A németek II. csatahajórajának pre-dreadnoughtjai a csatacirkálók mögé kerültek és a britek nem tudták üldözőbe venni őket mikor azok délnek fordultak. Amint a brit csatacirkálók tüzet nyitottak a régi csatahajókra, a német hajók délnyugatnak fordultak, hogy teljes oldalazó tüzet lőhessenek rájuk. Ez az összecsapás csak pár percig tartott, majd Mauve tengernagy 8 pontos jobb oldali fordulót rendelt el a hajóinak. Meglepő módon a britek nem üldözték őket. [62]

03:55-kor, a csata végének közeledtével Hipper üzenetben értesítette Scheert a hajóit ért nagy károkról. Ekkorra már a Derfflinger és a Von der Tann is csak egy két-két harcképes ágyúval rendelkezett, a Moltkéba 1000 tonna víz tört be, a Seydlitz és a Lützow súlyosan megsérült – utóbbit később fel is kellett adni. Hipper jelentése szerint: “Az I. felderítőcsoport komoly összecsapásban nem képviselt már harci értéket, ezért a főparancsnok elrendelte visszatérését a kikötőbe, miközben a csatahajókkal a Horns Revnél várta a további fejleményeket.” [63]

A csata során a Derfflingert 17 nehéz- és 9 könnyű lövedék találta el. A sérüléseinek javítása egészen október 15-ig eltartott. [64] A Derfflinger 385 darab 30,5 cm-es, 235 darab 15 cm-es lövedéket valamint egy torpedót lőtt ki a csata során. [65] Legénységéből 157 fő veszítette életét, 26-an megsebesültek, mely veszteségek a legnagyobbak voltak azon hajók között, melyek nem süllyedtek el a csatában. [66] A csatában tanúsított rendíthetetlensége miatt a britek a “vaskutya” (“Iron Dog”) névvel illették. [67]

Későbbi hadműveletek Szerkesztés

A második helgolandi csata során a Derfflinger kihajózott a II. felderítőcsoport könnyűcirkálóinak támogatására, de amint a többi csatacirkálóval a közelbe érkeztek, a britek visszavonultak északi irányba. [68]

1917 végén a Hochseeflotte támadásokat hajtott végre a Norvégia és Nagy-Britannia között haladó konvojok ellen. 1917 októberében és decemberében két konvojt állítottak meg és semmisítettek meg német rombolók és cirkálók. A Grand Fleet élére kinevezett David Beatty ezért csatahajókat és csatacirkálókat rendelt a konvojok védelmére. [69] Scheer kinevezése óta erre várt, mert így lehetősége adódott a brit flotta egy kisebb részére lecsapni és megsemmisíteni azt. 1918 április 23-án 05:00-kor flottájával útnak indult az egyik erős kísérettel ellátott konvoj elfogására. A rádióforgalmat a minimális szintre csökkentették, hogy a britek előtt rejtve maradjon a hadművelet. Azonban 14:10-ig még mindig nem találták meg a keresett konvojt és ezért Scheer a Hochseeflottéval visszafordult. [70]

A Derfflinger részt vett volna az október 24-re tervezett hadműveletben, melynek során a Grand Fleettel kellett volna megütköznie a Hochseeflotténak. Scheer ekkor már mint főtengernagy (Großadmiral) a német vezetéssel azt tervezte, hogy a lehető legnagyobb veszteséget okozza a briteknek és így jobb tárgyalási pozíciót ér el Németország számára. A flotta hadműveletre való készülődése közben a tengerészek tömegesen dezertáltak a hajókról. Mikor a Von der Tann és a Derfflinger a Wilhelmshaven belső kikötőjéből kivezető zsilipeken haladt át, körülbelül 300 tengerész mászott le a hajó oldalán és tűnt el a parton. [71]

1918. október 24-én kiadták a parancsot a Wilhelmshavenből való elindulásra. A háborútól megfáradt tengerészek közül sokan úgy érezték, hogy a hadművelet hátráltatná a folyamatban lévő béketárgyalásokat, ezért október 29-én számos csatahajó legénysége fellázadt. A III. csatahajóraj három hajója megtagadta az indulást és szabotázsakciókat hajtottak végre a Thüringen és a Helgoland fedélzetén. A nyugtalanság Scheert és Hippert végül a hadművelet lefújására kényszerítette. A wilhelmshaveni zendülés átterjedt Kielre is és az ottani események az 1918-19-es németországi forradalmakhoz vezettek. [72]

Háború után Szerkesztés

Németország kapitulációját követően a szövetségesek a Hochseeflotte nagy részének Scapa Flow-ban való internálását követelték. A kijelölt egységek Ludwig von Reuter ellentengernagy vezetésével érkeztek meg ide. Az indulás előtt Adolf von Trotha tengernagy közölte Reuterrel, hogy a flottát semmilyen körülmények között nem adhatja a britek kezére. [73] Az Északi-tengeren a Hochseeflotte találkozott a brit Cardiff könnyűcirkálóval, mely a 370 hajóból álló antant flottához vezette őket és azok kíséretében hajóztak tovább Scapa Flow felé. [74] Miután a hajókat internálták, az ágyúik závárzatát kiszerelték és a legénységüket 200 főre csökkentették. [75]

A flotta fogságban maradt a versailles-i békeszerződésbe torkolló tárgyalások végeztéig. Reuter számára nyilvánvalóvá vált, hogy a britek június 21-én, a szerződés aláírásának határideje után meg akarják szállni a német hajókat. Mivel nem volt tudomása arról, hogy a határidőt június 23-ra módosították, a hajók elsüllyesztése mellett döntött. Június 21-én reggel a gyakorlatozni induló brit flotta elhagyta a kikötőt. A brit hajók többségének távollétében Reuter 11:20-kor elküldte a parancs végrehajtására felszólító parancsot a flotta egységeinek. [76] A Derfflinger 14:45-kor süllyedt el. 1939-ben kiemelték és felfordult állapotában horgonyozták le Risa sziget mellett és egészen 1946-ig itt maradt. Ezt követően a hajót 1948-ig lebontották a clyde-i haditengerészeti bázison. A hajó harangját 1965. augusztus 30-án visszaszolgáltatták a Bundesmarinének. [77] A harang a külső Hebridákhoz tartozó Eriskay szigeten lévő St Michael templom mellett van kiállítva. [78]


The Derfflinger class was authorized for the 1911 fiscal year as part of the 1906 naval law design work had begun in early 1910. After their British counterparts had begun installing 34.3 cm (13.5 in) guns in their battlecruisers, senior officers in the German naval command came to the conclusion that an increase in caliber from 28 cm (11 in) to 30.5 cm (12.0 in) would be necessary. To keep costs from growing too quickly, the number of guns was reduced from ten to eight, compared to the earlier Seydlitz, but a more efficient superfiring arrangement was adopted. Hindenburg, the third and final member of the class, was allocated to the 1913 construction program. [1]

Hindenburg was slightly longer than her two sister ships, at 212.50 m (697 ft 2 in) at the waterline and 212.80 m (698 ft 2 in) overall. She had a beam of 29 m (95 ft 2 in), and a draft of between 9.20 m (30 ft 2 in) forward and 9.57 m (31 ft 5 in) aft. Hindenburg displaced 26,947 tonnes (26,521 long tons) normally and up to 31,500 tonnes (31,000 long tons) fully laden. She had a crew of 44 officers and 1,068 men when serving as the flagship for I Scouting Group, the ship carried an additional 14 officers and 62 men. Hindenburg was propelled by four sets of steam turbines driving four screws steam was provided by 14 coal-fired marine-type double boilers and eight oil-fired marine-type double-ended boilers. The propulsion system was rated at 72,000 metric horsepower (71,000 shp) for a top speed of 27 knots (50 km/h 31 mph). At a cruising speed of 14 knots (26 km/h 16 mph), she had a range of 6,100 nautical miles (11,300 km 7,000 mi). [2]

Hindenburg ' s primary armament was eight 30.5 cm (12 in) guns in four twin turrets, the same as in her two sisters. [3] However, the gun turrets were Drh LC/1913 mounts, which were an improved version the Drh LC/1912 type mounts on Derfflinger and Lützow—the gun houses on Hindenburg allowed gun elevation to 16°, [4] as opposed to 13.5° in the earlier model. This gave the guns mounted in the Drh LC/1913 turrets a range advantage of some 2,000 m (2,200 yd) over those in the older turret. [5] [b] [c] Like her sister ship, the Lützow, she was armed with fourteen 15 cm (5.9 in) SK L/45 guns and four 60 cm (23.6 in) torpedo tubes instead of the standard twelve 15 cm guns and four 50 cm (19.7 in) tubes mounted on Derfflinger. [2]

Hindenburg was protected by an armor belt that was 300 mm (12 in) thick in the central citadel of the ship where it protected the ammunition magazines and propulsion machinery spaces. Her deck was 30 to 80 mm (1.2 to 3.1 in) thick, with the thicker armor sloping down at the sides to connect to the lower edge of the belt. Her main battery turrets had 270 mm (11 in) thick faces. Her secondary casemates received 150 mm (5.9 in) of armor protection. The forward conning tower, where the ship's commander controlled the vessel, had 300 mm walls. [2]

Built by the Kaiserliche Werft at their shipyard in Wilhelmshaven, Hindenburg was the third and final ship of her class her sister ships were Derfflinger and Lützow. Designed as a replacement for the elderly protected cruiser Hertha, Hindenburg ' s keel was laid down on 30 June 1913. She was launched on 1 August 1915, but due to shifting construction priorities in time of war, she was not completed until 10 May 1917, by which time it was too late for her to see any significant operations in World War I. [6] At the time, British naval intelligence believed the ship was commissioned so late because she had had parts removed to repair Derfflinger after the battle of Jutland in June 1916. [7] In actuality, construction proceeded slowly because of labor shortages. [8]

SMS Hindenburg was the last battlecruiser completed for the Imperial German Navy, and as such had a very short career. She was fully operational by 20 October 1917, but this was too late to see any major operation in World War I. On 17 November Hindenburg and Moltke, along with the light cruisers of II Scouting Group, were acting as distant support for German minesweepers off the German coast when the minesweepers were attacked by British warships. The British raiders included the new battlecruisers Repulse, Courageous, and Glorious. [9] However, the raid was brief by the time Hindenburg and Moltke arrived on the scene, the British ships had broken off the attack and withdrawn. On 23 November, Hindenburg replaced Seydlitz as flagship of I Scouting Group. [8] [d]

Advance of 23 April 1918 Edit

In late 1917, light forces of the High Seas Fleet began interdicting British convoys to Norway. [e] On 17 October the light cruisers Brummer and Bremse intercepted one of the convoys, sinking nine of the twelve cargo ships and the two escorting destroyers—Mary Rose and Strongbow—before turning back to Germany. On 12 December, four German destroyers ambushed a second British convoy of five cargo vessels and two British destroyers. All five transports were sunk, as was one of the destroyers. [10] Following these two raids, Admiral David Beatty, the commander of the Grand Fleet, detached battleships from the battle fleet to protect the convoys. [11] The German navy was now presented with an opportunity for which it had been waiting the entire war: a portion of the numerically stronger Grand Fleet was separated and could be isolated and destroyed. Vice Admiral Franz von Hipper planned the operation: the battlecruisers of I Scouting Group, along with light cruisers and destroyers, would attack one of the large convoys, while the rest of the High Seas Fleet would stand by, ready to attack the British dreadnought battleship squadron. [12]

At 05:00 on 23 April 1918, the German fleet, with Hindenburg in the lead, departed from the Schillig roadstead. Hipper ordered wireless transmissions be kept to a minimum, to prevent British intelligence from receiving radio intercepts. [12] At 06:10 the German battlecruisers had reached a position approximately 60 kilometers southwest of Bergen, when Moltke lost her inner starboard propeller. Without resistance from the water, the propeller-less shaft began spinning faster and faster, until one of the engine gears flew apart. Shrapnel from the broken machinery damaged several boilers and tore a hole in the hull the ship was dead in the water. [13] The ship's crew effected temporary repairs, which allowed the ship to steam at 4 knots (7.4 km/h 4.6 mph). However, it was decided to take the ship under tow by the battleship Oldenburg. Despite this setback, Hipper continued northward. By 14:00, Hipper's force had crossed the convoy route several times but had found nothing. At 14:10, Hipper turned his ships southward. By 18:37, the German fleet had made it back to the defensive minefields surrounding their bases. It was later discovered that the convoy had left port a day later than expected by the German planning staff. [12]

Later planned operations Edit

On 11 August 1918, Hipper was promoted to Admiral and given command of the entire High Seas Fleet. Rear Admiral Ludwig von Reuter replaced Hipper as the commander of I Scouting Group he raised his flag on Hindenburg the following day. [8]

Hindenburg was to have taken part in what would have amounted to the "death ride" of the High Seas Fleet shortly before the end of World War I. The bulk of the High Seas Fleet was to have sortied from their base in Wilhelmshaven to engage the Grand Fleet Admiral Reinhard Scheer intended to inflict as much damage as possible on the British navy, to achieve a better bargaining position for Germany whatever the cost to the fleet. [14] The plan involved two simultaneous attacks by light cruisers and destroyers, one on Flanders and another on shipping in the Thames estuary Hindenburg and the other four battlecruisers were to support the Thames attack. After both strikes, the fleet was to concentrate off the Dutch coast, where it would meet the Grand Fleet in battle. While the fleet was consolidating in Wilhelmshaven, war-weary sailors began deserting en masse. [15] As Von der Tann and Derfflinger passed through the locks that separated Wilhelmshaven's inner harbor and roadstead, some 300 men from both ships climbed over the side and disappeared ashore. [16]

On 24 October 1918, the order was given to sail from Wilhelmshaven. Starting on the night of 29 October, sailors on several battleships mutinied three ships from III Battle Squadron refused to weigh anchors, and acts of sabotage were committed on board the battleships Thüringen and Helgoland. In the face of open rebellion, the order to sail was rescinded and the planned operation was abandoned. [17] In an attempt to suppress the mutiny, the High Seas Fleet squadrons were dispersed. [16]

SMS Derfflinger

SMS Derfflinger was a battlecruiser of the German Kaiserliche Marine built just before the outbreak of World War I. She was the lead vessel of her class of three ships, her sister ships were Lutzow and Hindenburg. The Derfflinger -class battlecruisers were larger and featured significant improvements over the previous German battlecruisers, in terms of armament, armor protection, and cruising range. The ship was named after Field Marshal Georg von Derfflinger who fought in the Thirty Years War.
Derfflinger was part of the I intelligence for most of world war I, and was involved in several fleet actions during the war. She participated in the bombardments of English coastal towns, as well as the battle on the Dogger Bank and Jutland, where her stubborn resistance led to the British nickname her the "iron dog". The ship was partially responsible for the deaths of two British battle cruisers at Jutland, and Seydlitz derfflinger destroyed the Queen Mary and Lutzow helped her older sister in the sinking of invincible. Derfflinger was interned with the rest of the high seas Fleet in Scapa Flow after the armistice in November 1918. On the orders of rear Admiral Ludwig von Reuter, the interned ships were sunk on 21 June 1919 derfflinger sank at 14:45.

1. Design. (Дизайн)
On completion she displaced 26.600 26.200 Tons long tons and was 210.40 690 m 3 feet in length. The ship had a crew of 44 officers and soldiers 1.068. Derfflinger was equipped with two sets of high and low pressure turbines operating at 14 coal-fired boilers, which drives four propellers. She was capable of speeds of 26.5 knots 49.1 km / h 30.5 km / h and maybe a couple on 10.400 5.600 nautical miles km 6.400 miles at a cruising speed of 14 knots 26 km / h 16 km / h. In early August 1915, a derrick was mounted amidships, and tests with Hansa-Brandenburg W seaplanes were conducted.
Installation of main armament of eight 30.5 cm 12 In guns, derfflinger was the largest and most powerful German battlecruiser at the time. The armament of the ships were rounded twelve 15 cm 5.9 in SK l / 45 guns in single casemate mounts and eight 8.8 cm 3.5 in SK l / 45 guns, also placed in casemates, though four of them were removed in 1916. Four 8.8 cm anti-aircraft guns were installed on the midsection. There were four 50 cm 20 in submerged torpedo tubes, one of which was in the bow, two on starboard, and stern.
Derfflinger was protected by the armor belt that was 300 mm 12 in thickness in the Central part of the ship, where it protected the ammunition and movement of the machinery space. Her deck was from 30 to 80 mm 1.2 to 3.1 in thick, with thicker armor on the sides sloping down to connect to the lower edge of the belt. Her main battery turrets had 11 in 270 mm thick faces. Her secondary casemates received 150 mm 5.9 in armor. Forward of the wheelhouse, where the captain controls the ship, had 300 mm of the wall.

2. Service. (Услуги)
Built on the famous shipyard Blohm & Voss in his yard in Hamburg, derfflinger with the keel was laid in January 1912. She was launched on 14 June 1913, but the wooden sled on which the ship rested became jammed, the ship was moving only 30-40 centimeters. The second attempt was successful on 12 Jul 1913. Took the crew, consisting of employees of the shipyard the ship around Skagen to Kiel. At the end of October, the ship was assigned to the I scouting group, but damage to the ships of the turbine during the tests does not allow her to join the group until 16 November.

2.1. Service. Bombardment of Scarborough, Hartlepool, and Whitby. (Обстрел Скарборо, Хартлпул и Уитби)
In the derfflinger the first combat operation was a RAID on the English coastal towns of Scarborough, Hartlepool and Whitby. One RAID had already been conducted cruisers I scouting group, in Yarmouth in late 1914. Admiral Friedrich von Ingenohl, the commander of the high seas fleet, decided to conduct another RAID on the English coast. His goal was to lure the Grand fleet into combat where it could be isolated and destroyed. At 03:20 on 15 December, rear Admiral Franz von hipper, with his flag in Seydlitz, left the jade estuary. The following was in Seydlitz derfflinger, Moltke, von der Tann, and blücher, along with the light cruisers Kolberg, Strassburg, Stralsund, and Graudenz, and two squadrons of torpedo boats. The ships sailed North past the island of Heligoland, until they reached the horns Reef Lighthouse, after which the ships turned West towards Scarborough. Twelve hours after hipper left the jade, in the high seas fleet departed to provide distant cover. The main fleet consisted of 14 dreadnoughts, eight pre-dreadnoughts and a demonstration of the strength of two armored cruisers, seven light cruisers, and 54 torpedo boats.
Some four months ago, on 26 August 1914 the German light cruiser "Magdeburg" ran aground in the Gulf of Finland, the ship was captured by the Russian Navy, which found code books used by the German Navy, along with navigational charts for the North sea. The Russians passed these documents to the Royal Navy, whose cryptographic unit - the so-called room 40 began decrypting German signals. On 14 December, they intercepted messages about the planned bombardment of Scarborough. However, the exact details of the plan were unknown, and the British assumed that the high seas fleet would remain safely in port, as in the previous bombardment. Vice Admiral David Beattys four cruisers, supported by the 3rd cruiser squadron and 1st light cruiser squadron, with the 2nd squadrons six dreadnoughts, were to ambush hippie cruisers.
On the night of 15 December, the bulk of the high seas Fleet encountered British destroyers. Fearing the prospect of the night attack of torpedo, Admiral Ingenohl ordered the ships to retreat. Hipper was unaware of the reversal Ingenohls, and so he continued firing. Reaching the coast of the UK, hippie cruisers split into two groups. Derfflinger and von der Tann went South to shell Scarborough and Whitby, and Seydlitz, Moltke, and blücher went North to shell Hartlepool. By 09:45 on the 16th, the two groups were gathered, and they began to retreat to the East.
By this time, Beattys battlecruisers were to block selected hippie escape route, while other forces were EN route to complete the ambience. At 12:25, light cruisers of second scouting group began to pass through the British forces searching hipper. One of the cruisers in the 2nd light cruiser squadron spotted the Stralsund and made a report to Beatty. At 12:30, Beatty turned his battlecruisers on the German ships. Beatty to assume that the German cruisers were the advance screen for ships of the hippies, however, it was ahead of the 50 km 31 Mi. The 2nd light cruiser squadron, which was screening at Beattys ships, detached to pursue the German cruisers, but a misinterpreted signal from the British battlecruisers sent them back to their screening positions. This confusion allowed the German light cruisers to slip away and warn hipper to the location of the British cruisers. The German battlecruisers wheeled to the northeast of the British troops and fled.
Both the British and the Germans were disappointed that they were able to effectively engage their opponents. The reputation of Admiral Ingenohls suffered greatly as a result of his shyness. The captain of Moltke was furious, he stated that Ingenohl had turned back because he was afraid of 11 British destroyers which could be eliminated.under the current leadership we will not achieve anything". The official German history criticized Ingenohl for failing to use his light forces to determine the size of the British fleet, stating: "he decided on a measure which not only jeopardized his advance forces from the English coast but also deprived the German fleet of a signal and certain victory."

2.2. Service. Battle of Dogger Bank. (Битва при Доггер Банке)
In early January 1915, the German naval command became aware that British ships was exploration in the area of the Dogger Banks. Admiral Ingenohl first reluctant to try to destroy these forces, because I reconnaissance group was temporarily weakened while von der Tann was in drydock for periodic maintenance. Konteradmiral Richard Eckermann, the chief of staff of the high seas fleet, insisted on the operation, and so Ingenohl relented and ordered hipper to take his battlecruisers to the Dogger Bank. 23 January, hipper sortied, with Seydlitz in the lead, followed by Moltke, with derfflinger, and blücher, along with the light cruisers Graudenz, Rostock, Stralsund, and Kolberg and 19 torpedo boats from V flotilla and II and XVIII half-flotillas. Graudenz and Stralsund was assigned to the front screen, while Kolberg and Rostock was assigned to the Board and left, respectively. Each light cruiser attached was half flotilla of torpedo boats.
Again, interception and decryption of German wireless signals played an important role. Although they were unaware of the exact plans, the cryptographers of Room 40 deduced that hipper would be conducting an operation in the area of the Dogger Banks. To confront him, Beattys 1st cruiser squadron, rear Admiral Archibald Moores 2nd battlecruiser squadron and Commodore William Goodenoughs 2nd light cruiser squadron were to meet with Commodore Reginald Tyrwhitts Harwich force at 08:00 on 24 January, approximately 30 miles 48 km North of the Dogger Bank.
At 08:14, Kolberg noticed a light cruiser Aurora and several destroyers from the Harwich force. Aurora challenged Kolberg with a search light, at which point Kolberg attacked Aurora and scored two times. Aurora returned fire and hit twice on Kolberg in retaliation. Hipper immediately turned his battlecruisers to the gunfire, when, almost simultaneously, Stralsund spotted a large amount of smoke to the Northwest of their position. It was defined as a number of large British warships moved to the ships hippies.
Hipper turned South to flee, but was limited to 23 knots, 43 km / h 26 km / h, the maximum speed of the older armored cruiser blücher. The pursuing British battlecruisers were steaming at 27 knots 50 km / h 31 miles / hour, and quickly caught up with the German ships. At 09:52, cruiser lion opened fire on blücher from a range of approximately 20.000 yards of 18.300 m, shortly thereafter, Queen Mary and Tiger began also to fire. At 10:09, the British guns made their first hit on blücher. Two minutes later, the German ships began returning fire, mostly concentrating on Lion, from 18.000 15.460 m. 10:28, lion was struck on the waterline, which tore a hole in the side of the ship and flooded a coal bunker. At 10:30, New Zealand, the fourth ship in accordance Beattys, arrived in the zone of blücher and opened fire. By 10:35, the range had closed to 17.500 yards 16.000 m, then the entire German line was within the effective range of the British ships. Beatty ordered his battlecruisers to engage their German counterparts. Confusion aboard Tiger led the captain that he was to shoot at Seydlitz, Moltke, who left able to fire without distraction. In this period of the battle, derfflinger was once hit, but the shell did only minor damage. Two armor plates in the hull were forced inward and some of the protective coal bunkers were flooded.
At 10:40, one of lion 13.5 cm 34 shells punched Seydlitz causing nearly catastrophic damage that knocked out both rear turrets and killed 159 people. The Executive officer ordered the flooding of both magazines to avoid a flash fire that would have destroyed the ship. By this time, the German battlecruisers had zeroed in on Lion, scoring repeated hits. At 11:01, 11 in 28 cm shell from Seydlitz struck lion and knocked out two of her dynamos. At 11:18, two Derfflingers 12 in 30 cm shells hit Lion, one of which struck the waterline and penetrated the belt, allowing seawater to enter the port feed tank. Lion had to turn off its engines due to the pollution of sea water and, consequently, fell out of line.
By this time, blücher was severely damaged after it had been occupied by heavy shells. The chase ended when there were several reports of submarines on the eve of the British ships, Beatty quickly ordered maneuvers, which allowed the German ships to increase the distance to their pursuers. At this time a lion with the last operational Dynamo failed, which dropped her speed to 15 knots 28 km / h. Beatty, in the stricken lion, ordered the remaining battlecruisers to "engage the enemys rear", but the bewilderment caused the signal for the ships to solely target blücher, allowing Moltke, Seydlitz, and derfflinger to escape. Blücher was hit by over 70 shells from the British cruisers in the battle. Badly damaged the ship rolled over and sank at about 13:10. When Beatty regained control over his ships, after boarded Princess Royal, the German ships was too great for the British to catch them at 13:50, he was interrupted by chase.

2.3. Service. Bombardment of Yarmouth and Lowestoft. (Обстрел Ярмута и Лоустофта)
Derfflinger also took part in the bombardment of Yarmouth and Lowestoft on 24-25 April 1916. Hipper was on sick leave, so the German ships were under the command of Konteradmiral Friedrich Boedicker. Derfflinger, her newly commissioned sister ship Lutzow, and the veterans Moltke, Seydlitz and von der Tann left the jade estuary at 10:55 on 24 April. They were supported by a screening force of 6 light cruisers and two flotillas of torpedo boats. Heavy units of the high seas Fleet under Admiral Reinhard Scheer, sailed at 13:40, with the aim of providing remote support for Boedickers ships. The British Admiralty became aware of the German sortie through the interception of German wireless signals, and deploy the Grand fleet at 15:50.
By 14:00, Boedickers ships reached a position Off Norderney, at which point he turned his ships northward to avoid the Dutch observers on the island of Terschelling. At 15:38, Seydlitz struck a mine which exploded 50 feet 15 m hole in its hull, just overboard broadside torpedo tube, allowing 1.400 1.250 short tons long tons of water inside the ship. Seydlitz turned the screen of light cruisers, at a speed of 15 knots 28 km / h 17 km / h. the Four remaining cruisers immediately turned South in the direction of Norderney to avoid further mine damage. To 16:00, Seydlitz away from the impending danger, so the ship stopped to allow Boedicker to go. The torpedo boat V28 brought Boedicker in Lutzow.
At 04:50 on 25 April, the German battlecruisers were approaching Lowestoft when the light cruisers Rostock and Elbing, which had covered the southern flank, spotted the light cruisers and destroyers of Commodore force Tyrwhitts Harwich. Boedicker refused to be distracted by the British ships, and instead trained his ships guns on Lowestoft. At a distance of about 13.000 m 14.000 m, the German battlecruisers destroyed two 6 in 15 cm shore batteries and inflicted other damage in the city, including the destruction of about 200 houses.
At 05:20, the German raiders turned North, towards Yarmouth, which they reached by 05:42. Visibility was so poor that the German ships fired one salvo each, with the exception of derfflinger, which fired fourteen rounds from her main battery. The German ships turned back South, and at 05:47 faces the second time the Harwich force, who then participated in the six light cruisers of the screening force. Boedickers ships opened fire from a range of 13.000 12.000 yards M. tyrwhitt immediately turned his ships around and fled South, but not before the cruiser conquest sustained severe damage. Due to reports of British submarines and torpedo attacks, Boedicker interrupted the chase and turned back East towards the high seas Fleet. At this point, Scheer, who had been warned of the Grand fleet sortie from Scapa Flow, turned back towards Germany.

2.4. Service. Deployment. (Развертывание)
Almost immediately after the Lowestoft RAID, Scheer began planning another foray into the North sea. It was initially intended to begin in mid-may, but the damage mine Seidlitz difficult to repair and Scheer does not want to embark on a major RAID without his battlecruiser forces at full strength. At noon on may 28, repair Seydlitz was finally completed and the ship returned to the I reconnaissance group.
Derfflinger and the rest of the hippies I scouting group battlecruisers lay anchored in the outer roads of jade in the night of 30 may 1916. The following morning, at 02:00 CET, the ships steamed out towards the Skagerrak at a speed of 16 knots 30 km / h 18 km / h. Derfflinger was the second ship in the line of five, ahead of Seydlitz, and to the rear of the Lutzow, the group flagship. The second reconnaissance group, consisting of the light cruisers Frankfurt, Boedickers flagship, Wiesbaden, Pillau, and Elbing, and 30 torpedo boats of the II, VI, and IX flotillas, accompanied by the hippie cruisers.
Half an hour later, in the high seas fleet left the jade, the force was composed of 16 dreadnoughts. In the open sea fleet was attached to IV reconnaissance group composed of the light cruisers Stettin, Munich, Hamburg, Frauenlob, and Stuttgart, and 31 torpedo boats of the I, III, and V, and VII flotillas, headed by the light cruiser Rostock. Six pre-dreadnoughts of the second battle squadron had departed from the Elbe roads at 02:45, and pass it to the combat fleet at 05:00.

2.5. Service. Run to the south. (Бегите на юг)
Shortly before 16:00, a group of hippies faced six ships of Vice-Admiral Beattys 1st and 2nd squadrons of the cruiser. The German ships were the first to open fire, in the range of about 15.000 yards 14.000 m. When the British ships began returning fire, confusion amongst the British battlecruisers resulted in Moltke engagement of New Zealand and Tiger. The British rangefinders had misread the range to their German targets, and so the first salvos fired on the British ships fell a mile past the German cruisers. Due to errors in British communication, derfflinger was not engaged during the first 10 minutes of battle. Later derfflinger officer-gunnery, Corvette-captain Georg von Hase noted that "some errors we did not get. I laughed grimly and now I began to engage our enemy quietly, as a tool of practice, and with continually increasing accuracy." At 17:03, the British battlecruiser HMS indefatigable exploded after 15 minutes of gunfire from von der Tann. Soon after the second half of the Beattys forces, the four Queen Elizabeth class battleships of the 5th battle squadron, came into range and began firing at von der Tann and Moltke.
After serious damage to Lutzow on Lion, derfflinger lost sight of the British ship, and so at 17:16 transferred her fire to the "Queen Mary". Seidlitz also the involvement of Queen Mary, and under fire from two cruisers, the "Queen Mary" was repeatedly hit in quick succession. Observers in New Zealand and Tiger ships behind and ahead, respectively, reported three shells from a salvo of four struck the ship at the same time. Followed by another two hits and a giant explosion erupted on the midsection, billowing clouds of black smoke poured from the burning ship, which was divided into two parts. The leading ships of the German high seas fleet to 18:00 come in effective range of the British battlecruisers and Queen Elizabeth -class battleships and had begun trading shots with them. Between 18:09 and 18:19, derfflinger was hit by a 38 cm 15 in shell from Barham and valiant. At 18:55, derfflinger was hit again, this shell struck the bow and tore a hole that allowed some 300 tons of water to enter the ship.

2.6. Service. Battlefleets engage. (Потом заниматься)
Shortly after 19:00, the German cruiser Wiesbaden had become disabled by a shell from the cruiser invincible, the German battlecruisers made a 16-point turn to the northeast and made for the crippled cruiser at high speed. At 19:15, they spotted the British armored cruiser defence, which had joined the attack on Wiesbaden. Hipper initially hesitated, believing the ship was the German cruiser Rostock, but at 19:16, the captain of the LRC to see harder Lutzow commander, ordered his ships guns to fire. Other German battlecruisers and battleships joined in the melee, defence was struck by several heavy-caliber shells from the German ships. One salvo penetrated the ships with ammo and a massive explosion destroyed the cruiser.
19:24, the 3rd battlecruiser squadron was formed with the remaining Beattys battlecruisers ahead of the German line. The leading British ships noticed Lutzow and derfflinger and began to shoot at him. Within eight minutes, the battlecruiser invincible scored eight hits on Lutzow. Instead, like Lutzow and derfflinger concentrated their fire on his antagonist, and at 19:31, derfflinger fired her last salvo at unbeatable. Shortly thereafter the forward magazine detonated and the ship disappeared in a series of massive explosions.
To 19:30, in the high seas fleet, which was at that time the achievements of the British cruisers, had not yet encountered the Grand fleet. Scheer had been considering retirement of his forces before darkness exposed his ships to torpedo attack boats. He has not yet made a decision when his leading battleships encountered the main part of the Grand fleet. This development made it impossible for Scheer to retreat, for that would have sacrificed the slower pre-dreadnought battleships of the second battle squadron. If he chose to use his dreadnoughts and battlecruisers to cover their retreat, he would have subjected his strongest ships to overwhelming British fire. Instead, Scheer ordered his ships to turn 16 points to starboard, bringing the pre-dreadnoughts to the relative safety of the disengaged side of the German front line.
Derfflinger and the other battlecruisers followed the move, which put them back to Koenig. Hippie badly battered ships gained a temporary respite, and uncertainty over the precise location and rate Scheers ships led Admiral Jellicoe to deploy his ships eastward, towards what he thought was the likely escape route of the Germans. Instead, the German fleet was Sailing West, but Scheer ordered a second 16 a reversal, which changed course and sent ships to the center of the British fleet. The German fleet came under intense fire from the British line, and Scheer sent derfflinger, Seydlitz, Moltke and von der Tann at high speed towards the British fleet, in an attempt to disrupt their formation and gain time for his main force to retreat. 20:17, the German battlecruisers had closed to within yards 7.700 7.000 M. Colossus, and at this point Scheer directed the ships to attract the leading ship of the English line. Three minutes later, the German battlecruisers turned in retreat, covered by attack by torpedo boats.

2.7. Service. Withdrawal. (Вывод)
Pause in the battle at dusk about 20:20 to 21:10 is allowed derfflinger and the other German battlecruisers to destroy the wreckage that prevented guns, extinguish fires, repair the fire control and signal equipment, and prepare the searchlights for nighttime action. During this period, the German fleet reorganized into an ordered formation in reverse order, when the German light forces were encountered the British screen shortly after 21:00. The resumption of the attack got Beattys attention, so he turned his battlecruisers westward. At 21:09, he saw the German battlecruisers, and drew within meters 8.500 7.800 m before opening fire at 21:20. In the ensuing battle, derfflinger was hit several times, at 21:34, a heavy shell struck her last operational turret and disable it. The German ships returned fire with every available gun, and at 21:32 hit like a lion and Princess in the darkness. The maneuvering of the German battlecruisers forced the leading battle squadron to turn westward to avoid collision. This brought the pre-dreadnoughts of the second battle squadron directly between the two lines of cruisers. Thus, it prevented the British ships from pursuing their German colleagues, when they turned South. The British battlecruisers opened fire on the old battleships, the German ships turned southwest to bring all their weapons to bear against English ships. This meeting lasted only a few minutes before Admiral mauve turned his ships 8-points to starboard, the British inexplicably did not pursue.
Towards the end of the battle, at 03:55, hipper submitted a report to Admiral Scheer informing him of the tremendous damage his ships had suffered. By that time, derfflinger and von der Tann had only two operational guns each, Moltke was flooded with 1.000 tons of water, Lutzow was sunk, and Seydlitz was badly damaged. Hipper reported: "I intelligence the group was bigger, so there is no value for a serious engagement, and was consequently directed to return to port, the commander-in-chief, while he himself determined to await developments from the horns reef with combat."
During the battle, derfflinger was hit 17 times by heavy caliber shells and nine times by secondary guns. She was in dock for repairs until 15 October. Derfflinger fired 385 shells from her main battery, another 235 rounds from her secondary guns, and torpedoes. Her crew suffered 157 men killed and another 26 men wounded, it had the highest casualty rate on any ship not sunk during the battle. Because of her stalwart resistance at Jutland, the British nicknamed her "iron dog."

2.8. Service. Later operations. (Позже операции)
During the Second world war Helgoland Bay in November 1917, derfflinger sailed from port to assist the German light cruisers of Second scouting group, but by the time she and the other cruisers arrived at the scene, the British raiders had fled northward.
In late 1917, the high seas fleet began to conduct anti-convoy raids in the North sea between Britain and Norway. In October and December, the German cruisers and destroyers intercepted and destroyed two British convoys to Norway. This forced Beatty, now commander of the Grand fleet, to detach several battleships and battlecruisers to protect convoys in the North sea. This presented to Admiral Scheer the opportunity he was waiting the entire war: the chance to isolate and eliminate part of the Great fleet. At 05:00 on 23 April 1918, the high seas fleet left Harbor with the intention of intercepting one of the heavily escorted convoys. Wireless radio traffic was kept to a minimum to prevent the British from learning of the work. By 14:10, the convoy had still not been found, and so Scheer turned the high seas Fleet towards German waters.

2.9. Service. Fate. (Судьба)
Derfflinger was to take part in what would have amounted to the "death ride" of the high seas Fleet shortly before the end of the First world war the main part of the high seas Fleet had sortied from its base in Wilhelmshaven to engage the British Grand fleet, Scheer today GroSadmiral of the fleet-intended to inflict as much damage on the British fleet, in order to preserve the benefits of, fitting for Germany, regardless of the cost of the fleet. While the fleet is consolidating in Wilhelmshaven, war-weary sailors began deserting EN masse. As derfflinger and von der Tann passed through the locks that separated Wilhelmshavens inner Harbor and roadstead, some 300 men from both ships climbed over the side and disappeared ashore.
On 24 October 1918 the order was given to sail from Wilhelmshaven. Starting on the night of 29 October, sailors mutinied on several battleships, three ships of the third squadron refused to raise anchor and ships Thuringen and Helgoland reported acts of sabotage. The order to sail had been cancelled in the face of this open revolt. Next month, the German revolution toppled the monarchy and soon after the armistice that ended the war.
After Germanys surrender, the allies demanded that a large part of the high seas Fleet be interned in the British naval base in Scapa Flow. November 21, 1918 under the command of rear Admiral Ludwig von Reuter, the ships sailed from their base in Germany for the last time. The fleet met with light cruiser Cardiff, before meeting a massive flotilla of some 370 British, American, and French warships for the voyage to Scapa Flow. Once the ships were interned, their breech blocks were removed and deprived of their weapons.
The fleet remained in captivity during the negotiations that eventually led to the Treaty of Versailles. It became apparent to Reuter that the British intended to seize the German ships on 21 June, which was the deadline by which Germany had signed a peace Treaty. Unaware that the deadline has been extended until June 23rd, Reuter ordered his ships be sunk. On the morning of 21 June the British fleet left Scapa Flow to conduct training maneuvers. With most of the British fleet away, Reuter gave the order to his ships at 11:20. Derfflinger sank at 14:45. The ship was raised in 1939 and was anchored, still capsized off the island of Risa until 1946. Then derfflinger was sent to the port of Faslane are broken and 1948. The ships bell was taken into the Federal Navy on 30 August 1965.

  • Derfflinger may refer to: In warships: SMS Derfflinger a battlecruiser of the Imperial German Navy, launched in 1913 Derfflinger - class battlecruiser
  • The Derfflinger class was a class of three battlecruisers German: Schlachtkreuzer of the Imperial German Navy. The ships were ordered for the 1912 13
  • when he was 84 years old. Derfflinger died at his estates in Gusow. The Imperial German Navy s battlecruiser SMS Derfflinger was named after him. Gerd - Ulrich
  • SMS Lutzow was the second Derfflinger - class battlecruiser built by the German Kaiserliche Marine English: Imperial Navy before World War I. Ordered
  • Battle of Jutland, when the ship was sunk by the German ships SMS Seydlitz and SMS Derfflinger The Pennell Coast of Victoria Land, Antarctica, is named after
  • SMS Hindenburg was a battlecruiser of the German Kaiserliche Marine Imperial Navy the third ship of the Derfflinger class, built to a slightly modified
  • SMS Moltke was the lead ship of the Moltke - class battlecruisers of the German Imperial Navy, named after the 19th - century German Field Marshal Helmuth
  • previous Derfflinger class was armed with 30.5 - centimeter 12 in guns, though some consideration had been given to redesigning the last two ships - SMS Lutzow
  • SMS G40 was a 1913 Type Large Torpedo Boat GroSes Torpedoboot of the Imperial German Navy Deutschen Kaiserliche Marine during World War I, and the
  • SMS G38 was a 1913 Type Large Torpedo Boat GroSes Torpedoboot of the Imperial German Navy Kaiserliche Marine during World War I, and the 14th ship
  • SMS V45 was a 1913 Type Large Torpedo Boat GroSes Torpedoboot of the Imperial German Navy during World War I, and the 21st ship of her class. Built
  • the armored cruiser SMS Yorck. Two months after the outbreak of World War I, he was made captain of the battlecruiser SMS Derfflinger which he also commanded
  • Mary, and Derfflinger and Lutzow together destroyed Invincible. The five remaining battlecruisers - Von der Tann, Moltke, Seydlitz, Derfflinger and Hindenburg - were
  • SMS G39 SMS G40 SMS G41 SMS G42 SMS V43 SMS V44 SMS V45 SMS V46 SMS V47 SMS V48 SMS S49 SMS S50 SMS S51 SMS S52 SMS S53 SMS S54 SMS S55 SMS S56 SMS S57
  • British government returned the bell from SMS Hindenburg on 28 May 1959 and the bells from SMS Derfflinger and SMS Friedrich der Grosse on 30 August 1965
  • SMS Blucher was the last armored cruiser built by the German Empire. She was designed to match what German intelligence incorrectly believed to be the
  • der Grosse, Scapa Flow 1938: SMS Grosser Kurfurst, Scapa Flow 1939: SMS Derfflinger Scapa Flow 1947: HMS Iron Duke, Scapa Flow 1952: SS Oljaren, Pentland
  • SMS G39 was a 1913 Type Large Torpedo Boat GroSes Torpedoboot of the Imperial German Navy Kaiserliche Marine during World War I, and the 15th ship
  • SMS Vulkan was a U - boat salvage tug in the Kaiserliche Marine laid down in 1907 and commissioned 1908. The ship displaced 1595 tons and had a top speed
  • killed in the Battle of Jutland, when HMS Queen Mary was destroyed by SMS Derfflinger aged 16. The First Reader s Ticket Brief biographies National
  • SMS Seydlitz was a battlecruiser of the German Kaiserliche Marine Imperial Navy built in Hamburg. She was ordered in 1910 and commissioned in May 1913
  • SMS Konig Albert was the fourth vessel of the Kaiser class of battleships of the Imperial German Navy. Konig Albert s keel was laid on 17 July 1910 at
  • SMS Von der Tann was the first battlecruiser built for the German Kaiserliche Marine, as well as Germany s first major turbine - powered warship. At the
  • SMS Coln was a light cruiser in the German Kaiserliche Marine, the second to bear this name, after her predecessor SMS Coln had been lost in the Battle
  • and 35 destroyers 1st Scouting Group: SMS Seydlitz, Moltke, SMS Derfflinger and SMS Blucher 2nd Scouting Group: SMS Kolberg, Stralsund, Rostock, and Graudenz
  • SMS Strassburg 1911 1914, Konig - class battleship SMS Konig 1913 1917, Derfflinger - class battlecruiser SMS Hindenburg 1915 - - - - Mackensen - class battlecruiser
  • SMS Baden was a Bayern - class dreadnought battleship of the German Imperial Navy built during World War I. Launched in October 1915 and completed in March
  • SMS Grosser Kurfurst was the second battleship of the four - ship Konig class. Grosser Kurfurst or GroSer Kurfurst served in the German Imperial Navy
  • KAdm Franz Hipper SMS Seydlitz flagship Kapt.z.S. Moritz von Egidy GE SMS Moltke: Kapt.z.S. Magnus von Levetzow GE SMS Derfflinger Kapt.z.S. Ludwig
  • superior enemy force Acasta was hit by two 5.9 - inch 150 mm shells from SMS Derfflinger which left her with six dead and one wounded, and unable to stop or

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SMS Derfflinger served the Imperial German Navy of World War 1 1914 1918 as a battlecruiser. She was the lead ship of the three strong. SMS Derfflinger Steel Navy. SMS Derfflinger I. Posted on July 22, 2018 by MSW. Length: 210m. Beam: 29.0m. Draught: 9.20m. Displacement: 26.600 tonnes. Armament: 8 30.5cm L 50. GroSe Kruezer of the Derfflinger Class Imperial German Navy in. Ship Review: SMS Derfflinger. The Derfflinger class was the last class of German battlecruisers in WWI, and arguably the best looking, too. While Lutzow was the. German Kaiserliche Marine Battlecruiser SMS Derfflinger – 1913. SMS Derfflinger. No description defined. Traditional Chinese. 德弗林格爾號戰列巡洋艦. No description defined. 德弗林格號戰列巡洋艦 德夫林格.

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SMS Derfflinger was a battlecruiser of the German Kaiserliche Marine built just before the outbreak of World War I. She was the lead vessel of her class of. SMS Derfflinger Ausgleich of 1917 Alternative History Fandom. SMS Derfflinger translation in German English Reverso dictionary, see also ​derangiert,Dreckfinger,daherfliegen,dermalig, examples, definition, conjugation​.

Derfflinger class Battlecruiser 1:1100 Diecast Model Eaglemoss.

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SMS Derfflinger, 1916 Stock Photo Alamy.

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There were once two battlecruisers, on opposite sides. HMS Queen Mary with the British, and SMS Derfflinger with the Germans. One day, it was discovered that. Derfflinger class battlecruiser pedia. SMS Derfflinger Battlecruiser 1914. Original image dimensions: 3277 x 1681px. You are not logged in: the resolution of the images is restricted to a maximum. Hunter 1 700 SMS Derfflinger 1916 deck masking sheet for Flyhawk. Normal version Flyhawk FH1300 1 700 SMS Derfflinger 1916. Fashionable 790 platform flat form model: canvas shoes for women with a 4 cm platform flat form,.

SMS Derfflinger.

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SMS Derfflinger Warship, Navy ships, Battleship Pinterest.

Keyboard Shortcuts. Keyboard shortcuts are available for common actions and site navigation. View Keyboard Shortcuts Dismiss this message. Blueprints Ships Germany SMS Derfflinger. 1 1100 Scale Battlecruiser SMS Derfflinger Length: 7.5, Width: 1 THIS MODEL IS A JAPANESE IMPORT. THE TEXT ON THE DISPLAY PLATE IS IN. Derfflinger class battlecruiser Class of ship. Продолжительность: 4:28.

Recommended book on SMS Derfflinger?

Post by mstary1 » Fri Oct 05, 2018 3:17 am

Hey everyone. I was undecided on whether to put this request in this folder or hypothetical naval scenarios?
I've written a naval fiction book, approx 125,000 words long which revolves around the battlecruiser Derfflinger.
The story follows the career of a young Sub-Lieutenant from Jutland all the way to the 1950's. His nemesis of course is the Derfflinger,
which is not scuttled at Scapa Flow but fights again in the Second World War. The main character must prove to the admiralty that the Derfflinger is back and on the high seas in 1940 and not lying upside down at Scapa flow.

What I'm looking for good reference books on the Lutzow class and German battlecruisers in general, also perhaps the Scharnhorst class as the refitted Derfflinger takes some characteristics of that class of ship. I want to make sure my research is accurate on the Derfflinger to ensure plausibility of my novel. So if anyone can recommend good books on the class, I would be in your debt.

Lähes koko sodan ajan laivaston 1. tiedusteluryhmään kuulunut alus otti osaa Doggermatalikon taisteluun, jossa siihen osui kolme 13,5 tuuman kranaattia. Osumat eivät kuitenkaan aiheuttaneet merkittäviä vaurioita. Skagerrakin taistelun aikana alus ampui yksitoista täyslaidallista Britannian Kuninkaallisen laivaston taisteluristeilijä HMS Queen Maryyn tuhoten sen. Alus kärsi myös itse mittavia vaurioita, kun siihen osui kymmenen 15 tuuman, yksi 13,5 tuuman ja kymmenen 12 tuuman kranaattia. Aluksen taaemmat tykkitornit muuttuivat käyttökelvottomiksi HMS Revengen ampumien 15 tuuman kranaattien sytytettyä torneissa olleet ajopanokset tuleen. Aiemmin alukseen osuneet 15 tuuman kranaatit olivat aiheuttaneet vuodon aluksen etuosastoissa. Taistelun loppuessa alukseen oli vuotanut 3 350 tonnia vettä, mistä määrästä 1 020 tonnia oli tarkoituksella laskettu alukseen sammutettaessa takatornien tulipaloja ja 206 tonnia vakaamaan aluksen kallistumaa. [1]

Sodan päättyessä laiva internoitiin Kuninkaallisen laivaston tukikohtaan Scapa Flow’ssa, jossa sen oma miehistö upotti sen myöhemmin Versailles’n rauhan epäedullisten ehtojen vuoksi. Alus nostettiin 1934, minkä jälkeen se romutettiin. [1]


Derfflinger byl zapojený do několika bojových akcí první světové války. Podílel se na bombardování anglických pobřežních měst, stejně jako bitvy u Dogger Banku a bitvy u Jutska, kde její houževnatý odpor vedl k tomu, že mu britové začali přezdívat „Iron Dog“ (železný pes). Loď byla částečně zodpovědná za potopení dvou britských bitevních křižníků u Jutska - Derfflinger zničil bitevní křižník HMS Queen Mary, zatímco bitevní křižník Seydlitz a sesterská loď Lützow pomáhaly k potopení bitevního křižníku HMS Invincible.

Po příměří v listopadu 1918 byl Derfflinger internován spolu ostatními loděmi německé oceánské flotily na Scapa Flow. Dne 21. června 1919 v 14:45 ho zde během tzv. incidentu ve Scapa Flow potopila vlastní posádka, aby se nedostal do rukou vítězů války.


Die Derfflinger war das Typschiff der Derfflinger-Klasse, die aus drei Einheiten bestand und auf das Einzelschiff SMS Seydlitz folgte.

War die Seydlitz noch von der Konstruktion eine Fortsetzung der älteren Schlachtkreuzer der kaiserlichen Marine, so erarbeitete man mit der Derfflinger eine vollkommen neue Konstruktion. Der Hauptunterschied zu den Vorgängerschiffen lag vor allem in der Steigerung des Kalibers der Hauptartillerie von 280 mm auf 305 mm. Damit lag man zwar noch unter dem Kaliber der vergleichbaren britischen Schlachtkreuzer, jedoch waren die deutschen Granaten von besserer Qualität und ihre Durchschlagskraft den britischen Gegenstücken vollkommen ebenbürtig, da die deutschen Geschütze eine größere Mündungsgeschwindigkeit hatten. Eine weitere Neukonstruktion war die Anordnung der Hauptartillerie in der Mittelschiffslinie. Hierbei wurden die Türme jeweils am Bug und am Heck hintereinander angeordnet, so dass die inneren Türme die äußeren überschießen konnten. Die Vorgängerschiffe hatten noch eine asymmetrische Anordnung im Mittelschiff mit seitlich versetzten „Flügeltürmen“ besessen.

Die Derfflinger war ferner der erste Schlachtkreuzer in Glattdeckbauweise. Alle Vorgängerschiffe hatten vom Bug bis zum Heck eine absteigende Deckanzahl. Sie war damit mit ihren Schwestern das einzige Großkampfschiff der kaiserlichen Marine, das mit dieser Neuerung in Dienst gestellt wurde. Diese Bauweise war dadurch möglich geworden, dass man das Schiff im Vergleich zu den Vorgängern deutlich verlängerte und so eine lange Back erzielte, welche die Geschütze vor überkommendem Wasser schützen konnte. Gleichzeitig wurde der Bug ebenfalls neu konstruiert: er war über der Wasserlinie vollkommen senkrecht ausgelegt. Die Schiffe der Derfflinger-Klasse waren dadurch elegant geschnitten und wurden als die schönsten Großkampfschiffe der kaiserlichen Marine angesehen.

Im Zuge der Reparaturen nach der Skagerrakschlacht wurde der vordere schmale Röhrenmast entfernt und als achterer (hinterer) Mast um 180 Grad gedreht wieder eingesetzt, während vorn ein neuer Dreibeinmast eingesetzt wurde, wie ihn die neuesten deutschen Großkampfschiffe der Bayern-Klasse besaßen, um einen Artillerieleitstand und einen Beobachtungsstand aufzunehmen.

Die Schlachten an der Doggerbank und im Skagerrak hatten die Standfestigkeit der Derfflinger unter Beweis gestellt und gleichzeitig das britische Missverhältnis zwischen Panzerung auf der einen und Hauptartillerie und Maschinenanlage auf der anderen Seite gezeigt. In beiden Schlachten war das Schiff erheblich beschädigt worden, konnte jedoch die Heimreise mit eigener Kraft antreten und war nach kurzer Werftüberholung wieder voll einsatzbereit. Spätere Bewertungen kamen zu dem Urteil, dass die Derfflinger ihren britischen Pendants ebenbürtig, wenn nicht sogar überlegen gewesen ist.

Dieses vorteilhafte Verhältnis zwischen Panzerung, Geschwindigkeit und Hauptbewaffnung konnte von einigen Schwächen, wie der geringeren Geschwindigkeit und dem Geschossgewicht einer Breitseite gegenüber gleichaltrigen britischen Schiffen, nicht beeinträchtigt werden.

Ein Manko der Schiffe der Derfflinger-Klasse war der Torpedoraum im Bug, der dem Schwesterschiff SMS Lützow in der Skagerrakschlacht zum Verhängnis werden sollte.

Beim Stapellauf am 14. Juni 1913 ereignete sich eine Panne: das Schiff blieb nach wenigen Zentimetern stecken und saß fest. Erst am 12. Juli wurde das Schiff schließlich zu Wasser gelassen. Taufpate und Taufredner war General August von Mackensen.

Erster Weltkrieg Bearbeiten

Die Derfflinger hatte ihren ersten Einsatz am 16. Dezember 1914 beim Angriff auf die britische Küste bei Scarborough und Whitby. Am 25. Januar 1915 war die Derfflinger am Gefecht auf der Doggerbank beteiligt, wo das Schiff einen Treffer erhielt. [2]

Am 31. Mai 1916 nahm die Derfflinger an der Skagerrakschlacht teil. Dort trug sie zur Versenkung der britischen Schlachtkreuzer HMS Queen Mary und HMS Invincible bei, musste aber im Gefecht selbst siebzehn schwere Treffer hinnehmen. Während der Schlacht musste das Schiff einmal völlig stoppen, um die Torpedoschutznetze zu klarieren, die in die Schrauben zu geraten drohten. In dieser Schlacht verschoss sie die größte Anzahl großkalibriger Granaten aller deutschen Schiffe, nämlich 385 Stück 30,5 cm und 235 Stück 15 cm. Vier der schweren Geschütze wurden unbrauchbar, weil beide achtere Doppeltürme C und D nach einem Volltreffer ausbrannten. Nur ein Mann der beiden Turmbesatzungen überlebte.

Berühmt wurde das Schiff vor allem durch die sogenannte Todesfahrt der deutschen Schlachtkreuzer, als nach der zweiten Gefechtskehrtwendung unter Führung ihres Kapitäns z.S. Hartog die verbliebenen deutschen Schlachtkreuzer (das Flaggschiff Lützow und mit ihr Vizeadmiral Hipper waren ausgefallen) in Ausführung von Vizeadmiral Scheers Befehl „Schlachtkreuzer ran an den Feind! – voll einsetzen!“ trotz schwerer Treffer zuerst direkt und dann schräg auf die Spitze der britischen Schlachtlinie zusteuerten, um die dritte Gefechtskehrtwendung des deutschen Gros zu erleichtern, das sich so vom Gegner wieder lösen wollte. Die britischen Seeleute gaben ihr infolge dieser Episode den Spitznamen „Iron dog“ (dt.: Eiserner Hund) in der Vorstellung einer Bulldogge, die sich an ihrem Gegner festbeißt. Schwer beschädigt und mit 157 toten Besatzungsmitgliedern erreichte die Derfflinger trotz Einbruchs von ca. 3000 t Wasser aus eigener Kraft Wilhelmshaven. In Kiel erfolgten bis zum November 1916 die erforderlichen Reparaturen. Dabei wurden die eher störenden Torpedoschutznetze entfernt, der vordere dünne Röhrenmast als achterer Mast (um 180 Grad gedreht) wiederverwendet und vorn ein neuer Dreibeinmast eingesetzt. Danach wurde ein neues Schießverfahren erprobt. Bis zum Kriegsende nahm die Derfflinger an keinen wesentlichen Einsätzen mehr teil. Beim letzten Flottenvorstoß im April 1918 war sie dabei.

Internierung und Selbstversenkung Bearbeiten

Nach Ende des Krieges wurde die Derfflinger im November 1918 zusammen mit mehr als siebzig Kriegsschiffen der kaiserlichen Flotte in Scapa Flow interniert. Als feststand, dass die Schiffe nicht wieder zurückgegeben werden würden, kam es dort am 21. Juni 1919 auf Befehl von Konteradmiral Ludwig von Reuter zur Selbstversenkung der deutschen Hochseeflotte, bei der auch die Derfflinger um ca. 14:45 Uhr ihr Ende fand.

Bergung des Wracks Bearbeiten

Das Wrack wurde erst im November 1939 gehoben, die Abwrackarbeiten mussten allerdings wegen des Ausbruchs des Zweiten Weltkriegs bis 1948 verschoben werden, weil die Werft in Rosyth für den Kriegsbetrieb benötigt wurde. Während des ganzen Krieges lag die Derfflinger kieloben in Schottland vor Anker, und musste fortwährend gelenzt werden. Sie war das letzte Kriegsschiff der in Scapa Flow selbstversenkten deutschen Flotte, das gehoben wurde. Am 30. August 1965 wurden dem deutschen Marineattaché die geborgene Schiffsglocke und das Dienstsiegel der Derfflinger zum Zeichen der Völkerversöhnung überreicht.

1. September 1914 bis 2. September 1915 Kapitän zur See Ludwig von Reuter
3. September 1915 bis 1. April 1916 Kapitän zur See Paul Heinrich
3. April 1916 bis 3. Dezember 1917 Kapitän zur See Johannes Hartog
4. Dezember 1917 bis 10. November 1918 Kapitän zur See Hans-Carl von Schlick
4. Dezember 1918 bis 21. Juni 1919 Korvettenkapitän Paul Pastuszyk

Schwesterschiffe waren SMS Hindenburg, die ebenfalls in Scapa Flow selbstversenkt wurde, und SMS Lützow, die am 1. Juni 1916 auf dem Rückmarsch von der Skagerrakschlacht aufgegeben und von einem deutschen Torpedoboot versenkt werden musste.

Derfflinger (mit Röhrenmast), Seydlitz und Von der Tann (v.l.n.r) in der Schlacht bei der Doggerbank

Seydlitz führt die Schlachtkreuzer zur Internierung nach Scapa Flow. (v.l.n.r) Seydlitz, Moltke, Hindenburg und Derfflinger

Gefechtsschaden auf der Derfflinger unterhalb der Brücke nach der Skagerrakschlacht 1916

Schema der Panzerdickenverteilung auf den Schiffen der Derfflinger-Klasse

Wrecks in ruins

Although the wrecks of the Tarpon and the Warrior are legally protected as war graves, McCartney said all war wrecks in the area are threatened by illegal salvage operators, who plunder them for the valuable metals inside.

He said the most valuable items are the bronze condensers that were used in many wartime ships&rsquo engines, which are worth tens of thousands of dollars as bronze scrap when melted down.

"We estimate that in the last 10 years, anything up to 1.5 million pounds worth of bronze has been ripped out of these [Jutland] wrecks," McCartney said. "And the majority of those wrecks are also the graves of the sailors who died in the battle, and so it's just wrong that they should be doing this."

McCartney said that salvaging naval vessels without permission from the owning navy is illegal under international law, but very little has been done to protect the wrecks.

"There are millions of shipwrecks on the bottom of the ocean — it's the world's largest museum. And at the moment it's being trashed just for a want of people standing up to their responsibilities," he said.

He said the authorities in Europe, in particular, should track salvage ships and monitor their whereabouts.

"And when they're stopping over wrecks that they're not allowed to be on, then they need to be [inspected] when they get back into harbor," McCartney said.